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Abstract
Mobile devices have consistently advanced in terms of processing power, amount of mem-
ory and functionality. With these advances, the ability to store potentially private or sensi-
tive information on them has increased. Traditional methods for securing mobile devices,
passwords and PINs, are inadequate given their weaknesses and the bursty use patterns that
characterize mobile devices. Passwords and PINs are often shared or weak secrets to amelio-
rate the memory load on device owners. Furthermore, they represent point-of-entry security,
which provides access control but not authentication. Alternatives to these traditional meth-
ods have been suggested. Examples include graphical passwords, biometrics and sketched
passwords, among others. These alternatives all have their place in an authentication tool-
box, as do passwords and PINs, but do not respect the unique needs of the mobile device
environment.
This dissertation presents a continuous, transparent authentication method for mobile devices
called the Transparent Authentication Framework. The Framework uses behavioral biomet-
rics, which are patterns in how people perform actions, to verify the identity of the mobile
device owner. It is transparent in that the biometrics are gathered in the background while
the device is used normally, and is continuous in that verification takes place regularly. The
Framework requires little effort from the device owner, goes beyond access control to pro-
vide authentication, and is acceptable and trustworthy to device owners, all while respecting
the memory and processor limitations of the mobile device environment.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1965, Gordon Moore predicted that the number of transistors on integrated circuits would
double every two years [1]. His prediction, now known as Moore’s Law, has been stated in
a more colloquial manner: the processor speed of computers will double every two years.
Since its inception, this prediction has guided the computer industry, in terms of both re-
search and manufacturing.
Computers continue to improve. Performance increases in terms of memory, processor speed
and functionality with great regularity. This is especially evident with mobile devices. Once
simple telephony tools, mobile devices have become fully-fledged computing environments.
Their features, functionality and near-constant connection to the Internet and mobile service
providers has unbound people from their desktop and laptop computers. This freedom does
not, however, come without cost. The improvements in processor speed, amount of memory,
functionality and features allow us to work (and play) more than ever before. Accordingly,
mobile device popularity has soared – in 2011, 488 million smartphones were sold, which
is more than desktop and laptop computers combined [2]. Their ubiquity and features mean
mobile devices now store more information than ever before, some of it personal or person-
ally identifying [3]. Furthermore, we have come to depend on them to provide access to
services such as email and the Internet, among others, and are often at a loss if they are not
present. Due to the nature and amount of data now stored on these devices, a security method
for protecting access to this information is required.
1.1 The Problem
The motivation for this work comes from several areas. Modern mobile devices are now able
to perform potentially risky tasks such as the ability to store (corporate and personal) data,
and e-transactions such as making purchases or online banking. With such broad access to
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services comes the ability (and responsibility) to store and access increasingly personal (and
personally identifying) information about the device owner and their activities. This in turn
indicates the need for a way of protecting this data from those who should not have access
to it – the authentication problem.
Current authentication methods are known to have issues with strength and memorability [4,
5]. The real issue is not that passwords are broken – they have their place in a toolbox of
authentication schemes, and are particularly useful in situations where humans are excluded.
For instance, computers authenticate to each other, and can remember long, complicated
passwords with ease. The overarching problem is with humans – the memory-load put onto
users to remember several long passwords encourages the use of coping mechanisms such
as reuse and sharing [4, 6]. Furthermore, the bursty nature that characterizes mobile device
use [7, 8] means that the device owner must enter their password frequently. This represents
a significant inconvenience and may encourage the device owner to subvert the security
mechanism.
The problems with current authentication methods are informed by the following standing
issues in computer security, which also provide a basis for this research:
The Password Problem has been described as the willingness of users, despite advice and
requirements to the contrary, to choose weak passwords and share, reuse and write
them down. This problem is based on the proposition that “strong” passwords (i.e.,
those that are difficult to break: long, with various cases, special characters, and num-
bers) are often difficult to create and to remember. This problem is exacerbated when
users require different strong passwords for each of the approximately 25 separate
accounts the average user has [9]. Furthermore, passwords and PINs provide binary
access control. Once the secret knowledge is entered, access to all protected data and
functionality is allowed. In this way, resources are either protected or unprotected;
there is no nuanced control over the level of protection.
Disconnect between Mental Models and Password Security: This problem refers to the
idea that users have a skewed vision of the dangers associated with security methods,
especially with password reuse and sharing. Many users do not believe they are at
risk, or that they have “anything worth having” [10]. Furthermore, the threats linked
with using weak password practices such as identity theft, fraud and account abuse are
considered distant threats by many users. There is no conclusive proof that a strong
password will protect users from such threats, or, conversely, that a weak password
does indeed make them more vulnerable since there is no way to link the possibility
of a threat to an actual instance of the threat’s occurrence. This disconnect between
the mind-model and the security of a password ensures that passwords and similar
authentication methods will be adjusted by users to make them more usable.
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Inflexibility in Authentication Policy creation: In direct response to fears regarding threats
due to password weakness, many organizations have imposed significant authentica-
tion policies on their employees. Such policies, in terms of passwords, define the
required length, character set and change frequency for passwords used to gain access
to company resources. Such policies are known to not only force users to circumvent
them in order to cope [4, 11], but also to provide a reduced search space to potential
attackers.
Other security methods for mobile devices have been proposed, including sketched pass-
words1, biometrics [12–14] and graphical passwords [15, 16]. Each of these solutions also
has issues similar to those with passwords and PINs. They are effortful, have memorability
issues, and provide point-of-entry protection. The solution to this problem should take these
issues into account when proposing an alternative to traditional authentication mechanisms.
1.2 The Solution: Teaching Computers to “Know” Their
Owner
Mobile devices are fully-fledged computing platforms, and this has opened up an attack vec-
tor that is not effectively managed by current authentication mechanisms. Device owners
cope with the current mechanisms in insecure ways. A solution to the mobile device authen-
tication problem is something that is as effortless as possible, and provides protection that
goes beyond point-of-entry security. A solution to the mobile device authentication problem
should have the following attributes:
1. Require less effort than current authentication methods [17];
2. Go beyond access control and point-of-entry solutions to protect data and functionality
at a more granular level [17];
3. Authenticate users continuously to maintain confidence in their identity [17];
4. Provide a security method that is acceptable and considered trustworthy by device
owners;
5. Respect the needs of the mobile device environment in terms of its bursty nature as
well as its limitations in both processor speed and memory.
1http://support.google.com/android/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2381897
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1.3 The Transparent Authentication Framework
This dissertation introduces the Transparent Authentication Framework: a framework to sup-
port the creation of a mechanism that provides continuous, transparent authentication on
mobile devices. The Framework uses patterns in how users perform regular device actions
to affect the mobile device’s knowledge of who is currently using it. In this research, the
mobile device’s level of certainty that the current user is the device owner is called device
confidence. Behavioral biometrics, which are patterns in user actions, are used to inform
device confidence levels. A biometric match increases device confidence, and a non-match
lowers it. The tasks and data on the device are mapped to particular device confidence levels.
For instance, highly private data such as a list of passwords may be assigned a high secu-
rity level. If this level is higher than the current device confidence, then access to the data
or functionality is denied. In the event that the device confidence is too low to accomplish
a particular task, the legitimate device owner may use an explicit authentication method to
increase their device confidence. If the device is no longer being used, the device confidence
will lower over time. Eventually, the user will have access to only very basic functionality,
but device confidence can be increased again via biometrics or explicit authentication.
The Framework provides a solution to the mobile device authentication problem by address-
ing each of the attributes given in the previous section. It does so in the following ways:
Reduces user effort by using behavioral biometrics, which can be gathered while the device
owner uses the device in their normal manner. Two biometrics were tested for this
purpose: keystroke dynamics and speaker verification. The former uses patterns in the
way we type and the latter uses patterns in the way we speak;
Goes beyond access control by using biometrics in combination with explicit methods to
verify the identity of the device owner;
Authenticates continuously by collecting biometrics and using them regularly to increase
device confidence. Storing the biometrics and replacing them with newer samples
frequently further supports the continuous nature by allowing recalculation even when
the device owner is not currently using the device.
Provides an acceptable and trustworthy security method as evidenced by user studies con-
ducted as part of this research.
Respects the limitations of mobile devices by requiring only the hardware already on the
device and minimizing processor and memory use by selecting biometrics and classi-
fiers that are simple and have minimal processing needs.
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These contributions are summarized in Table 1.1. The first column identifies the require-
ments for a transparent authentication method for mobile devices; the second column spec-
ifies how the Transparent Authentication Framework meets the requirement. The third col-
umn lists an attribute provided by the Framework that meets the requirement in question.
The final column shows which chapter of this dissertation contains the explanation or exper-
imental work that supports each stated feature.
Requirement How Met Attribute Chapter
Less user effort Behavioral biometrics Transparency 4, 5
Beyond access
control
Authentication provision,
task mapping
Authentication 3
Continuous
authentication
Continuous device
confidence recalculation, task
mapping
Continuousness 3
Acceptable,
trustworthy
method
User study into perceptions Acceptability,
trustworthiness
7
Respects mobile
environment
Uses minimal hardware and
efficient algorithms
Minimality 6, 7
Table 1.1: How the Transparent Authentication Framework meets the needs for a mobile
device authentication solution.
The Transparent Authentication Framework is a potential solution to the mobile device au-
thentication problem. Its creation is driven by the research question and hypotheses stated in
the next section.
1.4 Research Question
This research is based on the following research question:
It is possible to verify the identity of the current user of a mobile device in
a secure, continuous, transparent and passive manner by using a combination
of behavioral biometrics. Such authentication will not normally require explicit
owner action, but will instead rely on the owner’s usual interaction with the mo-
bile device. Finally, such a transparent authentication method will be acceptable
to device owners.
The following assumptions have been made in carrying out this research:
1. Mobile devices are single user devices (this may not be the case in all countries). This
assumption reduces the complexity of the overarching problem of owner identification
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versus verification. The mobile device user is implicitly claiming a particular identity,
that of device owner, when using the device. Therefore, the only biometric patterns
that the gathered patterns must be compared to are those of the device owner.
2. Behavioral biometrics are not unique to a specific user. Instead, they are relatively
distinctive and stable enough to support authentication in a small population [18–20],
especially when combined into multimodal biometrics.
1.4.1 Research Hypotheses
The following research hypotheses are based on the above research question:
H1: Behavioral biometrics such as keystroke dynamics and speaker verification are suffi-
ciently distinctive to contribute to verification of the identity of a mobile device owner.
H2: Combining keystroke dynamics and speaker verification into a multimodal behavioral
biometric reduces the error rates seen with the individual biometrics.
H3: It is possible to gather keystroke dynamics and speaker verification biometrics while
the mobile device user goes about other tasks on the device.
H4: Mobile device owners would consider using a transparent authentication method if it
was available to them.
A framework that combines the above hypotheses is the major contribution this dissertation
provides. The assertion in this research is that the Framework is device and operating system
independent.
1.5 Main Contributions of this Research
This research contributes new knowledge to the field of mobile device security. Specifically,
it provides the design for a framework upon which continuous, transparent mobile device se-
curity may be based. The Transparent Authentication Framework goes beyond other similar
models by keeping the owner’s private, identifying information on the device and making all
decisions regarding identity on–device. Furthermore, the Framework uses multimodal bio-
metrics to overcome some of the limitations of single biometrics, and allows the developer
who uses the Framework to choose not only the type but also the number of biometrics to
include. Finally, this Framework allows the user to control the mapping of security level to
the tasks and data available on the device; in other similar work, this is left to the developer.
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The following publications have resulted from exploring the research areas described in this
dissertation, as follows:
Heather Crawford and Karen Renaud, “Invisible, Passive, Continuous, and Multimodal
Authentication”. In Proceedings of the Mobile Social Signal Processing Workshop, 2010, to
appear.
Heather Crawford, “Keystroke Dynamics: Characteristics and Opportunities”. In Proceed-
ings of the 8th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security, and Trust (PST), 2010, pp. 205 –
212.
The following papers related to this research are currently under peer review:
Heather Crawford, Karen Renaud and Tim Storer. “A Framework for Continuous, Trans-
parent Mobile Device Authentication”. Submitted to Computers & Security Special Issue on
Active Authentication. (Under revision).
1.6 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation continues with a discussion of the background needed to understand the
studies and research performed for this work, including an overview of the state-of-the-art
in authentication research. Next, the Transparent Authentication Framework is presented
in detail in Chapter 3. Then, the four user studies undertaken to justify the Framework’s
inclusions are presented. These four feasibility studies examine keystroke dynamics (Chap-
ter 4), speaker verification (Chapter 5), combining biometrics into multimodal authentica-
tors (Chapter 6), and finally a study to gather user perceptions of transparent authentication
(Chapter 7). Finally, the security issues inherent in the Framework are discussed in Chap-
ter 8, and the conclusions and future work appear in Chapter 9.
8Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces concepts and current research in the field of authentication. Topics
covered begin with a discussion of current authentication methods and a discussion of the
issues caused by widespread password use. Then, alternatives to passwords and their accep-
tance by users are discussed. The focus of this research is on mobile device authentication, so
subsequent sections focus on methods used on mobile devices. Biometrics, including physi-
ological, behavioral and multimodal are then discussed, along with user acceptance of them,
and methods of measuring biometric performance. The focus of the chapter then shifts to
transparent authentication mechanisms and frameworks that support them, which often use
biometrics as a basis. Finally, pattern classification concepts and research are discussed since
they can be used to support biometric decision-making. The chapter concludes with a de-
scription of the Transparent Authentication Framework and the terminology used throughout
the dissertation. This chapter extends the motivation discussion given in the previous chapter.
2.1 Authentication and Access Control
Authentication and access control are linked concepts that are part of information and system
security. Authentication verifies the identity of one person, process or computer to another.
Access control determines what a person, process or computer may do with the resources
mediated by another person, process or computer. Access control generally requires identi-
fication followed by an authentication step that confirms the validity of the claimed identity.
It is used as a means of limiting resource access to those who are pre-approved [21], and as
a means of implementing a measure of accountability when using the protected resources.
The access control problem has three components: identification, authentication and autho-
rization [22]. This chapter (and research) is concerned with the first two of these components.
User authentication, a special case of the broader topic of authentication, begins when a user
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claims an identity, either explicitly by providing a username or a card with a chip that holds
an identity, or implicitly by possessing a device. Next, the user provides some evidence to
support this claim. This evidence is used to authenticate the user; if successful, the user is
granted access to a protected resource. The authorization component mediates this stage by
determining what resources may be accessed.
Authentication mechanisms are traditionally built upon one or more of the following three
types of factors [22]:
1. Something you know: This is a secret that the user shares with the authentication sys-
tem, such as a password, PIN or answer to a challenge question. This factor is known
as a secret-knowledge technique. This recall-based method is often used as a form of
authentication despite the fact that it can allow access to anyone who knows the shared
secret rather than to a specific person. Secret knowledge can also be easy to share and
to guess.
2. Something you have: These are usually tokens such as a smartcard, RFID chip, keyfob
or other hardware token. This factor can be combined with something you know to
provide additional security. Physical objects such as this can be easy to share with
others, and can be lost or stolen. To manage theft and loss, there must be a method
of canceling those tokens that are no longer possessed by the intended owner, which
adds complexity to systems that use them. Users tend to find tokens cumbersome and
inconvenient despite their widespread use [23].
3. Something you are: Biometrics, both physiological and behavioral, can be used to sup-
port authentication. The latter is also referred to as something you do. Biometrics can
be more difficult to impersonate or forge compared to knowledge or possessions, but
are computationally more difficult to process. They can require more hardware than
other methods, although behavioral biometrics often do not. Physiological examples
include fingerprints, iris and retina scans and facial recognition. Behavioral examples
include typing, voice–related and device use patterns.
These types of factors are related to each other as shown in Figure 2.1. For instance,
keystroke dynamics measures typing patterns, and can be combined with secret knowledge
entry, such as typing a password. Behavioral biometrics are an example of both something
you are and know since our experiences and skills affect how we perform such actions, such
as typing.
As research into authentication has progressed, more factors have been suggested, such as
the following:
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Something 
you have Something you know
Something 
you are
Physiological 
BiometricsBank card
Token
Password
PIN
Behavioral 
Biometrics
Bank card 
w/ PIN
Figure 2.1: Relationship between the three access control factors.
1. Someone you know: Using Bluetooth or some other short range communication method,
the general area around the user is searched for people (or their hardware) who appear
in the user’s social network [24]. These people are then asked to vouch for the user by
confirming their identity.
2. Where you are: This factor encompasses location-based activities [25], particularly
in ubiquitous computing environments [26]. These can take the form of comparisons
to usual locations (i.e., if a person is in a location they visit frequently as opposed to
someplace they have never been) or comparison of known calendar events to location.
The factors listed here are often combined into multi-factor authentication solutions to in-
crease the security provided by any one method, and to support their known weaknesses.
Passwords and PINs in particular are used almost ubiquitously even though they have sig-
nificant issues both in design and use that make them a poor choice for security provision in
many situations.
2.2 Textual Passwords and the Password Problem
Passwords and other secret knowledge techniques are the most commonly-deployed authen-
tication mechanism despite several problems [22]. They are familiar to users, and may not
compromise privacy provided the user does not use publicly-known information in their pass-
word choice. However, there is a well-understood trade-off, known as the password problem,
between the security of a password (i.e., the difficulty for an attacker in guessing the secret)
and the memorability of the password for the user. Typically, the harder a password is to
guess for an attacker, the harder it may be for a legitimate user to remember. This trade-
off between memorability and security has encouraged research into password strengthening
and improved memorability in the form of alternatives to traditional passwords.
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Efforts into improving memorability and security have included password phrases [27] and
mnemonic passwords [28], both of which attempt to create secure passwords with built–in
memorability aids. Other research focuses on balancing rather than improving memorability
and security, such as using persuasive technology to encourage users to select secure and
memorable passwords [29]. In this approach, users are allowed to select a password and
then additional characters are added at random positions to improve the password’s security.
The users are then allowed to shuffle the characters to find a combination that is memorable.
The result was that users chose more secure passwords overall, but they still tended to choose
weak initial passwords to improve memorability.
Despite strong research interest in improving passwords and secret-knowledge techniques in
general, there has been no single authentication mechanism of this type that is considered
both secure and usable. It is likely, then, that rather than focusing on finding the single au-
thentication mechanism that will be the panacea to all authentication needs, research should
focus on creating a toolbox of possible authentication methods that can be selected to suit a
particular application’s needs. To this end, research into password alternatives has become
an increasingly important field.
2.3 Alternatives to Passwords
The problems with traditional authentication mechanisms has not gone unnoticed in the re-
search community; many alternatives to traditional textual passwords have been suggested.
These include, but are not limited to, the following ideas:
Graphical passwords. This method relies on using either user-chosen or system-selected
images to authenticate the user. Click-based graphical passwords [15, 30] consist of a series
of n points on an image or series of images that the user has chosen during the enrolment
process. During enrolment, the user chooses an image, then clicks on a series of memorable
points on the image. The password is entered by subsequently clicking on the same points
in the same order, within certain tolerances. Other methods require the user to select m pre-
chosen images from a series of k > m distractor images [31, 32], or to draw a simple sketch
on a grid of known size [33, 34]. Graphical passwords, while shown via lab studies to be
usable and acceptable to users [35, 36], have not gained significant notice or use outside of
laboratory studies. The reasons for this are not yet known, although Chiasson et al. postulate
that it is because laboratory studies do not accurately mimic real-world use [36]. Based on
the results of a lab study into the usability of graphical passwords, Stobert et al. [37] have
argued that graphical passwords are potentially a useful security measure for mobile devices,
both in terms of usability and expected security level. Their lab study did not explicitly in-
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clude usability studies for mobile devices, but instead opined that the ability to use a smaller
image on a touch screen would lend itself well to a mobile environment.
Single Sign-On (SSO). Some SSO systems use a single strong password to secure a list
of other passwords in order to reduce the user’s memory load. Detractors of password-based
SSO systems note that the loss of the main password, no matter how strong it is considered,
reveals all passwords it protects, and thus the other passwords are useless. The security level
would be the same if the strong password were used on each of the accounts it protects rather
than having different passwords. The hope of SSO supporters is that the main password will
be strong enough and treated with enough respect that it will not be lost. This is a simple
case of moving the security of each individual password to the main password. Since SSO
systems can be complex in terms of overhead and initial setup, the lack of additional security
over a single strong password is often not seen as worth the overhead SSO provides [38].
Transparent authentication. This method gathers samples of user behavior while go-
ing about other tasks on a computer to produce a behavioral use pattern that can be used
to verify the identity of the person using the resource. In this scenario, the user does not
have to explicitly provide a sample for authentication (other than during enrolment in the
authentication system); the expected benefit is that this may reduce frustration and improve
security [39]. Transparent authentication may be implemented using biometrics, particu-
larly behavioral since they are often easier to gather implicitly compared to physiological
biometrics.
These alternatives to passwords and PINs are positive steps towards finding a viable authen-
tication method for mobile devices. However, research has shown that these methods, as
well as passwords and PINs, are not always accepted by users [40, 41].
2.4 User Acceptance of Secret-Knowledge Mechanisms
There has been a considerable amount of research that investigates the extent to which users
will opt for secret-knowledge mechanisms, and the extent to which they understand their
limitations. In a user study of mobile phone authentication practices, Kowalski and Goldstein
found that users did not understand the security options available on mobile devices [42],
specifically the difference between (and the existence of) the SIM PIN and the phone security
code. Kowalski and Goldstein found that only 32% of users in their study were aware of
the SIM PIN, and none of them chose to use it. Similarly, Botha et al. [43] distinguish
between SIM and handset PINs and recognize that these are simply point-of-entry security
mechanisms that have limited ability to provide content security. Botha et al. also state that
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PIN entry on mobile platforms may be tedious and annoying to the owner because “mobile
users may simply wish to take the device out of their pocket to check a schedule entry and
could therefore find that entering the password takes longer than the task itself.” [43, p. 3].
These concepts suggest the need for a more nuanced and effortless mechanism for mobile
devices, as stated explicitly by Botha et al.
In a similar study, Clarke and Furnell found that 42% of respondents believed phone security
codes (i.e., the handset PIN) provided an “adequate” level of security [44]. Despite the
fact that fewer than half of respondents felt the security provided by the PIN was adequate,
66% of respondents used phone security code authentication when first starting up their
device, and 18% also used it to awake from standby. These statistics present an impression
of users’ mental model of security – fewer than half of respondents felt that their device
was adequately protected, and yet a significant number regularly “secure” their device with a
phone security code. This may be due to users choosing a “something is better than nothing”
approach to security, in which they choose to use what is available despite their perceptions
of its inadequacy. In a follow-up study, Karatzouni et al. [23] confirmed these findings, and
state that users did not believe they had anything worth protecting on their mobile device.
While the alternatives to passwords discussed in this section help provide support for a tool-
box of authentication mechanisms, they all have issues that prevent them from being the best
choice for all authentication needs. In particular, the popularity and ubiquity of smartphones
has increased the need for authentication mechanisms that are specifically tailored to these
devices. One compelling reason is that they are increasingly able to store and transmit per-
sonal information [3], and their mobile nature and susceptibility to loss and theft make them
particularly difficult to protect.
2.5 Mobile Device Authentication
The previous section has argued for mobile device authentication methods that are tailored
to the nature of the device. One difference between desktop or laptop computers and mobile
devices is that they are used very differently. Mobile device use patterns are often character-
ized by short, bursty intervals [7, 8, 45]. This means that mobile device owners tend to use
their device frequently, but for short periods of time. Current mobile device authentication
methods, including those discussed below, do not lend themselves well to frequency. Having
to enter knowledge-based access control frequently may cause device owners to disable the
security mechanism to reduce frustration.
Mobile devices are generally single-user devices, as evidenced by the lack of a multi-user
model in the major mobile operating systems. Thus, access control is reduced to verification
since the user assumes the identity of the device owner while using it. Many methods of
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controlling non-owner access to a mobile device have been studied. Two common methods
are passwords and PINs, including the Android sketched password. Quite apart from the
known weaknesses of knowledge-based mechanisms, they are of limited utility given that
they only protect the device at point-of-entry. This means that once the password or PIN
has been verified, the device can be used to its full extent. Furthermore, in this context,
since knowledge-based authentication verifies knowledge of a secret and not the identity of
the knowledge bearer, this kind of mechanism is somewhat unsatisfactory. If passwords for
other applications are stored on the device, then a potential intruder also has access to these
applications without authenticating further.
Like other computer systems, passwords and PINs are commonly-used security provisions
on mobile devices [44]. There are two types of mobile device PINs [44, 46]; the handset PIN,
which protects the handset itself and the data stored in its memory from unauthorized use,
and the SIM PIN, which protects the use of and data stored on the SIM card. The handset
PIN is the one that most users think of when asked about a mobile device PIN; many people
do not realize that in using only this PIN, they are leaving unprotected a significant amount
of potentially private information stored on the SIM card. As an example of the difference
between the two PINs, note that even with the handset PIN enabled, it is possible to remove
a device SIM and use it in another device.
In addition to PINs, which can have a variable number of digits, some mobile devices al-
low the use of standard alphanumeric passwords. These are different from PINs not only
in length, but in possible character sets. Having a larger set of characters to choose from
allows for more possible passwords. However, as was discussed previously, passwords on
all platforms fall victim to the struggle between memorability and security. This holds on
mobile devices as well.
In an attempt to move away from alphanumeric passwords and PINs, some device manufac-
turers have employed a sketch-based password, in which the user joins a series of points on
a grid in a sequence. The order of the points defines the password. While quite memorable,
they are also quite insecure since the drawn pattern has limited variations, and can be cracked
by looking at the traces left on the screen and through direct observation [47].
Other manufacturers have experimented with graphical passwords, and a few have begun
to examine the use of biometrics [48]. However, these experiments are in early stages and
currently point towards the need for alternatives to passwords and PINs for protecting mobile
devices.
Hardware tokens have been suggested for use in mobile device authentication. With this
method, authorized users carry a small, physical object such as a keyfob or card that may be
used in combination with a knowledge-based mechanism to authenticate the holder. Tokens
may be used to authenticate to other computing systems such as ATM machines, but research
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in this area also considers how a token owner can first authenticate to the token, then allow
the token to manage further authentication requests from other computing systems. The first
part of this dual authentication is of interest in this research; the second is out of scope. Since
carrying a token may be seen by users as limiting [23] because it may be forgotten or lost,
some researchers have focused on embedding a hardware token in a device that users al-
ready carry [49]. Suggestions for tokens have included watches, jewellery, credit card-style
cards [50] and mobile devices [51, 52]. Stajano [53] used the mobile device itself as the
token, however none of the research to date has investigated this from a transparent perspec-
tive. Transparency implies that the device owner does not explicitly provide information to
authenticate, but is authenticated via information gathered while they go about other tasks
on the device.
Other researched authentication methods include user’s social group [24, 54] (e.g., the people
nearby who know the user can vouch for their identity) and computer use patterns [55, 56].
This latter area of research takes advantage of the distinctive ways in which people use
computers, including mobile devices. For instance, the regular pattern of one person may
be to check their email once per hour, and work on a word processing document in between
these checks. For another, they may check their email more regularly and use a wider variety
of programs in between checks. The research in this field focuses on determining whether
these patterns of device use may be sufficient to verify the identity of the device user to a
sufficient level of confidence.
2.6 Biometrics
Biometrics is defined as the “science of recognizing an individual based on her physiological
and behavioral traits” [57]. A physiological biometric is one that is measured from the
human body. Examples include iris and retina scans, fingerprints and facial recognition.
Behavioral biometrics rely on a person’s unique behaviors, i.e., how they do particular tasks.
Key behavioral biometrics are signatures, gait, voice and keystroke dynamics.
Biometric traits are inextricably linked to the person who provided them since they cannot be
shared and are unlikely to be stolen1, unlike passwords and PINs. Biometrics present an al-
ternative to traditional knowledge- and ownership-based authentication (i.e., something you
know and something you have, respectively). Support for biometrics has centered around
memorability – biometrics cannot be forgotten. However, they are not universal: for exam-
ple, approximately 2% of the U.S. population does not have viable fingerprints [58]. Further-
1The word “stolen” in terms of a biometric pattern is not the same as “copied”. A person’s biometric trait
may be copied after it is gathered, but in order to steal a physiological biometric, the thief must be in possession
of the thing from which the biometric was gathered, for instance a finger or an eye.
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more, there are issues with biometric matching ability. Women’s fingerprints are harder to
match than men’s; they require about 150% the processing power of male fingerprints [58].
Biometrics are used for two purposes, as follows [59]:
1. Verification (a.k.a. authentication): the person providing the gathered biometric claims
an identity, then the gathered biometric is compared to that of the claimed identity in
the database. If they match, the person is granted access to the protected resource;
otherwise they are not. Verification is called 1:1 matching. A person may claim an
identity by providing a username, or using an identification card either with or without
a chip that contains further information. Cards that contain chips, known as smart-
cards, may also contain the known biometric for the card’s owner, which can reduce
pattern matching times since the biometric system need not store patterns for all au-
thorized users. For example, a bank may decide to use biometrics in conjunction with
chipped debit or credit cards at its ATM machines. When the person inserts the card
into the ATM, their fingerprint pattern is accessed from the chip on the card. Then,
the ATM prompts the person to scan their fingerprint using the built–in scanner on the
ATM. If the gathered and stored patterns match, the person may continue with their
transaction. If there is no match, the transaction is not allowed. In this way, the ATM
machines need not store a fingerprint for each bank customer in each ATM worldwide,
or in a bank server.
2. Identification: recognizing a person who has not made a prior claim of identity via a
match between the person’s offered biometric and any of those in a database of autho-
rized people. The gathered biometric is compared to each pattern in the database until
a match is found. If none exists, the person is rejected as unauthorized. Identifica-
tion is called 1:N matching. This is a significantly more difficult and time–consuming
process when compared to verification, but requires less information from the person
offering the biometric. Identification can be used for “negative recognition”, which is
when the biometric system determines if the person is who they implicitly or explicitly
deny to be [60]. Logically, negative recognition is the opposite of verification and can
be thought of as explicitly denying to be all people in the database except that person
whose pattern matches the gathered biometric. Negative recognition is used to prevent
people from claiming more than one identity. It can also be used in the case where the
subject is not in a database. For instance, fingerprints may be used to identify a person
who has been arrested in the past. In this case, a subject who has not been arrested
previously claims that their identity is not in the fingerprint database.
Like traditional authentication mechanisms, biometrics also have issues that prevent them
from being the method of choice in some cases. Jain et al. have proposed a list of desirable
characteristics for biometrics that help address some of these issues, as follows [14, 59]:
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Universality: the majority of system users should have the characteristic being used as a
biometric.
Distinctiveness: the characteristic should differ sufficiently between users to allow for iden-
tity verification.
Permanence: the characteristic should not vary significantly over time.
Collectability: characteristics must be measured quantitatively.
Performance: this encompasses concerns with accuracy, speed of matching, resources re-
quired and operational factors. These should fit the needs of the system under design.
Acceptability: refers to how willing people are to accept the biometric in their daily lives.
This trait also encompasses whether they consider the biometric a trustworthy authen-
tication method.
Circumvention: indicates how easily a particular biometric can be used to fraudulently
grant access to someone other than the biometric’s owner.
Most biometrics have several issues that make them poor choices for some users. A lack
of universality leads to failure to enrol issues, where certain users may not use a biometric
system because they cannot provide biometrics for comparison purposes. Failure to capture
issues arise when performance degrades or has not been considered fully during the design
process. Research into compensating for the variability and issues with individual biometrics
has led to efforts into combining them into multimodal biometrics. Such combinations can
often eliminate the weaknesses of individual biometrics.
Biometrics, both physiological and behavioral, have a strong history as an authentication and
access control tool. The following sections introduce current work on the use of biometrics
as an authentication method specifically for use with mobile devices. It does not include
a discussion of biometrics on desktop or laptop computers. Thorough treatments of these
topics can be found in [57, 59, 61–63].
2.6.1 Physiological Biometrics
Examples of physiological biometrics include fingerprints, palmprints, iris and retina scans
and facial recognition. These biometrics generally require a method of obtaining them such
as a scanner or camera, and a method of converting them from a detailed scan to a concise
feature vector that represents the most salient (i.e., distinctive) parts. Each of these biometrics
has strengths and weaknesses and the selection of which to use depends on the needs of the
application that will deploy it. The biometrics listed above are discussed briefly below.
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Fingerprint: the pattern of ridges and valleys on the fingertips. Fingerprints are distinct
from finger to finger on the same person, and are different for identical twins. The
accuracy of fingerprints in terms of verification is high – around 90% for a single index
fingerprint [58]. Fingerprint readers are increasingly affordable (around USD $20 each
for large orders) and are appearing on electronics such as laptops, tablet computers
and mobile phones [48]. A detractor for fingerprint use, however, is that processing
and matching the print requires large amounts of resources such as processor speed
and memory, particularly when used for identification versus verification. Another
potential issue is permanence, since fingerprints are sensitive to age, damage to the
fingertip or loss of the finger. Once these are lost, the fingerprint cannot be used for
identification. Furthermore, if a copy of the scanned fingerprint is stolen, it cannot be
reset as can a password.
Palmprint: Much like fingerprints, the palm of the hand has ridges and valleys that are
distinctive from person to person. The larger surface area of the palm compared to
the fingertip is expected to provide more distinctive measurements. The tradeoff is
an increase in pattern complexity and thus in matching. The larger palm area means
that the scanners must be larger and likely more expensive. They are known to be
distinctive [64], particularly when a high-resolution scanner is used. Palmprints are
vulnerable to loss or injury to the hand, and are irreplaceable, much like fingerprints.
Palmprint biometrics may be combined with scans of the veins in the hand to increase
distinctiveness.
Retina: the blood vessels in the back of the eye have a distinctive pattern from person to
person, including identical twins [63]. These patterns remain unchanged over a per-
son’s life, unlike fingerprints. Retina biometrics are highly accurate and matching is
quick. The subject must stand very close to a expensive and specialized scanner and
remove glasses or contact lenses, which may limit acceptability. Retinal patterns may
be altered by injury or medical conditions such as glaucoma and diabetes. Further-
more, they are affected by severe astigmatism and cataracts, which may render them
indistinctive in the elderly.
Iris: the colored region of the eye that is bounded by the pupil and the white area. It
is a distinctive biometric pattern (even between twins) that can be gathered from
a short distance using a dedicated scanner [63]. The iris can be scanned through
glasses and contact lenses, although accuracy may be improved if they are removed.
Commercially-deployed iris recognition systems are fast and accurate and are becom-
ing more common-place. It is difficult to surgically alter the iris, and copies are quickly
detected. However, irises can be damaged or lost due to injury or loss of the eye itself
and are not easily replaced.
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Face: is a common recognition method that people use regularly to identify those they have
met in the past. The electronic version of facial recognition uses location and shape
of facial features such as eyes, nose, eyebrows, lips and chin to create a distinctive
pattern. The subject’s orientation to the camera, facial expression and lighting in the
gathered images are known to be issues with facial recognition. Accuracy is known
to be reasonable [64]. Facial recognition may be susceptible to circumvention via
photographs held up to the camera.
Table 2.1 shows how each of these biometrics meets Jain’s seven biometric characteristics.
For each biometric, a determination for its adherence to the characteristic in question has
been made. The determinations are High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L), and have been
selected by the author. For example, a determination of H for fingerprint universality implies
that most people can be authenticated via a fingerprint scan. A determination of L for retina
collectability means that there are issues surrounding collecting retina scans that stop it from
being more highly collectable.
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Fingerprint H H M M M-L H H
Palmprint H H M M M M M
Retina H H H L M M L
Iris H H H M H M L
Face H M M H M M L
Table 2.1: Characteristics of selected physiological biometrics. The determinations of High
(H), Medium (M) and Low (L) are the author’s interpretations.
Some of the issues with physiological biometrics, particularly collectability and circumven-
tion, are addressed by the use of behavioral biometrics. Basing a biometric pattern on a
person’s actions may be less distinctive, but they often do not require additional hardware
and may be gathered while the subject engages in normal activities rather than requiring
them to submit to a scan.
2.6.2 Behavioral Biometrics
Physiological biometrics can be limiting, particularly in a mobile device environment, be-
cause they can require additional hardware to gather the biometric. Behavioral biometrics are
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known to be less distinctive than physiological biometrics [65], but have several benefits over
physiological systems. They are easy to gather while the subject goes about other tasks and
thus are ideal for transparent authentication. Their collection does not usually require special
hardware and thus may be more cost effective. Much research has been undertaken into var-
ious possibilities, including keystroke dynamics [19, 66–68], speaker verification [69–71],
touch screen interaction patterns [72] and device use patterns [55, 73]. The list below briefly
describes key behavioral biometrics.
Signature: is the distinctive way in which a person signs their name. Signature metrics in-
clude the writing instrument pressure (electronic signatures only), shape of letters and
other additions such as dots and flourishes. It has long been accepted as a method of
identification and verification by government and legal bodies as well as by the general
public. It requires use of a writing instrument and either a paper or electronic surface
upon which to sign, which are relatively low-cost. Signatures are highly susceptible
to forgery, although signature verification by a person or improved pattern matching
algorithms can improve these methods [74, 75]. Signatures can be highly variable and
thus require acceptance within certain tolerances rather than exact matches.
Gait: is the characteristic way in which a person walks. Gait is a complex biometric because
it combines spacial and temporal issues, in that both movement in a 3D space as well
as the timing of each movement must be measured [76]. It uses hardware such as
accelerometers and gyroscopes for measurement [77], which are common in mobile
devices, as well as 3D cameras. Issues with gait include limited universality since those
who cannot walk are immediately exempt, which includes young children, the elderly
and infirm and people in wheelchairs. Gait may also vary depending on the subject’s
weight, age and mental state, among others, and thus is not highly invariant [78]. It
is computationally-intensive both in feature vector creation and matching due to the
complexity of the data gathered.
Device Use: attempts to gather patterns in how subjects use devices such as desktop and
laptop computers and mobile phones. Examples of device use include sequences of
events, use of shortcuts versus menu items, and routes taken while walking or driv-
ing [79]. These patterns, which can be gathered from such things as browser history
and application notifications, are expected to be moderately distinctive, and require
a relatively long training period [80]. They are subject to variability due to device
changes (i.e., if the subject begins to use a new mobile phone), and changes to the
functionality of the device (i.e., new software or programs on the computer). This sort
of monitoring may be cause for concern in subjects due to its similarity to eavesdrop-
ping.
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Typing: The way a person types is expected to be distinctive and is known as keystroke
dynamics [81]. Measurements of the speed, frequency of characters and n-grams as
well as the pressure with which keys are pressed are gathered and combined into a
distinctive pattern [18, 82]. It is considered discriminatory for verification but not
identification [59]. This biometric is highly variable due to mental state, subject po-
sition (i.e., standing, sitting or walking) and keyboard familiarity. It can be gathered
using a standard keyboard while the subject goes about other tasks. Privacy issues in-
clude fear of keylogging. Keystroke dynamics may be subject to replay and imitation
attacks, although the latter may be more difficult.
Voice: is both a physiological and a behavioral biometric. The physiological aspects include
measurements of voice features that change due to the distinctive shape of the subject’s
features such as larynx, glottal folds, mouth and lips [59]. The behavioral aspects
include pronunciation, word frequency and use and accent. The physiological aspects
are relatively invariant over a person’s life, but the behavioral aspects may be affected
by mood, state of mind, age and medical conditions such as the common cold. Voice
biometrics are not very distinctive and unsuitable for large-scale deployment due to
issues with contamination from other noise during recording [83]. It is subject to
misuse due to recording and replaying a subject’s voice, and it can be gathered without
the subject’s knowledge.
Table 2.2 shows the biometrics described above in relation to Jain’s seven biometric char-
acteristics. As with the physiological biometrics discussed in the previous section, a deter-
mination of High (H), Medium (M) or Low (L) denotes how well the biometric adheres the
characteristic. The individual determinations are based on the author’s opinions and knowl-
edge of biometrics.
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Signature H M L H M H M
Gait L M L H M H L
Device Use L M L H M L L
Typing H M L H M M M
Voice H M M H M H M
Table 2.2: Characteristics of selected behavioral biometrics. The determination of High (H),
Medium (M) and Low (L) are based on the author’s opinions.
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The biometric chosen should reflect expected use in the regular context. The current research
in mobile device authentication has examined these, and other, behavioral biometrics. How-
ever, studying the literature in the wider field of authentication may provide a basis for new
research in mobile authentication.
In 2008, Yampolskiy and Govindaraju published a survey paper on behavioral biometrics [65],
with the intent of gathering different types of behavioral biometrics and outlining studies that
have been based on them. The biometrics included programming style and “soft” behav-
ioral biometrics such as word knowledge and mathematical ability, and biometrics such as
keystroke dynamics and gait analysis. Yampolskiy and Govindaraju’s work provides a basis
for selecting behavioral biometrics to use for a particular purpose.
While the 2002 study by Clarke et al. [18] showed the applicability of various biometrics to
mobile device environments, their determination of such applicability was based on devices
available in 2002. Other researchers have since attempted to use the increasingly feature-
rich mobile devices developed since that time to test a wide range of behavioral biometrics
including speaker recognition, signatures and handwriting, touching and tapping and device
use patterns. In 2004, Gamboa and Fred published a study on using captured taps via a
pointing device (a mouse) [55], and while their study does not specifically refer to mobile
devices, their method has the potential of being adapted to touch-based mobile devices since
they gather the clicked location itself rather than relying on what specifically performed the
click (e.g., finger or mouse). The main contribution of Gamboa and Fred’s research is in the
biometric feature selection decisions, which are the specific parts of a biometric pattern that
make it distinctive from those of others; these are the parts that are presented to the pattern
classifier.
One interesting advantage that touch–screen mobile devices have is that touches have been
shown to contain potentially distinctive patterns, although it does not deliver the level of
assurance required for authentication. Frank et al. performed a study (N = 41) to examine
the applicability of screen touches as a behavioral biometric for use in a continuous authen-
tication system [72]. Their study resulted in misclassification error rates in the range of 4%,
which although quite low, is not low enough to support authentication unless it is combined
with another biometric.
Many other behavioral biometrics have been considered for authentication. Examples in-
clude device use patterns (also called service utilization) [12, 56, 79, 80, 84], signatures and
structured writing [85, 86], gestures and gait [87] and mouse movement [88–90]. The com-
mon thread running through all of these methods is that there is much uniquely identifying
information in behavioral biometrics, and these methods lend themselves to a transparent
authentication method.
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While many behavioral biometrics are suitable for authentication purposes, a few are par-
ticularly applicable to mobile devices. This platform is characterized by short, frequent
interactions [7, 8, 91], and has several input modalities such as a keyboard, touch screen and
microphone. A number of characteristics of behavioral biometrics are particularly important
in choosing a biometric to use on a mobile device:
1. They can be gathered without using extra hardware on the device;
2. They can be gathered while the user goes about his or her normal device use;
3. They have the potential to be processed on the device itself;
4. They may be sufficiently discriminatory in terms of ability to verify that a user is the
owner of the device.
Therefore, biometrics such as keystroke dynamics and speaker verification, among others,
that use the existing device hardware are worth examining for their applicability as authen-
ticators on a mobile device. To this end, the focus now moves to examining the current
research into two behavioral biometrics, keystroke dynamics and speaker verification, to the
mobile device environment. These biometrics have been selected because they can be gath-
ered transparently on mobile devices while the user goes about regular tasks. Whether they
meet the third and fourth characteristics is one subject of this research.
Keystroke Dynamics
Keystroke dynamics has a long history as a potential authenticator, beginning with Spillane’s
seminal work in 1975 [92]. Interest in keystroke dynamics has grown over the years and now
includes several patents [93, 94]. Early studies focused on desktop and laptop computers,
although more recent work has extended to mobile device keyboards of all type [95–103].
These studies vary in the types of metrics used, the pattern classification technique, the data
collection modality (fixed or free text), and how much information must be collected before
error rates are low enough to support authentication.
Several studies have focused on mobile keyboards [68, 104, 105] although few have been
performed on a soft keyboard device in which the keyboard is displayed on the device screen
and the user types by tapping the displayed characters [106]. Huang et al. [107] studied
keystroke dynamics on a soft keyboard but their results were based on removing the data
from the mobile device for processing with a customized pattern classifier, and uses fixed text
in the form of a username and password. Many of these studies required modifications to the
device such as removing the keyboard and wiring it to a desktop computer for processing or
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using a virtual keyboard created with infrared scanners [108]. This may have had an impact
on the study participant’s typing patterns.
In a similar study, Clarke et al. [19] performed a keystroke dynamics study on a thumb-based
keyboard using text messages and number entry. They also removed the keyboard from the
mobile device and attached it to a desktop for processing, which may have changed the user’s
interaction with the device. It is unclear, however, whether their results would generalize to
all thumb-based keyboards that were used in their natural state.
Current keystroke dynamics work on mobile devices use a variety of metrics including key
hold-time, inter-key latency, finger pressure and number of errors while typing [109]. Finger
pressure, in particular, produced a high level of accuracy [106], but required adaptations to
the device screen that may inhibit widespread use of this metric. Many studies use two or
more metrics to reduce the authentication error rate due to the inadequacy of any one metric.
Karatzouni and Clarke found that key hold-time is unreliable for use with mobile devices
that have full QWERTY keyboards [20], thus the practice of combining metrics may have
value.
In 2009, Hwang et al. [82] proposed a keystroke dynamics authentication method that used
fixed-text modality. They found that only five short (4 character) typing samples were needed
in order to accurately identify the device owner. Their low error rates with such a small
amount of data were due to a unique metric – they asked users to type with an artificial
rhythm that was encouraged through the use of audible cues while typing the fixed text.
Hwang et al.’s work is another example of password hardening [99, 110–112], in which the
point-of-entry protection provided by a password or PIN is enhanced by adding the use of
keystroke dynamics while the password or PIN is typed.
In addition to varying the number and type of metrics used, current research also varies the
type of pattern classifier used to match a gathered keystroke pattern to an existing pattern.
Options include, but are not limited to, neural networks [19, 20, 106], Support Vector Ma-
chines [96], fuzzy classifiers [104], and various distance measure such as Mahalanobis, Eu-
clidean, and Manhattan distances [68, 82, 113]. Clarke and Furnell compared the accuracy
and speed of both statistical and neural network classifiers [19] for classifying keystroke
dynamics data. They found that neural networks had lower misclassification errors, but
higher processing requirements when compared to statistical classifiers. Along the same
lines, Haidar et al. used fuzzy classifiers, neural networks, and statistical classifiers on the
the same data to create a user profile that was used in combination with the password typed
to identify the user [114]. This research compares several statistical classifiers, including
k-nearest neighbor, decision trees, and Naı¨ve Bayes approaches. The result of their work
was that the statistical classifiers had fewer misclassification errors than the neural networks
and fuzzy classifiers. For all classifiers, they found that combining classifier output reduced
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the error rate further, although evidence of this is not given in their paper.
A concern with the current research in keystroke dynamics on mobile devices is with the
validity of the findings given the experimental procedures used. These studies often change
the way in which the user interacts with the device; mobile devices are often used while
standing, walking and sitting, for example, where desktop and laptop computers are gener-
ally used while seated. These changes may alter the user’s typing patterns and thus do not
represent their natural patterns. These studies fail to take into account this difference, which
means that the reported error rates for the study may be artificially low.
Speaker Verification
This section introduces the current literature on speaker verification as a behavioral biomet-
ric capable of supporting authentication on a mobile device. Since speaker verification is
strongly related to other speech-related biometrics such as speaker diarization [115, 116]
and speaker identification [117, 118], other types of similar work will be included here. The
main difference between speaker verification when compared to other voice biometrics is the
application for which the results are used (i.e., verification rather than identification).
In 1999, Li et al. investigated whether speaker verification methods were sufficiently dis-
criminatory for use in an authentication system [70]. They examined the speech patterns of
100 speakers making long-distance telephone calls. They found that they could distinguish
a particular speaker with error rates between 1.8% and 2.6%, and related this to a confi-
dence measure for how confident the authentication system was that the speaker was who
they claimed to be. Li et al.’s study is similar to that performed for this dissertation work.
Similarities exist in the modality (telephone conversations) and the use of speaker verifica-
tion methods rather than speaker identification. Li et al. chose to use 8 kHz audio samples,
which they claim to be a standard for voice verification. Their work is important in terms
of defining the terms and methods of speaker verification in general. However, their claim
that “The performances of lab data indicate that both systems are ready for real-world de-
ployment” [70] cannot be supported with the small amount of lab data they chose to provide
in their study, especially since the statistical significance of the values that are reported have
not been calculated.
Speaker verification and other related voice biometrics are not a panacea for authentication.
There are serious limitations in the technology, as argued by Bonastre et al. in 2003 [83]. The
authors warn that, as of the time of the published paper, “there is no scientific process that
enables one to uniquely characterize a persons voice or to identify with absolute certainty
an individual from his or her voice” [83]. The warnings presented by Bonastre et al. show
that extremely low error rates for speaker verification are not likely within the confines of
(relatively) current state-of-the-art in the field.
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In 2010, Kinnunen and Li reported on text-independent speaker recognition systems [119].
Like the contribution of Li et al. [70], they too provide an important look at the key terms
and technologies used in text-independent speaker verification systems. Unlike Li et al.,
though, Kinnunen and Li did not perform an experimental study; their goal is to compare
commonly-used technologies. They also provide definitions for text-dependent and text-
independent studies, define significant problems with voice-based identification and provide
speaker selection and speaker models. Most significantly, however, this paper suggests the
definitions for cooperative and uncooperative speakers (i.e., those who know their speech is
being sampled and allow it and those who do not).
In 2006, O’Gorman et al. [120] developed an authentication method that uses a spoken PIN
that can be uttered in front of an attacker without revealing the secret, and also a Query
Directed Password [120] that the authors considered more memorable than a regular pass-
word. These directions in authentication research explore methods to manage the problem
of password memorability and reuse. Furthermore, the authentication methods they propose
are intended to be used in busy locations where secret knowledge leaks are common.
It is possible that the method described by O’Gorman et al. could be extended for use in
transparent authentication. For instance, the password or PIN could be a particular combina-
tion of words or phrases that the device owner speaks frequently in normal conversation, al-
though this would have to be tested against others who also speak them to determine whether
they are distinctive enough to use as an authenticator, particularly if the words or phrases are
commonly used. Finally, O’Gorman et al.’s speaker authentication methods are static since
the answers required of the pre-selected questions must be the same as those provided during
enrolment.
In 1994, Gish and Schmidt [118] performed two speaker verification studies that used the
SWITCHBOARD corpus as a datasource. SWITCHBOARD was created by Texas Instru-
ments [121] and consists of about 2500 long-distance telephone conversations on landlines
rather than mobiles from around 500 speakers. It was created to provide a source of training
and testing data for many speech processing algorithms, specifically for speaker verifica-
tion research [121]. The purpose of Gish and Schmidt’s two experiments was to determine
whether noisy channels and different channels (e.g., handsets) make a significant difference
to the pattern classification of these samples. Their results showed that it was significantly
harder to perform a high-quality, low error rate pattern classification when the channel be-
ing tested was not represented in the training set. This result is significant because it led
to further research on how to improve pattern classification techniques to allow for these
differences.
There is sufficient evidence that behavioral biometrics on their own may not be sufficiently
distinctive to deliver a confident assertion of the identity of the user of a mobile device. Con-
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sideration should be given to combining biometrics to provide sufficient evidence of identity.
This allows exploration of the strengths of different biometrics and whether combining them
can offset their weaknesses.
2.6.3 Multimodal Biometrics
Multimodal biometrics are intended to minimize the weaknesses of individual biometrics
by providing more information upon which biometric decisions can be based. They are
versatile tools since there are several possible aspects from which their combination can be
considered. Some possible methods for combining biometrics are as follows [57]:
1. Measuring the same trait with multiple sensors:
(a) Single trait, multiple sensors (i.e., one finger, multiple fingerprint scanners used
in succession). This combination method gathers the same biometric pattern with
a series of scanners. The two options at this point are to combine the features of
the individual scans into a single feature vector, which is then presented to the
pattern classifier. This type of feature fusion technique is often characterized
by too many features, making the pattern computationally difficult to classify.
Another method is to process the raw data from each scanner into separate feature
vectors and present each to a pattern classifier. Then, the scores from each are
combined into a single score; this is an example of score-level fusion.
(b) Single trait, multiple classifiers (i.e., present the same fingerprint to more than
one pattern classifier and aggregate the results of each into a single decision)
This differs from the above method in that only one biometric scan is taken. The
raw data from the scan is converted into a feature vector that is then presented to
a series of pattern classifiers, each of which outputs a score for the input biomet-
ric. These individual results are then combined into a single score upon which a
decision can be made.
(c) Single trait, multiple versions (i.e., more than one finger, both irises or both reti-
nas, etc). In this combination method, two or more scans of the same type of
biometric are taken, but the source of the biometric is different. For instance, a
fingerprint of the subject’s index finger and thumb may be taken in two succes-
sive scans, and presented separately to pattern classifiers. Then, the scores from
the pattern classifiers can be combined into a single score upon which a decision
can be made.
In each of these cases, an alternative to combining scores is to combine decisions, as
described below.
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2. Measuring more than one distinct biometric identifier and combining the results of
individual pattern classification [122, 123]:
(a) Feature Fusion: combines biometric features from two or more different bio-
metric patterns by concatenating extracted features into a single larger feature
set, which is then presented to the pattern classifier. The two biometrics should
be independent of one another; that is, varying one should not result in variations
in the other. The new feature vector has a higher dimensionality and should result
in a more reliable biometric decision, particularly if a pre–processing step is used
to select the most distinctive features from each biometric.
(b) Match Score Fusion: two or more biometrics are presented to pattern classifiers
and are assigned a score (but not a decision) that identifies how close the gathered
feature vector is to the template vector. The scores are then combined and a
decision is made based on the combined scores.
(c) Decision Score Fusion: multiple biometric feature vectors are presented to pat-
tern classifiers, and are placed into one of two groups: accept or reject based on
the output of the pattern classifier. The individual accept and reject scores are
then combined, often with a weighting factor, to output a single accept or re-
ject decision. The decision combination can be made based on a majority voting
scheme, such as the one described by Zuev and Ivanov [124].
Each of these combination methods has pros and cons, and selection should be made based
on the needs and user base of the system under development. One consideration when mak-
ing a selection is whether the system will perform identification or verification, as defined
in Section 2.6. In general, if a claim of identity is made previously, verification is the cor-
rect mode. For instance, a person using a mobile device may be considered to inherently
claim the identity of the device owner; in this case, verification rather than identification is
performed.
Research into multimodal biometrics was undertaken as part of this work because behavioral
biometrics are not expected to provide sufficiently low error rates for authentication [59].
As the research highlighted in this section shows, combining two or more biometrics may
improve the error rates when compared to a single biometric. There is a large body of mul-
timodal biometric research that uses variations of common biometrics, such as fingerprints,
facial recognition and ear shape. This section focuses on research that uses biometric com-
bination methods to reduce error rates.
Iwano et al. [125] use a combination of speech patterns and ear shape to authenticate mobile
device owners. They selected these two biometrics because voice patterns have many issues
such as noisy environments that make this biometric error-prone, but ear shape is relatively
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static and thus can be used to increase robustness. Iwano et al. contaminated their audio
samples with white noise in order to test the improvements multimodal biometrics provided.
They found that combining the two biometrics reduced the error rate from approximately
38% for the individual biometrics to just over 10% for their combination. Iwano et al. did not
experiment with the possible transparency of ear shape by taking the ear image while a call
was made from the device, likely because devices available at the time of their experiment
did not routinely have a camera on the side of the phone that is held to the ear.
In similar work to Iwano et al., Rokita et al. [126] used a mobile device camera to take photos
of users’ hand and face. They extracted similar features from each photo to create a single
feature vector. They did not compare the error rates of individual and combined biometrics,
but found that there is a point where adding more features resulted in a higher error rate.
One issue in Rokita et al.’s work is that it is unlikely that the photo pre-processing they
perform prior to pattern classification, as well as the classification itself, will be performed
on a mobile device due to processor speed and memory limitations. Furthermore, even if the
device were capable of this, the amount of time that passes between taking the photos and an
authentication decision is likely prohibitive.
In 2005, Fierrez-Aguilar et al. [74] published a comparison of fusion techniques for multi-
modal biometrics that was based on the quality of the metric at the time it was gathered. Their
study used fingerprints and signatures as the biometrics. Their proposed fusion techniques,
while not specific to mobile devices, may be used in a mobile environment. Their technique
determined the quality of the biometric at the time it was gathered, and used it to influence
the result of the pattern classification by adding a quality factor to the classification formulae.
One of the major issues in Fierrez-Aguilar et al.’s work is that the quality of the fingerprints
is determined by a human expert as part of their experiment. This was not of concern during
their work as they used a corpus of fingerprints that had already been examined for quality.
This, however, would not be viable in a production environment, particularly on a mobile
device.
Multimodal biometric authentication methods based on facial recognition and voice biomet-
rics are common choices [127–132]. Poh and Korczak [132] developed a text-dependent
voice biometric, which differs from the text-independent method used for this thesis work.
The use of facial recognition implies that the authentication method is explicit, much like
the work of Rokita et al. and Iwano et al. Poh and Korczak attempted to simplify the head
positioning requirements typical to facial recognition systems by only using features around
the eyes of the image, and accept that they will lose important features for the sake of sim-
plicity. In addition, the voice analysis uses a spoken password for comparison purposes;
this supports the determination that this was an explicit authentication method. Such text-
dependency represents a limitation in their work since speaking a password gives attackers
a strong advantage, as does the fact that the password is quite short (3 seconds of record-
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ing time) since then it may be easier to spoof the intended owner. Poh and Korczak’s work
shows that the fusion of these two biometrics improves the error rates seen when using one
biometric, which supports the use of multiple biometrics in authentication.
An important consideration when deploying an authentication mechanism is whether the
user base for which it is intended will accept and trust the method. To justify the use of
biometrics as an authenticator, research has been performed to determine user acceptance of
it.
2.6.4 User Acceptance of Biometrics
In 2001, Clarke et al. [41] undertook a study to determine the security needs of mobile device
owners, and what types of security precautions they take or would be willing to employ
if they were available. Their study found that while many users did not utilize the PIN
available on their mobile devices, they would be willing to consider using biometrics as an
authenticator. The authors opine that the reason for the participants’ apparent acceptance of
some biometrics and rejection of PINs may have to do with whether the participant had heard
of the biometric in question. For instance, the authors state that many of the participants were
likely to have heard of fingerprints, but were less likely to have been exposed to the idea
of ear geometry as a biometric. Therefore, they conclude, the participants may have been
responding to knowledge of the method rather than their desire to use it as an authenticator.
In a follow-up study, Clarke, Furnell and Reynolds [12] examined several physiological and
behavioral biometrics with the goal of identifying those that were viable in a mobile device
context. Their study examined the physiological biometrics fingerprints, facial recognition,
and iris scanning; the behavioral biometrics they focused on were voiceprints, signatures,
keystroke dynamics, and service utilization. Their study found that the latter two behavioral
biometrics were the most viable on mobile devices because they do not require additional
hardware and can be sampled transparently. They chose not to study physiological biometrics
further due to the cost and difficulty of applying the required additional hardware such as
fingerprint scanners to the mobile device environment. Therefore, it is worth considering
behavioral biometrics in more detail.
While acceptance is an important aspect to biometric authentication techniques, performance
of the method must also be taken into consideration. The methods for reporting the distinc-
tive ability of biometrics vary, but have been the subject of significant research efforts.
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2.6.5 Biometrics Performance Metrics
There is currently no widely accepted method for reporting the results of biometric studies.
Crawford [133] provided a step towards such formalization by reviewing keystroke dynamics
research on mobile and non-mobile platforms and proposing a list of reportable statistics.
Many studies in this area continue to report a dizzying array of error rates and performance
curves. This makes it challenging to compare study results, and has the potential for drawing
incorrect conclusions.
Pattern classifier output is sensitive to many factors, including algorithm choice, amount
of training data, the chosen features in the feature vector, and within-participant variation.
These factors will have an effect on the performance metrics computed for each classifier.
Within the current literature, there are several widely-used methods to report the quality
of a particular pattern classifier; those described here are used to report the results of the
biometrics studies in this research. Table 2.3 shows the different types of metrics that can
be considered for any pattern classifier. It shows all of the possible results in a two-class
problem, with the class decisions made by the classifier in the columns, and the true, known
classes in the rows. The diagonal from top left to bottom right shows the number of correctly
classified patterns. True accept and true reject are seen when the classifier produces the same
result as the known classification for the pattern. False accept and false reject are when the
classifier produces the opposite result to the known classification. Many studies report both
false accept and false reject rates but do not report the true accept and true reject rates. In
many research papers, these values are known as false (or true) positive and false (or true)
negative, but the terms false (or true) accept and reject will be used in this research.
Predicted Class
A
ct
ua
l
C
la
ss
Positive Negative
Positive True Accept False Reject
Negative False Accept True Reject
Table 2.3: A generic confusion matrix for a two-class decision problem.
Several different types of error rates are commonly reported in biometrics studies. There is
some disagreement in the research community as to which rates are important [133], but the
generally accepted errors are as follows (see Figure 2.2):
Crude Accuracy (CA): Also called misclassification error, this standard method of report-
ing results is simply the number of incorrect classifications made when comparing the clas-
sifier output to the known true class for the pattern [134]. As it is a combination of the next
two metrics, it delivers minimal value on its own.
False Accept Rate (FAR): Also called Type I error or false positive. FAR expresses the
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Figure 2.2: Generic classifier performance metrics, with threshold levels for secure, insecure,
and unknown security levels, showing the relationship between EER, FAR and FRR. These
curves do not represent results from this or any research. Adapted from [12].
likelihood that an unauthorized user (i.e., an impostor) will be granted access to the protected
resource. High FAR values are often seen as a significant problem because they represent an
intrusion into a protected system, although the determination of a threshold accepted level
is left to particular implementations. Let FA be the number of false accepts and NI be the
number of impostor patterns. FAR is calculated as in Equation 2.1 [135]:
FAR =
FA
NI
(2.1)
False Reject Rate (FRR): Also called Type II error or false negative. FRR represents the
likelihood that an authorized user will be denied access to the protected resource. It can be
seen as an annoyance to the authorized user since it means that they will have to attempt
to reauthenticate, perhaps more than once. Let FR represent the number of false rejects
from the classifier output and NA be the number of authorized user patterns. Then, FRR is
calculated using Equation 2.2.
FRR =
FR
NA
(2.2)
The relationship between FAR and FRR has been described as mutually exclusive since it is
impossible to both reject and accept the same authentication attempt [18, 136]. While such
a statement is true, care must be taken when using such a description for these two related
error rates. FAR and FRR also share an inverse relationship – it should not be assumed from
the use of the term “mutually exclusive” that no relationship exists between the error rates.
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The proof of such a relationship lies in the definition of Equal Error Rate (EER).
Equal Error Rate (EER): EER is defined as the point at which the plotted curves of FAR
and FRR values cross [12], as seen in Figure 2.2. In this figure, a large or “slack” error
threshold means that the value above which an authentication attempt is granted access is
low. In other words, more authentication attempts will be accepted than with a small, or
“tight”, error threshold. The terms “small” and “large” in this context refer to the range in
which accepted attempts reside. With small error thresholds, the range of values that are
accepted is small, and the reverse for a large error threshold. EER can also be determined by
plotting the ROC curve for the classifier, as detailed below, and determining its abscissa by
plotting a diagonal line from the upper left to the lower right corners and observing where
the two lines cross.
ROC Curve: A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, as seen in Figure 2.3, shows
the relationship between FAR and True Accept Rate (TAR), which is the number of patterns
that actually belong to the positive class [134]. The ROC curve shows the overall usefulness
of the results of the pattern classification. The closer the line comes to the upper left corner of
the graph, the better the method is at correctly identifying or verifying users. Furthermore,
since this curve is based over all thresholds, it can be used to select a viable threshold at
which the classifier in question is most accurate.
Area Under Curve (AUC): AUC is a measurement of the area under the ROC curve [137]
for a given classifier and a given user. It is a representation of the probability of a true
response (either positive or negative) when classifying data – a random classifier will have
an AUC value of 0.5 (50%) and an ideal classifier will have an AUC of 1.0 (100%). AUC
is a summary that attempts to represent the entire ROC curve in one value. As such, AUC
calculation loses some information and nuances of the original curve since the individual
tradeoff values that make up the curve are lost.
The European Standard for Access Control Systems (EN 50133-1) states that a biometric
authentication system must have a False Accept Rate (FAR) of less than 0.001% and a False
Reject Rate (FRR) of less than 1% in order to be used in production systems [138]. However,
the error rates suggested in EN 50133-1 are not specific to behavioral biometrics, which are
known to be less distinctive than physiological biometrics [65]. Therefore, the values stated
in EN 50133-1 may not provide a suitable benchmark to use in determining the applica-
bility of any behavioral biometric. Instead, the error rates of related work in the particular
biometric field may be used as a benchmark.
The research presented to this point has examined biometrics for use on mobile devices, in-
cluding user acceptance of them and the methods of reporting their errors. Their use in the
mobile device environment has the potential to provide a continuous, transparent authenti-
cation method. This concept has been studied by several researchers, both for mobile device
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Figure 2.3: An example ROC curve. The AUC for this curve is 80.13%. The EER (25.99%)
is the point where the two lines cross.
and standard computer authentication.
2.7 Transparent and Continuous Authentication
In the context of this work, transparent authentication is defined as verifying the identity of
the user of a mobile device without explicitly requiring user effort. This section discusses
current literature on transparent authentication, which is also called implicit [56, 80, 139] or
zero-interaction authentication [140]. For the purposes of this research, the term transparent
authentication will be used in place of all other similar terms. The implication is that the data
upon which to base an authentication decision is found in how a person uses a device while
that person goes about their regular tasks.
Attempts to describe transparent authentication have been seen as early as 2002. Corner and
Noble [140] describe a system that uses a physical hardware token worn by the user that
wirelessly communicates a master password to a laptop that is then used to unlock a larger
password file. However, their system requires the user to explicitly authenticate to the token,
which means that their system is not truly transparent, although the authors state that the
owner would have to authenticate less often than with regular password systems [140].
Since early attempts in 2002, the idea of transparent authentication has been researched
heavily. In 2008, Briggs and Olivier [141] suggested creating “biometric daemons” that
learned their owners’ behavior, pined and eventually died in the absence of this behavior.
Their ideas were based on the His Dark Materials trilogy of books by Philip Pullman [142]
in which a human is matched with a small creature, called his daemon, who essentially
represents the human’s soul and will pine and die in the absence of the human, as will the
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human in the absence of the daemon. Briggs and Olivier paint a picture of an electronic
form of daemon that requires imprinting and nurturing – essentially equivalent to the more
traditional enrolment and testing phases of authentication systems. This is a rather fanciful
embodiment of the idea of transparent authentication, and Briggs and Olivier do not go
beyond the thought-experiment phase.
In 2009, Tanviruzzaman et al. [52] experimented with the idea of an “electronic pet” that
learns the owner’s patterns to determine the identity of the person using it. Tanviruzzaman et
al. go beyond Briggs and Olivier’s idea to describe which biometrics they intend to gather:
gait, location, voice, fingerprints, and facial patterns. It is unclear how they intend to com-
bined these processor-intensive biometrics into a single decision. Their system is described
as “silent and less intrusive most of the time, i.e., the authentication process runs continu-
ously in the background until a higher level of security is needed” [52], which implies that
it is an transparent authentication system although they do not use such a term specifically.
They have extended Briggs and Olivier’s thought experiment but have not yet, to this author’s
knowledge, empirically evaluated their proposals.
Marsh and Briggs [143] expanded the idea of a biometric daemon further by developing
a concept they call device comfort. Rather than focusing solely on the capabilities of the
biometric daemon, Marsh and Briggs examine the device’s relationship with its owner –
device comfort – and relate it to the concept of trust in an electronic environment. Marsh
and Briggs consider electronic trust to be related to the device’s knowledge of its owner’s
patterns, preferences and data on the device, although this is a simplification of a increasingly
well-defined concept [144]. In this way, the concepts of electronic device trust may also be
used as a foundation for transparent authentication on a mobile device. While trust in an
electronic environment is applicable to transparent authentication, it is not a topic that will
be addressed in this dissertation. The reader is directed towards more thorough sources for
further information [144, 145].
Marsh and Briggs point out that device comfort is not the same as the owner’s relationship
with the device. Device comfort is from the point of view of the device rather than from
its owner. The owner’s point of view is achieved through customizing the device interface.
Device comfort originates from the point of view of the device since it is the device that does
the majority of the work. Their work was intended to fill the gap between increasing mobile
device functionality and the limited amount of security on such devices. In this way, the work
of Marsh and Briggs has similar goals as the work described in this dissertation, although
their work does not reference authentication. They do, however, provide a “roadmap” that
can be used to apply the concept of device comfort to a mobile environment, which allows
transparent authentication on mobile devices to be developed with this in mind as well as
with a strong idea of how electronic trust applies.
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Riva et al. have proposed a solution to mobile device authentication [146]. Their solution,
called progressive authentication, does not appear to be a new method; instead, it is an exam-
ination of whether when we decide to authenticate (as opposed to how) improves the security
of mobile devices. The authors suggest that if the mobile device remains in the owner’s pos-
session, even if the owner is not currently interacting with it, there is no need to authenticate
should the owner decide to use the device. However, if the device has lost contact with its
owner (i.e., it is lent to someone else or placed on a surface), then authentication should be
required. Riva et al. suggest a hybrid transparent authentication method since with enough
information regarding who possesses the device, authentication is transparent. Otherwise,
explicit authentication is required. Their user study showed that they were able to reduce the
number of required authentications by 42%.
Shi et al. cite the frustration owners experience in entering standard passwords and PINs into
small mobile device keyboards as a motivating factor for transparent authentication [80], a
notion that is supported by Allen et al. [147]. Shi et al. proposed using a smartphone to record
the owner’s location, motion, phone call patterns, and application usage to determine whether
the owner is in possession of the smartphone, and allow him or her to access the Internet
based on this determination. Shi et al. have the main goal of using sources of identifying
data that do not require typing since they see smartphone keyboards as frustrating and error-
prone. The high levels of reported success show that device use patterns are indeed a rich
source of information.
A behavioral biometric that may be used transparently was studied by Conti et al. [148] in
2011. Their work uses the accelerometers and gyroscopes in mobile devices to track the
movements a user makes when answering a phone call, with the purpose of using these
distinctive movements to identify the device’s owner. Their research showed that there is
sufficient uniqueness in this pattern to verify the owner’s identity, and suggest that it can be
used in an transparent manner. The gap in the research that Conti et al. have filled is that
passwords and PINs on mobile devices are not required when answering an incoming phone
call, and thus do not protect the device from misuse in that case.
The applicability of behavioral biometrics to transparent authentication has been presented
in this section. While these individual instances of studies to determine their feasibility are
important, what is required to solve the mobile device authentication problem is a model that
is biometric and platform independent, so that as technology progresses, the model stays
useful.
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2.8 Transparent Authentication Frameworks
As transparent authentication becomes a more heavily researched field, authors are begin-
ning to note that a framework for supporting such an authentication method would be in-
valuable. Such a framework removes the focus from specific methods, such as particular
biometrics that can be gathered while the owner goes about other tasks, and moves on to the
requirements to support device use and functionality choices in light of the specific biometric
decisions. Since it is a relatively new research aim, there have been only a few published
attempts at creating such a framework or model.
In 2008, Furnell, Clarke and Karatzouni [149] described a framework called Non-Intrusive
Continuous Authentication (NICA). NICA was designed to allow transparent, continuous
authentication that provides more security than secret-knowledge techniques such as pass-
words and PINs. They used keystroke dynamics, facial recognition and voice patterns as
their biometric identifiers. NICA includes the idea of an “alert level” that relates the bio-
metric decisions to the device functionality, and also uses an explicit authentication method
when the transparent method is insufficient.
In 2009, Clarke, Furnell and Karatzouni [17] published an extension of their 2008 NICA pa-
per [149] that moves beyond the framework stage to lab experiments and testing. Their study
used two approaches to assess user perceptions of current and potential future forms of au-
thentication. The first approach was to issue an online survey that gathered 297 respondents.
The second approach was a focus group with 12 participants. The result of both approaches
was a determination of a series of stakeholder requirements for a transparent authentication
framework, that they then used to improve the NICA framework. Once complete, they built
a prototype of NICA and performed an end-user trial with 27 participants. The overall result
was that 92% of the trial participants felt that NICA provided a more secure environment
compared to traditional authentication methods, although the traditional methods were not
specified.
Clarke, Furnell and Karatzouni’s work depends on having a server–side extension to the
mobile device that manages authentication decisions, data synchronization and biometric
profiling. This implies that the data must leave the device for processing, which may have
privacy implications. Furthermore, Clarke, Furnell, and Karatzouni used a mocked-up device
that existed as an interface on a desktop computer due to limitations in mobile device memory
and programmability at the time of their experiments. This requires a certain “suspension
of disbelief” on the part of the study participants since they are not using the device itself,
which may affect the outcome of the study. Advances in technology have made it possible
to extend Clarke, Furnell and Karatzouni’s framework to allow for on-device processing.
Jakobsson et al. [139] were among the first authors to use the term “implicit authentication”.
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In their work, Jakobsson et al. further filled the transparent authentication gap by proposing
a model for it, although they did not create a working implementation of it. They suggest
two important findings: first, that both authentication security and usability are increased
by using transparent authentication when compared to explicit methods; second, that while
transparent authentication can be used on many devices, it is ideally suited to mobile devices
because of their access to a rich source of data about the device owner [139]. They did not,
however, proffer justification for either claim. Jakobsson et al. also consider data that is
available from the carrier and from off the device itself. They chose to use the call frequency
as the sole biometric, although they do make reference to other biometrics such as keystroke
dynamics that could be used.
The model that resulted from Jakobsson et al.’s work is yet another step in the direction
towards realizing transparent authentication but has issues such as how the results of call
frequency calculations relate to what may be done on the mobile device. Another issue in
their work is that there is no comparison of the strength of call frequency to other biometrics
that can be used on a mobile device.
In 2007, Mazhelis and Puuronen [79] produced a framework for user substitution detection
(USD) on mobile devices. They claim to consider security “detective” methods, rather than
“preventive” aspect of security. The difference with these two approaches is that the former
investigates who committed an intrusion after it happens, while the latter focuses on prevent-
ing the intrusion from happening. Mazhelis and Puuronen claim that USD is only closely
related to authentication rather than true authentication. In their view, true authentication
can be assumed to end when the user is granted access to a resource, although more con-
temporary definitions of authentication refer to allowing or disallowing the use of specific
resources, services and data. Mazhelis and Puuronen’s work focuses on a strong psycholog-
ical connection between the user’s actions and their uniqueness and classification ability in
place of implementation methods and pattern classification techniques.
Biometric techniques and the frameworks that support them require methods for comparing
gathered patterns to known patterns. Typically, machine learning techniques such as sta-
tistical and neural network-based pattern classification algorithms have been used for this
purpose.
2.9 Pattern Classification and Machine Learning
The pattern matching tasks in most biometrics research use standard pattern classification
algorithms to make decisions. Figure 2.4 shows a typical workflow for a pattern classification
task. The workflow begins with the selection of one or more classifiers for the data at hand.
Next, the classifiers are trained with a subset of the gathered data to create a model to which
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test data and future patterns will be compared. Once training is complete, the classifier model
is tested for accuracy by presenting the trained classifier with some test data that was not used
in the training phase. The results of the tests are then examined and measurements such as
those described in Section 2.6.5 are generated.
The next step is to simplify the model by identifying those data features that provide the
most discriminatory information to the classifier and removing those that provide minimal
information. This reduction of dimensionality simplifies the classifier since there are fewer
features to compare during any one classification task. It may be the case that no features
may be removed if they are all equally important.
Select 
Classifier
Train (create 
model)
Measure 
Classifier 
Accuracy
Simplify 
Model
Figure 2.4: Generic workflow for a pattern classification problem.
If the error rates are not sufficiently low, then a different classifier is selected, as shown by
the top dotted arrow in the figure. If the dimensionality can be reduced, then the new model
is once again tested with the same data as in the previous test and the error rates are compared
to see if simplifying the model had an effect. The expected outcome is that the error rates
are no lower than previously, although there are some cases where simplifying the model
may increase the classifier’s accuracy. Once the most accurate classifier has been chosen, the
model can be used to classify new data.
The classifiers used for this research are suitable for use on a mobile device platform, which
has limitations in memory, battery life and processor speed. For this reason, several factors
influence classifier choice, as follows:
Simplicity: the classifier should have a simple algorithm.
Speed: the classifier should make a decision within a few seconds so that device function-
ality is not impaired.
Accuracy: the classifier should, within the constraints of behavioral biometric accuracy,
have acceptably high AUC and low EER, FAR and FRR values. The exact definition
of “acceptable” relies on the specific classifier and biometric implementation.
The following classifiers, all of which meet the first two requirements stated above, are
commonly used and are standard in some programming language libraries:
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Naı¨ve Bayes (Gaussian and Kernel Density): This probabilistic classifier uses either a Gaus-
sian or Kernel Density Estimation, and requires data independence within each class.
Data independence means that the presence of one feature in the data is unrelated to the
presence of any other feature. Such a characteristic lends itself well to small datasets
since using additional features does not require an exponentially larger dataset. The
specific types of Naı¨ve Bayes classifier tested were Gaussian distributions for estima-
tion, and also a kernel density model since the data in this study does not follow a
Gaussian distribution. A kernel density Naı¨ve Bayes classifier does not make assump-
tions regarding the distribution of the data to be classified (a Gaussian model assumes
a Gaussian data distribution), and is suitable for continuous rather than discrete mea-
surements. Based on the training data, the probability density of the timing features
for each class is estimated using a kernel function. When new data is presented to the
classifier, it is placed in the class whose estimated density function gives the highest
value for the new data [150].
Decision Tree (DT): This classifier is often used to map decisions used to place data into
one or more classes. Each node in the tree represents a feature in the data that can
be used to determine to which class it belongs. The leaf nodes of the tree represent
the classes. Decision trees are a suitable classifier for the data in this research because
they are fast to classify new data, and have misclassification error rates that are com-
parable to more complex classifiers. They also make no assumptions about the data’s
distribution.
k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN): This algorithm creates a feature space by plotting all training
data on an n-dimensional graph as single points. When new data is classified, the
data point is plotted on the same graph, and then assigned the majority class of its k
nearest neighbors, where k is a parameter that can be adjusted by the experimenter.
Smaller values of k allow classification when there is only a small amount of training
data. Manhattan and Euclidean distance measures were tested with the k-NN pattern
classifier to determine whether the distance measure used makes a difference to the
accuracy of k-NN.
The following two classification algorithms were considered for use with this research, but
were discounted because they did not meet one or more of the above requirements:
Support Vector Machine (SVM): This classifier is commonly used with two-class prob-
lems that use supervised learning methods. The model represents the data as points
in space that are divided by a hyperplane; one of the two classes is on each side of
the hyperplane. New data is classified by plotting it in the same space and predicting
its class based on which side of the hyperplane the point falls. While Support Vector
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Machines are well-suited to the type of data seen in this study, they are often slow to
classify and require significant processor speed and memory. For these reasons, SVM
was considered a poor choice for this work and was thus not tested.
Neural Network (NN): Artificial neural networks are based on the network of biological
neurons that are present in the human brain. They consist of a series of artificial
neurons or nodes that are interconnected in such a way that they can be used to model
complex relationships between the network’s inputs and outputs. One of their uses is
to find patterns in data. A basic neural network consists of at least three layers: the
input, output and hidden layers. The nodes in each layer are connected to each other in
that each node in each layer passes its output to each node in the next layer, as shown
in Figure 2.5. The interconnections may be weighted, and the training (or learning)
phase of a neural network updates the weights for each interconnection. Generally,
neural networks have high accuracy but are slow to train and to classify. Furthermore,
they may require large amounts of training data, depending on the application. For
these reasons, they were considered unsuitable for this work and were not tested.
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Figure 2.5: Example of a neural network. The numbers on each interconnection are the
weights for that connection. They are updated during training.
Pattern classifiers are used to make decisions about the class of new data based on the fea-
tures and known class of previously provided data. They may be used for pattern matching
in biometric implementations, but should be accurate, algorithmically simple and provide
timely answers to new classification data.
2.10 The Transparent Authentication Framework
The current research into authentication, specifically that which takes place on a mobile
device, has provided a basis for further work in the field. Specifically, the research examined
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in this chapter has provided evidence to support the need for a mobile device authentication
method that has the following properties:
1. Allows provision of authentication and access control methods that go beyond point-of
entry security, such as those provided by passwords and PINs.
2. Works transparently to remove the need for explicit authentication, therefore providing
less intrusive and frustrating approach to authentication. This is intended to be suitable
for use with the short-but-frequent patterns that characterize mobile device use.
3. Takes into account user needs and wishes for mobile device authentication.
4. Maintains the device owner’s privacy by keeping their personally identifying data on
the device.
To address these needs, this research introduces the Transparent Authentication Framework.
This framework provides the basis for creating a continuous, transparent authentication
method for mobile devices by sampling behavioral biometrics while the owner uses their
device in a normal manner. The behavioral biometrics, which can be combined into a mul-
timodal biometric in order to potentially decrease errors, are used to make decisions about
the device user’s identity, which is then used to affect device confidence. This concept is
defined as the certainty that the device has that its user is the device owner. It is linked to
device service provision by mapping the device confidence to allowable tasks and data on
the device. If the minimum device confidence for a particular task or data is higher than the
currently calculated device confidence, the task or data is not accessible. The authentication
provided by such a framework is continuous in that the user’s behavioral biometrics are sam-
pled each time they use the device, and it is transparent in that the device owner does not
have to explicitly authenticate each time they wish to use the device.
2.11 Terminology Used in this Dissertation
The terminology used in the remainder of this dissertation is defined here. This section is
not exhaustive; many definitions are provided as they are used.
Mobile device: a typical smartphone. One definition of a mobile device is “any device that
can send and receive telephony services, contains a SIM card, and is controlled by a
mobile network operator” [151]. However, as stated by Becher et al., this definition
is too broad since it also includes mobile phones that are not considered smartphones
– those with limited functionality beyond telephony and text messaging. These latter
type of mobile device are called feature phones, and are not included in this definition
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of mobile device. Furthermore, laptop and desktop computers and tablets are excluded
as well. Therefore, the use of the term mobile device should be seen as synonymous
with the term smartphone. Specifically excluded from this definition are laptop and
desktop computers, e-book readers, and tablet computers.
Identification: determining whether a person is amongst a group of authorized users of a
protected resource.
Verification: determining the veracity of a claimed identity.
Keystroke dynamics: a behavioral biometric that uses typing patterns to identify or verify
the identity of the typist.
Speaker verification: a behavioral biometric that uses a person’s speech patterns to verify
a claimed identity.
Multimodal biometric: a combination of two or more biometric identifiers into a single
biometric, with which a decision on identity verification can be based.
2.12 Summary
This chapter has introduced the fundamental concepts that form the basis of this research. It
has provided a high–level view of authentication, biometrics and pattern classification, and
has defined key terms that will be used throughout this research. The purpose, therefore, has
been to provide a strong basis upon which the state-of-the-art research in the field of authen-
tication may be built. As such, this chapter has also examined the current research in the field
of mobile device authentication, with specific focus on biometrics and transparent authenti-
cation. Current work on several physiological and behavioral biometrics was examined, with
a focus on how these biometrics relate to authentication on mobile devices. Specific use of
behavioral biometrics as transparent authenticators on mobile devices was examined; finally,
other frameworks for transparent authentication were reviewed. The findings of the current
research in the field of mobile device authentication has provided a basis for the Transparent
Authentication Framework presented in this dissertation. This Framework expands upon the
current state-of-the-art by providing continuous, transparent mobile device authentication
based on behavioral biometrics. It is this Framework that addresses the research question
and resultant hypotheses presented in Chapter 1, and thus provides novel work in the field of
authentication.
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Chapter 3
Transparent Authentication
Framework for Mobile Devices
This chapter introduces the main contribution of this research: the Transparent Authentica-
tion Framework. The Framework provides a model for designing and developing a trans-
parent authentication mechanism to verify the user’s identity on a mobile device; its target
audience is mobile device developers. It is intended to be conceptually device and operating
system neutral, whether manufacturer or version.
The sections in this chapter cover concepts of device confidence (the level of certainty that
the current user is, in fact, the device owner), the data required as input to and the pro-
cesses associated with the Framework, and the requirements for the biometrics that may be
included. Each section contains a discussion of the rationale for the inclusion or concept, ma-
jor elements thereof, and examples of what technology may be used. Since the Framework
is intended to be device and software independent, it provides a basis for selecting the best
available design choices for provision of a continuous, transparent authentication method on
a variety of mobile devices.
3.1 Framework Overview
The Transparent Authentication Framework provides a model for creating an authentication
mechanism for mobile devices that goes beyond point-of-entry secret knowledge-based tools
such as passwords and PINs. The Framework describes an authentication model that utilizes
measurable patterns of device use that can be gathered during its normal functioning. The
data collected during execution of these common tasks and the identifiable patterns within
them are used to verify the identity of the owner of a mobile device. Presumably, owner
verification can also enable access to data and functions. In terms of the three access control
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components introduced in Chapter 2, the Transparent Authentication Framework exists in
the convergence of something you have, something you know and something you are. The
placement of the Framework in the greater access control field is shown in Figure 3.1.
Something 
you have
Something 
you know
Something 
you are
Physiological 
BiometricsBank card
Token
Password
PIN
Biometric 
Passport
Bank card 
w/ PIN
Behavioral 
Biometrics
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Figure 3.1: Placement of the Transparent Authentication Framework in the access control
domain. It resides at the convergence of the three standard access control factors: something
you have, something you know and something you are.
This chapter introduces the concept of device confidence as a means of expressing the on-
going confidence that the current user is also its owner. Device confidence increases and
decreases in response to biometric matches and non-matches. This continually changing
measure is mapped to on-device tasks and data. Task confidence is the level set by the owner
as the minimum threshold at which access to the task is permitted so that those considered
private or sensitive require a higher device confidence to be accessed. The intention is to
provide a more nuanced approach to security when compared to binary allowed/not allowed
security currently provided by passwords and PINs.
The authentication delivered by this Framework is transparent in that it does not require ex-
plicit user interaction. Instead, it takes advantage of uniquely identifying behavioral features
available while the owner uses the device. The authentication is also continuous in that it
is updated even when the device is not being used. In this way, it goes beyond traditional
point–of–entry authentication provided by passwords and PINs, which only protect the de-
vice up to the point the secret knowledge is entered. The transparent, continuous nature of
this Framework supports flexible, dynamic authentication.
In some situations, the device may have too low a confidence to permit access to functions
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requested by the owner; for instance, if the owner has only recently begun using the device.
To manage these situations, device confidence can be augmented with secondary, explicit
authentication methods such as challenge questions, a PIN or password. This secondary
method is not all-access; a correct challenge response raises device confidence by incre-
ments. This means that access to sensitive information remains possible only at the highest
device confidence levels.
The Transparent Authentication Framework addresses implementation concerns for mobile
device methods. Such concerns include the required characteristics of included behavioral
biometrics, how to combine these into a multimodal biometric for additional security, and al-
lowing the device owner to customize options. The Framework includes a process that maps
biometric decisions to device confidence, as well as the types of biometrics and classifiers
that may be used. Furthermore, this Framework respects device owner privacy since it is
designed in such a way that all device owner data remains on the device rather than being
processed at a server that then delivers a biometric decision.
The Transparent Authentication Framework uses device confidence, as calculated by bio-
metric decisions, to determine what tasks may be completed or data may be accessed. Each
task or data is assigned a confidence level either by default or explicitly by the device owner.
If the device confidence is greater than or equal to the required task/data confidence, then the
device user is allowed to complete the task or access the data. Otherwise, the task or data
access is denied and the user must attempt to raise the device confidence. This general flow
is shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Transparent Authentication Framework general flow.
The workflow begins with the device confidence at 0% since the device owner has not yet
provided biometrics with which a baseline can be established. The Enrolment phase, seen at
the upper left corner of Figure 3.2, precedes the Bootstrapping phase, and allows the owner to
provide biometric samples and set initial task confidence levels. Using the Enrolment phase
3.2. Device Confidence 47
in this manner allows device confidence to start at a level higher than 0%. This determination,
and the level at which device confidence will start, is left to the developer who uses the
Framework as a model for an application. As the device begins to know its owner, the device
confidence raises until the owner pattern is established. Until this point, access to data and
tasks is limited. During the Continuous, Transparent Authentication phase, the device user
is allowed access to a task or to data if their current device confidence is above the threshold
set for that task or data. During this period, the device confidence fluctuates as biometric
matches and non-matches occur. At some point, the device user has requested a task or data
whose task confidence is higher than that currently seen on the device. The owner may then
enter their response to the explicit authentication challenge, which may increase the device
confidence to a high enough level to allow the task or data access.
If the device is no longer being used, the device confidence lowers until it reaches 0% since
there is no biometric or explicit authentication data upon which to base increases or maintain
confidence. This regular degradation in device confidence implies that the device will even-
tually disallow access to all tasks and data. This can be overridden in the event the device
is once again used by entering the explicit authentication response. Then the flow shown in
Figure 3.2 begins anew at the beginning of the Bootstrapping phase.
3.2 Device Confidence
Device confidence is defined as the certainty the device has that its current user is the device
owner. This confidence is altered by the results of biometric matching – a non-match lowers
the device confidence and a match raises it. Device confidence can also change based on a
correct or incorrect response to an explicit authentication method that is used as a supple-
mental security mechanism. As such, the device confidence can be thought of as a value
ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 means that the device either does not recognize the current
user at all, or that there is not enough information to determine who is using the device,
and 100 means that the device is fully confident that the device owner is currently using the
device. These values can be seen as percentages, meaning that a device confidence of 50 is
half as confident as a device confidence of 100. Device confidence begins at 0% for new,
untrained devices.
3.3 Data Structures
The Transparent Authentication Framework has several types of data structures that support
it. The data structures are designed to be flexible and to use commonly available data primi-
tives that are available in most programming languages. They minimize the amount and type
3.3. Data Structures 48
of data required in order to support on–device processing, which helps protect privacy by
keeping the device owner’s personal information on their device.
3.3.1 Event Objects
Event objects are created from raw biometric patterns or from correct answers to explicit
authentication requests. There are two different types of event objects: biometric and explicit
authentication. The event object eij refers to the j-th instance of authenticator i, where
i, j ∈ N. All event objects, eij , are tuples that consist of the following:
• A timestamp, t;
• A feature vector, fv , that is a representation of either the biometric or the answer to the
explicit authentication method;
• A probability, pi, that the feature vector belongs to the device owner.
eij = (t, fv , pi)
The two different types of event objects, while the same in structure, have a few differences
in the contents of each variable in the tuple, as shown in Table 3.1.
Event Object t fv pi
Biometric
Time the biometric
was gathered
Represents the
gathered biometric.
Different for each
biometric
Probability that the
biometric belongs
to device owner
based on fv
Explicit
Authentication
Time the explicit
authentication was
gathered
User-supplied
answer to the
explicit
authentication
pi ∈ {0, 1}
Table 3.1: The differing components of each of the two types of event objects.
Event objects are the smallest building block of the Transparent Authentication Framework.
They are the basis for all decision–making processes within the Framework, and should be
organized in such a way that older event objects are considered before newer. Buffers are
one example of a data structure that supports this requirement.
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3.3.2 Input Event Object Buffers
The input event object buffers, as pictured in Figure 3.3, hold the event object instances
created from the raw biometrics. There is one input event object buffer for each type of
biometric used in the Framework and one additional buffer for the explicit authentication
input. As each biometric is determined to belong to the device owner, it is placed in the
corresponding sample buffer until needed to recalculate device confidence. The buffers are
First In First Out (FIFO), meaning that the oldest samples will be replaced by newer samples
as they become available.
e11 e12 e13 ... e1m
...
en1 en2 en3 ... enm
age
e11 e12 e13 ... e1mExplicit Authentication
Biometric n
Biometric 1
Figure 3.3: Input Event Object buffers. There is one buffer for each type of biometric and
one for explicit authentication.
Figure 3.3 shows each buffer as having lengthm, but in practice it is likely that buffers would
have different lengths. The recommended data structure for input event object buffers is a
FIFO queue, allowing older samples to be discarded as new samples are added.
3.3.3 Training Event Object Buffers
Training event object buffers follow the same basic structure as input event object buffers,
except that there are only buffers for individual biometrics. Explicit authentication buffers
are not required because this authentication method does not rely on pattern classification and
thus does not require periodic retraining. In the case of multimodal biometrics, the pattern
classification is performed on an individual biometric basis. The individual biometric buffers
are populated with those event objects that have been used to raise device confidence and that
are considered particularly descriptive of the mobile device owner, and are used on a first–
come, first–served basis. Therefore, the recommended data structure for training event object
buffers is a FIFO queue.
3.4. Processes 50
3.3.4 Device Confidence Value
The device confidence is a value that ranges between 0 and 100, as described in Section 3.2.
Since device confidence is a value that is compared to other similar values, the recommended
data type is a floating–point number.
3.4 Processes
There are several processes that use the data and data structures described in the previous
section. The processes comprise the Framework’s main actions throughout the lifecycle
described in Section 3.1. Each process in the following sections is introduced by stating its
inputs and outputs and then describing its intended use.
3.4.1 Update Biometric Input Event Object Buffer
Input: A raw biometric pattern and a trained classifier for that biometric
Output: A new biometric event object and a newly updated biometric event object buffer
This process updates the event object buffer for a given biometric pattern. It begins when a
biometric included in the Framework is gathered. A single biometric event is defined using
a windowing process. Each raw biometric pattern is gathered for a set period of time, after
which a new event object is created. The time period depends on the type of biometric being
gathered, and thus is an optional parameter within the Framework. All of the raw biometric
data gathered during this set time is considered one pattern, and is processed into a feature
vector that is then presented to the trained classifier for the particular type of biometric. The
classifier output is a probability that the device user is its owner, pi for the i-th pattern.
After classification has taken place, an event object as described in Section 3.3.1 is created
and added to the buffer that corresponds to the biometric used in the calculations. The new
event object remains in the buffer until it is replaced by a newer event object, or is culled due
to its age.
3.4.2 Update Explicit Authentication Event Object Buffer
Input: A response to the explicit authentication challenge
Output: An explicit authentication event object and a newly updated explicit authentication
event object buffer
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When the device owner answers their explicit authentication challenge, a new explicit au-
thentication event object is created. Its time t is the time the answer was provided, and in
place of a feature vector, the answer to the challenge is provided. These event objects are
created whether or not the correct response is given; in the case of an incorrect response, the
probability is set at 0%. For a correct response, it is set to 100%. In this way, a correct answer
has a high weighting when calculating device confidence, which is expected since explicit
authentication is similar to knowing a password, which is commonly used as the sole check
of a person’s identity. Once the new event object has been created, it is added to the end of
the explicit authentication event object buffer, in much the same way as for the biometrics
buffers.
3.4.3 Compute Averaged Biometric Probability
Input: An event object buffer
Output: A single probability that is the combination of the input probabilities in the buffer
Possible methods for creating a multimodal biometric are described in detail in Chapter 6,
which introduces a study used to determine whether multimodal biometrics are more distinc-
tive than individual biometrics. Within the Framework, multimodal biometrics are computed
by combining several probabilities using the methods detailed in Chapter 6.
The probability of the gathered biometric belonging to the device owner P (e) is based on
the output of the biometric classifier (pi), and is subject to a weighting factor wi:
P (e) = wi ∗ pi
The weighting factor wi is used to make some classifications more substantial than others,
in that they are considered more reliable (i.e., more representative of the device owner) and
thus should have more effect on device confidence. For instance, if the biometric is known
to be relatively indistinct for a given user, its weighting should reduce the biometric’s overall
effect. wi represents the weighting factor for the age of biometric pattern i (which could be
multimodal), and is calculated as follows:
wi =

0 if ai ≥ 30 days
0.5 if 7 days ≤ ai < 30 days
1 if ai < 7 days
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where ai, the age of the biometric in days is calculated as follows (now represents the current
date and time):
ai = now − ti
For example, if the current time (now) is July 13, 2012 at 9:45am (this is the biometric’s
t value in the event object) is subtracted from a speaker verification biometric gathered on
July 12, 2012 at 2:45pm, the difference is 1101 minutes, which is approximately 0.76 days,
calculated as follows:
1101 minutes(
24hoursday ∗ 60 minhour
) ∼= 0.76 days
and thus ai ∼= 0.76 days in the calculation of wi, above.
The values of 30 and 7 days used in the calculation of wi can be adjusted to suit the specific
instance developed using this Framework. This weighting factor accounts for aging bio-
metric samples that may not adequately represent the device owner’s current patterns. For
example, if the device owner rarely makes phone calls on the device, it is possible that there
may not be many voice event objects in the voice biometrics buffer. It is also likely that any
input events in that buffer may be old compared to other buffers since the voice buffer would
not receive enough input to refresh the buffer frequently. In this case, the age of the event
object would mean that it will hold less power to affect device confidence due to this weight-
ing factor. This is unrelated to the probability combination methods in Chapter 6 since the
weightings described above are intended to be applied to the posterior probabilities output
by the pattern classifier on an individual biometric basis. The methods in Chapter 6 are more
robust and intended for multiple biometric instances.
3.4.4 Compute Device Confidence
Input: The multimodal event object(s) and P (e)
Output: Updated device confidence
The calculation for device confidence takes into account the probability P (e) that all the
biometrics currently residing in the event object buffers belong to the device owner. P (e) is
used to calculate the new device confidence, C ′d, as follows:
C ′d =

Cd + value if P (e) ≥ towner
Cd − value if P (e) < towner
where value is a developer–determined percentage that is added to Cd if P (e) is greater
than or equal to the threshold, towner and subtracted from Cd if P (e) is less than towner.
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The threshold towner is a developer-chosen value that represents the point above which the
biometric is considered to belong to the device owner. The developer chooses value based
on the sensitivity of the system, and its tolerance for false accepts and rejects. For example,
value could equal 1% in a system that is very sensitive, such as a work–related mobile device
used by a government official, but be raised to, say, 10% for a personal mobile device. It is
also possible that the developer can change value depending on what stage the authentication
system is in currently. In particular, a higher value amount could be used during the training
stage to reduce the amount of time required before the device can be used in a regular manner,
and then lowered for regular device use.
Device confidence should be up to date at all times since it is what allows or disallows access
to data and tasks. Two methods of determining when to recalculate device confidence are
suggested:
1. On Demand: The current Cd value is compared to the level assigned to the requested
task (Ct) and found to be too low to allow the task. As seen in Figure 3.6a, two possible
actions result from this comparison: if the current device confidence is greater than or
equal to the task confidence, the user is allowed to begin the task. If the current device
confidence is less than task confidence, then the user is prompted to enter their explicit
authentication challenge. If they answer it, the update explicit authentication event ob-
ject buffer process begins, which adds a new event object to the explicit authentication
buffer that is then used to recalculate Cd. At this point, the newly calculated device
confidence is compared to the required task confidence, and the cycle begins again. If
the user does not enter the explicit authentication challenge response, then there is no
information with which to recalculate Cd, and the task is not allowed.
2. Periodically: The Transparent Authentication Framework can access the biometric
decisions via the event objects in each buffer on a timed basis. A default value may
be set (every 10 minutes is one suggestion, although the default timing should be
verified after testing on a production system). The suggested timing can be adjusted
by the device owner in the enrolment stage. This periodic recalculation of device
confidence is how continuous authentication is provided, since the device confidence
is recalculated even when the device owner is not interacting with the device. As
seen in Figure 3.6b, this recalculation uses event objects from the individual biometric
event buffers, if any are available. The figure refers to this as recalculation of device
confidence rather than raising it since it is possible that the biometrics in the buffer
may not represent the device owner. In such a case, device confidence may be lowered
during recalculation. If no biometric samples are available, then the device confidence
is lowered according to the calculations given in the previous section. During the
initial training phase of the Framework, the period for recalculation is set to zero,
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which means that as soon as a new event object is created, it is used to increase the
device confidence immediately.
When device confidence is recalculated, it takes into account all event objects in the biomet-
rics event buffers. The process begins by taking the event objects in all biometric buffers and
computing a combined biometric probability for each type of biometric, as shown in the top
of Figure 3.4. This calculation provides a single probability that the user is the device owner
that is based on all current event objects for that type of biometric. After this is completed for
all biometrics, the composite probabilities are then combined into a single probability using
the biometric combination method, as seen in the lower half of Figure 3.4. The result is a
single combined probability that is based on all event objects in all buffers. Since explicit
authentication event objects are also represented as probabilities, they can be included in this
process in the way described here. This single probability is then used to recalculate device
confidence.
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Figure 3.4: Multimodal biometric calculations to update device confidence.
3.4.5 Make Task Decision
Input: Current device confidence, required task confidence
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Output: Binary value that represents whether the user can perform the task (1 is yes; 0 is
no)
This process is wholly dependent on the current level of device confidence. There is a map-
ping between the current profile’s device confidence, Cd, and the tasks that are possible. The
task confidence, Ct is determined by the device owner during enrolment, although default
values should be set initially by the developer who uses the Framework. Figure 3.5 shows
an example mapping of several tasks to device confidence levels. It shows that as device
confidence increases, the user is allowed access to tasks of increasing security or sensitivity
level (None, Low, Medium and High).
None
No Functionality
Device
Confidence
(%)
High
Change Device Settings
Medium
Read Email
Low
Receive Phone Call
Device Functionality
Figure 3.5: Mapping of device confidence to task or data threshold. The tasks in each security
level are examples only.
The decision process for allowing or disallowing a task is shown in Figure 3.6.
Cd ≥ Ct ? Allow Task
Prompt for 
Explicit 
Authentication
User 
Attempts Task
Yes
No
Create Event 
Object and Add to 
Explicit Auth Event 
Buffer
Entered
Not
Entered
Recalculate 
Cd
Disallow 
Task
(a) On-demand device confidence recalculation and
task access.
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Empty Empty
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(b) Periodic device confidence recalculation.
Figure 3.6: The two methods by which device confidence is recalculated. The On-Demand
method shows task access logic.
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3.4.6 Update Training Event Object Buffer
Input: Biometric event object(s) and a threshold for minimum acceptable event object prob-
ability
Output: A new training event object buffer
As each biometric event object is used to recalculate device confidence, it is also used as input
to the process that updates the training event object buffer for that biometric. The developer
selects a threshold above which the probability, pi, in the event object is considered high
enough to adequately represent an owner pattern. This threshold is important because it must
be high enough that excellent representations of owner behavior are used for retraining, but
poor representations are discarded. One suggestion for the threshold is 75% as this is likely
a sufficiently high probability to ensure quality of pattern match.
As each event object is found to exceed the chosen threshold, it is added to the end of
the training event object buffer. There is a different buffer for each biometric used in the
Framework, although there are no buffers for explicit authentication since it does not require
a trained classifier.
3.4.7 Refresh Buffers
Input: The buffer to be updated, and the age factor above which a biometric is removed
(biometric dependent)
Output: The updated buffer
As new event objects are added to the buffers, older event objects are removed from the buffer
if the buffer is full when the new object is added. This allows for newer objects to be used in
device confidence calculation. However, this method of refreshing data does not allow for the
case where the buffer is not full, which may occur when few biometric patterns are gathered
(e.g., when the device owner speaks infrequently). In this case, the buffers are refreshed by
periodically assessing the age of each event object in the buffer and removing those that are
older than a given age. This age can be selected by developers since some applications may
allow older event objects, particularly those with a low security requirement.
3.4.8 (Re)train Classifier
Input: Training event object buffer
Output: A retrained classifier model
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The classifiers used to make biometric probability decisions must be trained on known owner
patterns prior to regular use in the Transparent Authentication Framework. The initial train-
ing is a special case of the periodic retraining described below. The only difference is that
the training set is populated either from user–supplied patterns gathered during Enrolment or
Bootstrapping. Otherwise, the process is the same as for retraining the classifier.
The classifiers require periodic retraining because the owner’s patterns will change over time
due to many factors such as device familiarity, varying device and use patterns. Always
comparing to old patterns as trained by the old model will mean that there will be more false
negatives over time as the owner’s patterns develop.
There are several possibilities for policies that govern retraining classifiers:
1. Periodic: Regular retraining based on time (i.e., every 24 hours).
2. Training set deviation: If the probabilities assigned to newer biometric patterns have
declined (especially if they decline in a gradual, regular way) then this could signal that
retraining is necessary since it is possible that the device owner’s patterns have altered
legitimately. If there is a sudden or dramatic difference in a few patterns, these would
not be included in the retraining set because they would not exceed the threshold set
for inclusion in the training buffer.
3. Device Idleness: If the device is not used for a long period of time, the data used to
train the classifiers is likely less useful because of its age. Retraining should take place
from either the Enrolment or Bootstrapping stage to provide up–to–date information
to the classifiers.
4. Processor Idleness: This can signal a time when the device is not being explicitly
used (for example, when the owner is sleeping, assuming it is not being used by an
unauthorized person) and may mark a time when retraining is least likely to impact
device use. This is important because retraining a classifier may not always be simple
or quick. This policy can also be combined with the regular updates idea since it would
make sense to do a regular update when the device owner is usually known to sleep,
which is periodic.
The device and processor idleness policy suggestions can be combined with device situa-
tional awareness to minimize the impact of retraining, in terms of memory and battery life
use. Situational awareness can include the device’s current location as well as whether the
device is currently connected to a power source. In the former case, the device may choose
not to retrain the classifiers if it is in a place it does not frequently habitate. This concept is
related to Marsh and Brigg’s idea of device comfort, in which the device may disallow tasks
if it is in an unfamiliar location or using an unsecured Internet connection [143]. In the latter
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Figure 3.7: Biometric lifecycle.
case, battery life is preserved during a potentially power-hungry task, an idea that is similar
to being warned to plug in your computer before performing regular updates.
3.5 Biometrics Lifecycle
The biometrics used in the Transparent Authentication Framework progress through a series
of stages in the biometric lifecycle, as pictured in Figure 3.7.
Each stage determines how a biometric sample is used and for what purpose. In some cases,
the same biometric sample may not be used more than once. For instance, those samples
provided in Enrolment to train the classifiers may not be used to adjust device confidence
during the Continuous, Transparent Authentication stage. Each biometric used may spend
a different length of time in the initial stages, depending on device use. Each biometric is
ready for use once sufficient samples have been gathered to contribute to device confidence
calculation.
3.5.1 Enrolment
The Enrolment stage marks the beginning of the biometric lifecycle. In this stage, the device
owner provides samples of the biometric patterns used in the Framework that, once provided,
are then used to train the pattern classifiers. Initially, authentication and task access during
Enrolment is dependent on an explicit authentication means, such as a challenge question or
password, since the device confidence has not yet been calculated.
The Enrolment stage is also used to educate the device owner on the transparent authentica-
tion method, including what biometrics are being gathered, how to determine current device
confidence and the purpose of the explicit authentication feature. It is at this point that the
device owner should also be warned that while device confidence is being increased (i.e., the
device is “getting to know” its owner), explicit authentication will happen more frequently,
but will reduce over time. This stage should only be entered in the early stages of using
the biometric in the Framework. Once the initial biometric patterns have been gathered, the
classifier training stage begins.
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3.5.2 Bootstrapping
During bootstrapping, biometric samples are gathered from the user and classified. This
continues until sufficient data is available for the biometric to be used in the overall device
confidence calculation. It is distinct from Enrolment because it requires a trained classifier.
This stage is when newly gathered biometrics resulting from regular device use are compared
to those provided during Enrolment, and the device confidence is increasing to a point where
regular device tasks are allowed. Access to applications, tasks, and data is restricted in
this stage, but can be accessed via the explicit authentication method. Each time a viable
biometric pattern is seen, it is used immediately to increase (or decrease) device confidence.
This continues until the minimum confidence threshold is reached, as set by the device owner
during Enrolment.
This stage holds a certain amount of security risk since there is not yet a device confidence
to use to allow or disallow tasks, which implies that all tasks are available to all users. How-
ever, the device will have minimal functionality since device confidence defaults to 0% in
new implementations, so the risk is minimized. The other concern is owner frustration –
it is likely that the device owner will be required to use the explicit authentication method
more frequently in this stage, which may lead to frustration and concern that transparent
authentication is no less frustrating than password and PIN entry.
3.5.3 Continuous, Transparent Authentication
This represents the normal working of the continuous, transparent authentication system,
in which new biometric patterns gathered as the device is used are presented to the trained
classifier model. Prior to the start of this stage, the device confidence has been increased to
the user–selected minimum confidence threshold via the Bootstrapping phase. The pattern
classification results are used to update the device confidence, and then to allow or disallow
access to tasks and data on the device.
3.6 Design Considerations
This section describes options for the biometrics and pattern classifiers that may be used in
the Framework.
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3.6.1 Biometrics
The Framework uses one or more biometrics to make decisions regarding the identity of the
current mobile device user. The Transparent Authentication Framework supports the use of
more than one type of biometric in order to reduce the error rates seen with many behavioral
biometrics. The type and number of biometrics is not specified in the Framework; they
should be chosen on an individual basis based on the needs of the specific authentication
system being developed. The biometrics are interchangeable so that future improvements
to existing or discoveries of new biometrics may be leveraged to reduce the error rates and
improve security levels beyond those provided by passwords and PINs. While the number
and type of biometrics is meant to be flexible, the biometrics used in the Framework should
have a majority of the following properties:
Universality: each mobile device owner should have the characteristic being measured;
Distinctiveness: any two people should have sufficiently different characteristics that their
identity can be verified (as opposed to matching an identity to the person using the
device);
Collectability: the characteristic can be measured in a quantitative manner;
Acceptability: device owners should consent to using the characteristic to identify them on
their device;
Transparency: the characteristic can be collected while the device owner goes about other
tasks;
Minimality: collecting the characteristic should not require additional hardware other than
that provided by the mobile device alone.
The first four properties are common to all biometrics [59]; the last two are specific to this
Framework.
Possibilities for the biometrics chosen for this Framework include, but are not limited to,
device use, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis, and voice–related patterns. These are all be-
havioral biometrics since most physiological biometrics require explicit participation, such
as providing a fingerprint or iris for scanning, adopting a specific facial expression, orien-
tation, or lighting condition for facial recognition. Furthermore, physiological biometrics
often require an enrolment phase that has its own security concerns such as confirming that
the person providing the biometric is the genuine owner of the device. Therefore, most
physiological biometrics conform to the first four properties listed above, but fall short on
the last two: transparency and minimality. Since these are the two that are most related to
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a continuous, transparent authentication method, physiological biometrics were disqualified
from use with this Framework. Should these biometrics adhere to the need for transparency
and minimality in the future, they may be added to this Framework without changing its
structure.
While the suggested behavioral biometrics all have the required properties, two stand out
as ideal for use with mobile devices: keystroke dynamics and speaker verification. Both
take advantage of common mobile device tasks: typing and speaking. Keystroke dynamics
can be gathered while the device owner types emails and text messages, and voice patterns
may be gathered during phone calls, recording voice memos, or using voice–activated search
capabilities such as those provided by Apple’s Siri1 and the Google voice search application2.
Neither biometric requires anything beyond what is already provided on the mobile device,
specifically a keyboard and a microphone, thereby fulfilling the minimality requirement. The
outstanding properties are collectability, acceptability and distinctiveness; Chapters 4 and 5
in this dissertation have provided initial evidence to conclude that keystroke dynamics and
speaker verification also have these properties.
Keystroke dynamics is straightforward since it can be gathered while the owner goes about
common tasks. Voice patterns, however, are somewhat more complex because the biometric
itself is more complex. Work on speaker verification has the most parallels to a transparent
authentication mechanism for mobile devices because it is concerned only with verifying
the speaker’s identity rather than knowing their identity (speaker recognition) or discovering
their role in a conversation (conversation analysis). Thus, speaker verification along with
keystroke dynamics are recommended as the biometrics for the Transparent Authentication
Framework, although it is the intent that these could be replaced with other biometrics as
required. Furthermore, it is suggested that whatever biometrics are chosen for use be com-
bined into multimodal biometrics since this is a widely accepted way of reducing error rates
seen with individual biometrics.
3.6.2 Pattern Classifiers
Classifier algorithm choice is non–trivial and depends on the biometric chosen and the dis-
tinctiveness of the feature vectors calculated from them. Feasibility studies into the appli-
cability of various classification algorithms should be performed after the biometrics used
have been chosen. Important considerations for initial classifier choice are speed of classifi-
cation, ease of development, processor and memory requirements, and accuracy. Suggested
initial classifiers to test are k-nearest neighbor, decision trees, and Naı¨ve Bayes variations
since they meet these requirements. Justification for these choices is given in Chapters 4
1http://www.apple.com/ios/siri/
2http://www.google.co.uk/intl/en_uk/mobile/voice-search/
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and 5, that describe classifier comparisons for keystroke dynamics and speaker verification
on iPhone and iPod Touch devices. Neural networks may be investigated, but are likely
too computationally intensive for use on a mobile device. More information on classifier
selection properties can be found in Chapter 2.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has presented the Transparent Authentication Framework, a device and oper-
ating system independent model that allows developers to create a continuous, transparent
authentication mechanism that fits the needs of their particular implementation. The Frame-
work was described in terms of data structures and their associated processes. The concept
of device confidence was presented, and a method for mapping device confidence to particu-
lar tasks on the device in question was offered. The biometric lifecycle was described, with
particular focus on how a user might work with an application that was based on the Frame-
work. Specific mention was made of the design considerations specific to the Bootstrapping
stage of the lifecycle, since this stage may require more attention to user education in order
to avoid misconceptions regarding the frequency of explicit authentication method use.
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Chapter 4
Keystroke Dynamics Feasibility
Study
This chapter provides details on the study performed to determine whether keystroke dy-
namics is a suitable behavioral biometric for use in the Transparent Authentication Frame-
work. First, the Keystroke Dynamics Feasibility study1 is introduced, then details of the
study’s methodology are given including participants, apparatus, materials, and procedure.
The study’s results are then presented, along with a discussion of their applicability. Fi-
nally, the results of the keystroke dynamics feasibility study are related to the Transparent
Authentication Framework and to this research as a whole.
4.1 Study Goals
This study was designed to answer two research questions:
1. Is there sufficient distinctive information in the keystroke dynamics of the study partic-
ipants to justify using it as a biometric in the Transparent Authentication Framework?
2. Can an “optimal” classifier be identified for the keystroke dynamics behavioral biomet-
ric? “Optimal” is defined as the classifier with the lowest error rate that also respects
the mobile device environment’s limitations in processor speed and available memory.
The answer to the first research question will provide a partial answer to the first overarching
hypothesis for this dissertation, H1, as identified in Section 1.4.1. As such, this study was
used to determine the feasibility of keystroke dynamics as an authenticator on the iPhone and
iPod Touch prior to developing a full implementation. The answer to the second question
1University of Glasgow ethics approval number FIMS00760.
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above provides a method for evaluating the feasibility by identifying which classifier may be
best deployed in implementing the Transparent Authentication Framework, within the limits
of a particular device and operating system.
Answers to both of these questions required access to a corpus of keystroke dynamics mea-
surements from a soft keyboard on a mobile device. Such a corpus does not yet exist for
research use; thus, another goal of this study was to create a corpus of keystroke dynamics
information from typists using soft keyboards. The results of this study have been used to
tailor the feature vector and pattern classifier for the keystroke dynamics biometric used in
the Transparent Authentication Framework.
4.2 Study Design
The study has two parts: the first part gathered the required keystroke corpus; to this end
an iPhone application was created that allows the user to type text into a textbox using the
standard iOS soft keyboard. The second part of the study presented the gathered patterns to
five pattern classifiers in order to determine whether there was distinctive information in the
keystroke patterns of mobile device typists. The latter part of the study provided information
used to answer the two research questions that drive this research.
The data gathering part of this study used a between–groups experimental design [152, p. 74]
in which each participant was in turn considered the owner of their device and the remaining
participants made up the group rest-of-world. Each of the participants used either an iPhone
or an iPod Touch during the experiment. Both iPod Touch and iPhones were included in the
study because they use the same type of keyboard and operating system, and are functionally
equivalent for the purposes of this study. All devices had a single user, and used the standard
soft keyboard provided by Apple. The data gathering exercise resulted in eight datasets,
each of which contained an owner and rest–of–world class. The gathered datasets were
then presented to the pattern classifiers chosen as part of the second part of the study. The
independent variable for the study was the classifier used on each dataset, which depended
in turn on which participant was considered the owner. The dependent variables were the
classifier error rates, which depended on the participants’ typing metrics.
4.2.1 Participants
The first part of the keystroke pattern gathering project involved eight participants. The five
female and three male participants ranged in age from mid-20s to late 50s, and also ranged
in experience in typing on the iPhone or iPod Touch from beginner (had never used one
before this experiment) to expert (repeated daily use). All participants were native English
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speakers, and were instructed to type in English during the study. The participants were
volunteers who provided their own mobile devices and who were not paid in any way for
their participation.
4.2.2 Apparatus and Materials
There were four iPhone 3GSes and four iPod Touch 3rd Generations with a minimum of iOS
3.0 used in this study. The devices used the standard iPhone and iPod keyboards without
modification of any kind. The pattern classification part of the study used MatLab release
R2012b and the standard pattern classification algorithms found in the Statistics Toolbox
add-on. The pattern classification exercise was performed offline (i.e., not on the mobile
device itself) since this was a feasibility study to select an algorithm and determine biometric
fitness, rather than an assessment of whether these algorithms are viable on the device itself.
4.2.3 Procedure
Part 1: Data Gathering
The metrics used for this work are key hold time and inter-key latency, as shown in Figure 4.1.
These measures represent the dependent variables for this part of the study. Key hold time
is used with keystrokes only; it is a measure of how long, in seconds, the owner tapped a
particular key. Inter-key latency is a measure of the time that passes between the release
of the first key and the tap of the second key. The key hold time for the keystroke key1 is
calculated by subtracting the time the key is tapped from the time the key is released, as
shown in Equation 4.1. The key hold time for the keystroke key2 is calculated similarly.
Inter-key latency is used with bigrams, which are sequences of two characters. This metric
measures how much time passes between releasing the first key in the bigram and tapping
the second key, and is calculated as shown in Equation 4.2.
keyHoldT imekey1 = key1release − key1tap (4.1)
interKeyLatencykey1key2 = key2tap − key1release (4.2)
After each participant signed the ethics Information and Consent sheets, the custom-designed
application was loaded onto their device and the participant was instructed to use the appli-
cation as many times per day as they wished to enter keystroke data. Participants were asked
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Figure 4.1: Keystroke metrics. Key hold time applies to keystrokes and inter-key latency
applies to bigrams.
to enter at least 100 characters each time they used the application in order to ensure that
sufficient data was gathered to be distinctive. The 100 character minimum was not rigidly
enforced and participants could type more or fewer characters if they wished. Screenshots
for the two versions of the KeystrokeData application can be seen in Figure 4.2a. The differ-
ence between the two application versions was that the second version allowed participants
to send their data to the experimenter via the application. In the first version, the data had
to be gathered manually, which reduced the possible pool of participants to those physically
near the experimenter. Allowing for remote data gathering solved this issue.
The user interface consists of a single text box, as seen in Figure 4.2a, and a counter that
represents the number of keystrokes left to type to reach 100 characters. To enter text, the
user tapped on the text box and the keyboard appeared. When the participant finished typing,
they closed the application by pressing the Home key on the device. After three weeks the
data from each device was gathered manually and the application was removed from each
participant’s device.
The second iteration of the application, as seen in Figure 4.2b, added the ability to copy typed
text to an email or text message. The buttons used to implement this functionality are labeled
“Copy to Email” and “Copy to SMS”, respectively. The third button, labeled “Send Data”
allowed the participant to email the SQLite data store containing the keystroke information
to the experimenter.
Other than the ease-of-use additions mentioned above, the inner workings of the second
iteration of this study were identical to the first iteration. After approximately three weeks,
an email was sent to the two study participants asking them to email the SQLite data store
to the experimenter using the button on the application. The participants were also given
instructions on how to remove the application from their device. All data stores were sent
successfully.
The keystrokes used in the study were those available on the standard iPhone and iPod Touch
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(a) First Iteration (b) Second Iteration
Figure 4.2: Screenshots of the first and second KeystrokeData application.
soft keyboard, as seen in Figure 4.3. The predictive text function was disabled as part of this
study because it skewed the user’s normal typing pattern. When predictive text changes the
series of characters actually typed by the user, the resulting changed string is replaced as
one chunk of text. The result is that the application gathers the timing information for the
original string of characters, then gets another string of characters from the predictive text
that all have the same key up and key down times, which means that the resulting key hold
time is zero. The net effect of predictive text is that the timing information needed for the
keystroke pattern is effectively lost. Future iterations of the keystroke gathering application
must manage this problem since asking users to disable predictive text is not likely to be
feasible.
Another notable change in regular typing functionality seen in the KeystrokeData application
is that automatic capitalization was disabled. In normal typing patterns, in order to type an
uppercase letter, the user must first tap the Shift key and then the letter they wish to type.
This means that the inter-key latency for a bigram containing a uppercase letter would be
different than the inter-key latency for the bigram containing the same lowercase letters. For
instance, if the user typed the bigram em, we would expect that the inter-key latency would
be shorter for this bigram than for the bigram eM since the user would have to press the
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Shift key before the M key in the second case. While it is desirable to allow device owners
to enable predictive text and auto-capitalization if they wish, the limitations imposed by
disabling them are acceptable for a proof-of-concept such as this experiment.
(a) Letters (b) Numbers (c) Symbols
Figure 4.3: The characters available on a standard iOS soft keyboard. The keys outlined
in red are not considered keystrokes by the keystroke gathering applications. The English
keyboard is shown since the participants were instructed to type in English.
The shift key is not considered a keystroke in this study. The return, space, and backspace
keys were all considered keystrokes, and were also allowable parts of a bigram. The space
character was included because it is an allowable and frequent character in English. Since
the KeystrokeData application did not allow the use of predictive text, participants often cor-
rected their typing errors by using the backspace key. This has the possibility of containing
valuable information on the user’s typing habits, and thus was considered a particularly rich
source of distinctive information about the participant, so it was included as a keystroke. The
return character was included as a keystroke for completeness, since it is a valid character on
a soft keyboard.
Part 2: Pattern Classification
Once the data had been gathered from the study participants, it was presented to five pattern
classifiers in order to determine firstly whether there was enough distinguishing information
in the data to justify using keystroke dynamics in the Transparent Authentication Framework,
and secondly whether any of the classifiers could be considered optimal for the type of data
gathered. The five pattern classification algorithms used in this study were described in
detail in Chapter 2. In summary, the five classifiers are Naı¨ve Bayes with kernel density
and Gaussian estimation techniques (NB (KD) and NB (Gau), respectively), Decision Tree
(DT), and k–Nearest Neighbor with both Manhattan and Euclidean distance measures (k-NN
(Man) and k-NN (Eucl), respectively). Each classifier was trained using supervised learning
methods, which means that the classifier was trained on a combination of patterns from both
the owner and rest-of-world groups and the known classes of each sample were provided
during training.
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The performance of each classifier was estimated using 10-fold cross-validation methods [153,
154]. These methods can be used to assess whether the results on a particular dataset will
generalize to an independent dataset, which is very important due to the study’s relatively
small dataset. Cross-validation is performed by repeatedly partitioning a dataset into train-
ing and testing sets (10-fold implies this is done 10 times), and then running the classifier
on each of the 10 data partitions. The mean of the results of each run of the classifier was
calculated to produce a final result, which reduces the classifier output’s dependence on a
particular dataset. The classification problem is two-class; either the pattern belongs to the
owner of the mobile device, or it belongs to the rest-of-world.
4.3 Data Acquisition
The keystroke dynamics module was written in Objective-C and is specific to the Apple iPod
Touch and iPhone. The gathered data was stored on the device in an SQLite database. Three
object types were used to organize and store the keystroke information: Keystroke objects,
Bigram objects, and Pattern objects. These objects are related as shown in Figure 4.4. Each
of these objects is created as a Managed Object in Objective-C, which gives the developer
control over the object’s attributes, methods, and relationships. The iOS CoreData frame-
work can be used to save the Managed Objects and their relationships to a simple datastore.
This framework automates much of the object management and saving functionality, which
frees the developer from managing these often tedious and error-prone tasks. The data is
stored on the device in an SQLite database, which can be retrieved from the device and
accessed with standard SQLite database management tools.
 charPressed : NSString
 timesPressed : NSNumber
 keyHoldTime : NSNumber
Keystroke
 timesPressed : NSNumber
 interKeyLatency : NSNumber
Bigram
 allBigrams : NSSet
 allKeystrokes : NSSet
Pattern
1
∞ ∞
1
firstKeystroke
secondKeystroke
Figure 4.4: Details of Pattern, Keystroke, and Bigram classes.
The Pattern Managed Object (MO) is used to store the information on a series of keystrokes
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as typed by the user. The Pattern MO contains references to Keystroke and Bigram MOs,
which are used to store the information about keystrokes and bigrams, respectively. A Bi-
gram MO contains references to the two Keystroke MOs that form the bigram. Figure 4.5
shows the relationship between the three object types using the word science as an example.
Assuming that no other characters have been typed previously, when the user types the first
character, s, a new Keystroke object is created to represent s. Next, the user types c and the
program checks to see if it already has a Keystroke object representing c; since it does not,
this object is created. Now that two characters have been typed, the program checks to see
if an object representing the bigram sc exists – again, it does not so this Bigram object is
created by storing references to the s and c Keystroke objects. As the user continues to type,
Keystroke objects for i, e, and n are created, as well as the corresponding Bigram objects
(with references to each required Keystroke object) for bigrams ci, ie, and en.
Keystrokes
c
s
e
i n
Bigrams
sc en nc
ci ie ce
Pattern
Figure 4.5: Relationship between Pattern, Keystroke and Bigram objects for the word sci-
ence.
Next, the user types c again, which is already represented by a Keystroke object. Rather than
create a duplicate object, the program recognizes that this Keystroke object already exists and
checks to see if the corresponding bigram nc exists – this bigram is made up of the previous
character typed (n) and the current character (c). Since the bigram does not already exist, the
new nc Bigram object is created that contains references to the new n Keystroke object and
the existing c Keystroke object. Keystroke object duplicates are undesirable for two reasons:
firstly, because memory is a constrained resource on mobile devices so duplication of data
should be avoided wherever possible; secondly, the metric of interest for a single keystroke
is key hold time, which is a measure in seconds of how long the user pressed the typed key.
With repeated presses of the same key, the metric of interest is the arithmetic mean of the
individual key hold times for each keypress. The combination of hold times gives a more
effective metric for future pattern comparisons because it allows for small variations in the
user’s typing patterns while minimizing the effect of large changes. Therefore, representing
subsequent occurrences of the same character with the same Keystroke object is not only
valuable in terms of saving memory, it is also a way of storing the more valuable metric of
mean key hold time. The user then types the final character, e, and a similar operation as
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above takes place: since e is already represented, its key hold time is averaged and the new
Bigram object for ce is created.
At this point, the user has finished typing, and the Keystroke and Bigram objects are bound to
a single Pattern object that contains references to each of the Keystroke and Bigram objects
created. The user could have continued typing and further Keystroke and Bigram objects
would be created as described above; a new Pattern object is created when the user ends
the application in which they were typing. Pattern objects are used as a separator between
distinct typing instances and to facilitate the creation of a series of typing patterns rather than
a single pattern that is used for later comparison to a gathered pattern. This allows for several
comparisons to be made in situations where comparison to a single pattern may not provide
sufficient confidence to confirm the user’s identity.
Keystroke, Pattern, and Bigram objects each store information about their respective con-
tents, as can be seen in the class diagram in Figure 4.4. Keystroke objects are made up of
the character typed, the key hold time, and a counter that represents the number of times
this character was typed in the current Pattern. Bigram objects contain references to the two
characters typed in the order they were typed (this is important since the bigram th is not the
same as the bigram ht), the inter-key latency, and a counter representing the number of times
this bigram was typed in the current Pattern. Pattern objects contain two Set objects: one
containing references to each of the Keystroke objects related to this pattern, and one con-
taining references to each of the Bigram objects. Optionally, a Pattern object could contain a
timestamp representing the time the pattern was gathered, as well as which application was
being used at the time the pattern was gathered. Currently, however, this information is not
gathered because it is not relevant to the pattern classification task.
Each Pattern object and its related Keystroke and Bigram objects are stored in an SQLite
database on the user’s iPhone or iPod Touch. This storage method is handled through iOS’s
CoreData framework. Using this framework ensures that the database structure is compact,
and that data is stored in a way that minimizes memory and processor overhead2.
The relationship between Keystroke, Bigram, and Pattern objects, as seen in Figure 4.4,
was designed so that the amount of data stored on the device was minimized. Keystroke
objects contain the character typed, the key hold time, and a counter that denotes how many
times the key in question has been pressed. As a key is tapped, if that key has not been
tapped previously within the session in question, an array is created containing the KeyUp
and KeyDown times, the character tapped, and the key counter is set to 1. The KeyUp and
KeyDown times are used to calculate the key hold time, as explained in Section 4.2.3, which
is then stored in the array. As more keys are tapped, if the keystroke has been seen before,
2http://developer.apple.com/library/mac/#documentation/cocoa/
Conceptual/CoreData/Articles/cdTechnologyOverview.html#//apple_ref/doc/
uid/TP40009296-SW1
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the existing array is found, and the mean of the existing and new key hold times is calculated.
The mean key hold time then replaces the existing hold time in the array. Once the session
has finished, new Keystroke managed objects are created for each keystroke array stored.
The Keystroke managed object stores the character tapped, the key hold time (which is the
mean in the case of multiple taps of the same key), and the number of times that the character
has been tapped. Note that the KeyUp and KeyDown times are not stored in the Keystroke
objects – these times are discarded since they are only needed to calculate the key hold time,
which is performed as the key is pressed. Furthermore, storing these times would allow the
characters to be sorted in chronological order according to when each one was tapped, which
means that the original message as typed by the user could be retrieved. By storing only the
length of time each key is tapped, the user’s privacy is protected to a greater extent since it
would be more difficult to sort the characters into their original order.
Once the data was gathered from the users in both study iterations, it was pre-processed
offline on an iMac with a 2.66 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor, 4 GB of RAM, running
Mac OS X version 10.6.8. Pre-processing began with extracting all relevant timings and
keystroke or bigram frequency counts from the objects stored in the SQLite database for
each user. Then, each study participant in turn was designated the “owner” and their five most
frequently typed keystrokes and 10 most frequently typed bigrams were selected; the other
seven participants’ data was considered part of the “rest-of-world” dataset. This information
was used during feature extraction to determine which timings would be used for that owner.
Typing mistakes were not filtered out during the pre-processing stage since dynamic text
analysis does not, by definition, provide a fixed text string to type in order to provide a com-
parison template for mistakes. The use of the backspace key could be used as an indication
of a mistake, but instead it was used as a keystroke and treated no differently than any other
keystroke. The purpose of the study was to gather the owner’s raw typing pattern. If they
commonly make a mistake such as typing teh instead of the, then this is a relevant part of the
owner’s typing pattern that should not be lost to auto-correct or predictive text changes. Sim-
ilarly, uppercase letters are treated as a different keystroke from their lowercase version, so
use of auto-capitalization would replace a lowercase keystroke with an uppercase keystroke
in some instances, thereby skewing the user’s actual letter frequency counts.
Once the data was organized into the owner and rest-of-world datasets, they were examined
for outliers. An outlier was defined as any timing value greater than the keystroke or bigram
mean timing plus three standard deviations (SD). In addition, a value was considered an
outlier if it was greater than 0.5 seconds for keystroke timings and greater than 3.0 seconds
for bigram timings. The reason for the latter inclusion in the definition of an outlier is because
the data represented two distinct user behaviors: typing and not-typing. Typing behavior is
seen when small timing values near the mean are seen; non-typing behavior is seen when
larger values are seen, which indicates a pause in the user’s typing. These large timing
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values may be because the user was distracted while typing, perhaps by an interruption, or
to pause to gather his or her thoughts, or by a telephone call. By removing the outliers,
we represent the typing behavior and remove the non-typing behavior and thus our data
represents the behavior we are interested in using. The reason behind the specific cutoff time
of 0.5 seconds for keystrokes was because holding a key longer results in a repeated key
on the iOS soft keyboard. The reason for selecting 3.0 seconds for the bigram cutoff time
was because this is thought to represent a distraction, where one or two seconds may just
be a slower typing speed. In both cases, those values greater than the mean plus 3 SD are
non-representative of the user’s typing pattern.
Feature extraction is a data processing step that converts the raw keystroke and bigram tim-
ings into a feature vector that is a compact representation of the data. The feature extraction
step created the feature vectors as follows: first, one user was designated the owner of the
device and their five most frequently typed keystroke and 10 most frequently typed bigram
timings were concatenated into the feature vector. Equation 4.3 shows the structure of the
feature vector, where ki is the key hold time for key i and bj is the inter-key latency for bigram
j. The data set from each user was then processed to extract only the timings for the owner’s
features, since these features are the only ones that would be available on the owner’s de-
vice. Other options for the 15 features include the five most frequently typed keystrokes and
10 most frequently typed bigrams for the English language, although a simple comparison
test on the device owners showed that better results were seen with the owner’s most fre-
quently typed keystrokes and bigrams, as evidenced by lower classification error rates with
these latter features. Another option for feature vectors was to determine the typist’s most
frequently typed 15 features while they type, but this is not only computationally expensive,
but does not allow for easy comparison to existing feature vectors that do not have the same
keystrokes and bigrams represented. The owner’s most frequently typed keystrokes and bi-
grams were used because this is the only information that will be available on the device; it
is unlikely that a representative sample of rest-of-world typing patterns could be made avail-
able for comparison purposes. Additionally, a change in these most frequently typed typing
patterns could represent another user typing on that device, although this conjecture’s proof
is left for future work.
The feature vector contains five keystrokes and 10 bigrams for several reasons. First, the
length was limited to 15 timings to keep the vector manageable for on-device storage during
pattern gathering, and to allow for faster processing. The choice to use five keystrokes and
10 bigrams was made because there are only 62 characters that can be typed on an iPhone
soft keyboard, where there are 62 ∗ 62 = 3844 possible bigrams, which gives a larger set
from which to select features. Various combinations of 15 features were considered, from
zero keystrokes and 15 bigrams up to 15 keystrokes and zero bigrams, but there were few
if any gains in error rates with this manipulation. The exception is that the results of this
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study show that key hold time is not a distinctive characteristic on the iPhone soft keyboard,
and thus using 15 bigrams and zero keystrokes may improve results, although proving this is
outside the scope of this work.
fuser = (k1, k2, . . . , k5, b1, b2, . . . , b10) (4.3)
The feature extraction step was repeated eight times in total – once for each study participant,
who is considered the owner for that data run. The final result was eight distinct groupings
of the entire dataset, each of which contains an owner dataset and a rest-of-world dataset.
4.4 Results and Analysis
This section contains the results of this study and the analysis of these results in terms of the
Transparent Authentication Framework. It begins with a discussion of the pattern classifiers
tested, then presents the reported error rates for each pattern classifier. The data itself is
discussed initially to provide context for the statistical and error rate analyses that follow.
These error rates are discussed as values in themselves along with their meaning, and are also
tested to determine whether selection of a specific classifier by error rates is also statistically
significant.
In total, 251 keystroke patterns were gathered from eight participants; Table 4.1 shows the
number of keystrokes, bigrams, and patterns gathered on each device. The largest amount
of data at 487 KB was gathered from iPhone3, with a total of 61 patterns containing 10233
keystrokes and 8378 bigrams. This represents a mean pattern size of approximately 167
characters – well above the desired 100 characters per pattern. The smallest data store at
135 KB contained 14 patterns that referenced 2182 keystrokes and 1833 bigrams. The mean
size of each pattern for this device is 156 characters, which is still well above the desired
minimum. The participant who used iPhone4 had little experience using a soft keyboard
prior to this study. The data provided by this participant is encouraging; it shows that even
users who do not type very much can still be a rich source of keystroke information.
One of the main goals when designing both the KeystrokeData and full keystroke dynamics
applications was to minimize the amount of data stored in order to minimize the memory
and processor loads on the device. Using Objective-C’s CoreData helps create small object
footprints, but the sheer volume of possible data gathered on a frequently used device may
be a limiting factor. To this end, the size of each SQLite data store was noted at the end of
each iteration of the study. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the largest data store was 487 KB
and contained a considerable amount of data: 61 patterns that held 10233 keystrokes and
8378 bigrams.
4.4. Results and Analysis 75
Device Keystroke Count Bigram Count Pattern Count Data Store Size (KB)
iPhone1 6304 5410 36 307 KB
iPhone2 5863 5737 41 352 KB
iPhone3 10233 8378 61 487 KB
iPhone4 2182 1833 14 135 KB
iPod1 3785 3706 19 180 KB
iPod2 6789 6409 32 315 KB
iPod3 3191 2846 27 201 KB
iPod4 4944 4207 21 225 KB
Totals 43291 38526 251 2202 KB
Table 4.1: Number of Keystrokes, Bigrams and Patterns collected.
Table 4.1 shows that the largest datastore also contains the most patterns, keystrokes and bi-
grams, as is expected. The concern is that maintaining links to typing patterns may increase
the amount of on-device memory used, which may negatively affect the user’s experience
with an application based on the Transparent Authentication Framework. The small data
sizes for the amount of data gathered show that this is not likely to be an issue given that the
iPhones and iPod Touch devices available today contain either 16, 32 or 64 GB of available
memory. In order to further minimize the memory load on the device, the keystroke gather-
ing application should keep the minimum amount of information needed to authenticate the
device user.
Classifier Performance Metrics
The classifier performance metrics used for this study were False Accept Rate (FAR), False
Reject Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER), and Area Under the Receiver Operating Char-
acteristic Curve (AUC), as described in Chapter 2. FAR and FRR are known to be overly
sensitive to unbalanced datasets where the number of positive and negative patterns is un-
equal [134]. This sensitivity results in a over- or under-estimation of errors in cases where
the dataset balance is unequal. In the case of the keystroke data gathered for this study, the
dataset balance is highly skewed to negative samples (i.e., those samples not belonging to
the device owner) as shown in Figure 4.6. This reflects the case when the entire population is
considered since there will always be only one device owner, but many, many more patterns
in the possible rest-of-world class when all other people are considered part of rest-of-world.
The result is that the classifiers may have over-estimated false rejects and underestimated
false accepts. EER is also sensitive to unbalanced datasets since it is related strongly to FAR
and FRR. AUC, however, is not as affected by unbalanced datasets because the two values
upon which it is based (FAR and True Accept Rate) are equally affected by the dataset dif-
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ferences [134]. Furthermore, AUC is considered discriminatory and has been suggested as a
better measure of classifier performance [137, 155]. Therefore, while all four performance
metrics are reported, the AUC values are considered the more discriminatory and accurate
measurements for this study.
Figure 4.6: Proportion of owner and rest-of-world patterns for each device owner. There is a
much larger number of negative (rest-of-world) examples than positive (owner) examples in
the dataset, thus skewing FAR, FRR and EER values.
Table 4.2 shows the results when the owner and world datasets were presented to the pattern
classifiers discussed in Chapter 2. Each row grouping represents a separate device owner,
and the results in that row of the table are from classifying the subsets of owner and world
data organized according to that owner’s five most frequently typed keystrokes and 10 most
frequently typed bigrams. The results in the table are the median values for 10-fold cross-
validation, which takes the entire dataset for that owner and divides it into 10 randomly
chosen but equal-sized subgroups. Each subgroup is then divided – one-third is reserved for
training and two-thirds is reserved for testing. Each classifier, in turn, was then trained on
the training set and tested on the testing set and the EER, FAR, FRR, and AUC values were
calculated from the results.
Related research in the field of keystroke dynamics on mobile devices has reported FAR and
FRR values between 0% and 2.5%, and EER values between 9% and 24% [18, 82, 104–
106, 113]. Many of the EER and FAR values reported in Table 4.2 fall within these ranges,
but the FRR values are higher, which can be explained by the inbalance in the dataset, as
described previously. Few studies report AUC, which is considered more distinctive for this
research, therefore a comparison of AUC ranges to related work is not possible.
Due to the use of the owner’s most frequent keystrokes and bigrams as features, there may
be cases where a non-owner did not type those particular keystrokes or bigrams. In this case,
NaN (Not a Number) values were used in places where there was no data (i.e., the typist did
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Classifier
Result Owner Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
FAR (%)
iPhone1 26.06 11.34 3.55 0.00 0.00
iPhone2 13.04 5.08 5.08 1.45 1.45
iPhone3 18.55 9.68 16.13 1.61 1.61
iPhone4 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00
iPod1 7.23 4.61 2.63 0.66 1.32
iPod2 17.36 7.64 8.33 2.78 2.78
iPod3 2.70 1.37 1.37 0.00 0.00
iPod4 29.61 7.89 5.26 0.00 0.00
FRR (%)
iPhone1 43.56 56.44 87.12 100.0 100.0
iPhone2 23.08 42.31 42.31 84.62 76.92
iPhone3 25.00 27.50 25.00 80.00 80.00
iPhone4 0.00 0.00 37.50 100.0 100.0
iPod1 50.00 75.00 66.67 100.0 91.66
iPod2 30.00 40.00 55.00 75.00 70.00
iPod3 25.00 31.25 35.41 100.0 100.0
iPod4 33.33 83.33 83.33 100.0 100.0
EER (%)
iPhone1 30.99 29.08 34.22 41.19 38.31
iPhone2 16.66 16.66 24.35 8.60 5.26
iPhone3 25.00 20.49 17.97 21.11 10.79
iPhone4 0.00 0.00 29.31 0.00 0.00
iPod1 23.03 33.33 40.41 30.34 24.11
iPod2 25.70 20.00 36.32 30.74 26.31
iPod3 18.58 17.57 20.11 21.82 14.88
iPod4 32.24 32.45 41.13 37.50 48.81
AUC (%)
iPhone1 77.20 78.11 68.23 61.31 65.16
iPhone2 91.30 90.86 79.63 94.87 96.66
iPhone3 79.96 86.05 84.63 80.63 93.99
iPhone4 100.0 100.0 79.16 100.0 100.0
iPod1 86.29 77.74 64.58 79.25 84.77
iPod2 80.41 84.66 68.44 76.27 81.27
iPod3 86.40 87.50 87.51 88.20 92.20
iPod4 71.33 72.91 64.97 67.84 52.44
Table 4.2: Pattern Classifier Results, median values of 10-fold cross-validation. Rest-of-
world participants are repeated in both training and testing sets (data is not repeated).
not type the particular keystroke or bigram in question). Two other options for representing
this lack of data were tested: using zeros or a very large number in place of no data. Using
numeric values to represent no data is problematic because it skews calculations of mean,
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median and mode for the data after it has been gathered, and may have a small effect on
the error rate calculations. Similar error rate calculations as shown in Table 4.2 were also
performed for the zero and large number datasets; the result was slightly better error rates
with the NaN dataset, which is why it has been used for the rest of the calculations for this
work.
Table 4.2 show that some owners had a very distinct pattern (e.g., iPhone3 with low EER
values for both 5–NN classifiers) but others were more similar to the rest–of–world values
(e.g., iPhone3 with values near 40% for the 5-NN classifiers). Overall, since these results are
averages of many data runs, these results show that keystroke dynamics on a soft keyboard is
dependent on the type of classifier, and is unlikely to be certain enough to allow most owners
to use it as a sole measure of whether the owner is using the device.
The first and second results groupings show the FAR and FRR values for each owner. In gen-
eral, the FAR values are quite low and the FRR values are quite high. This result is due to the
unbalanced dataset, and confirms the assumption in the previous section that the classifiers
given unbalanced data will underestimate false accepts and overestimate false rejects. For
this reason, the FAR and FRR values will not be considered when selecting an optimal clas-
sifier; they are included here for completeness and to show the results of using unbalanced
datasets in pattern classification tasks.
In order to allow comparison with other studies, the Equal Error Rate (ERR) for each clas-
sifier and owner is also reported in Table 4.2. The EER values reported are relatively high,
with many values higher than 40%. The lowest EER values of 5.26% and 8.26% can be seen
for iPhone2 as owner with the two 5–NN classifiers (iPhone4 values are not being considered
since this participant provided very little data, which skews classifier error rates). The other
values reported are significantly higher than is acceptable for a single authentication method,
but this is expected since the unbalanced dataset that affects FAR and FRR also affects EER
since it is dependent on FAR and FRR. However, the two main goals of this study were to
determine which of the pattern classification algorithms works best with the data gathered
during this study, and to test whether keystroke dynamics is a viable part of a multimodal
authentication system. The EER values, while high in some cases, support using keystroke
dynamics as part of a multimodal biometric because they were also quite low in some cases.
The final error rate calculated for the gathered data was AUC, or Area under the Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curve. For this error rate, a higher percentage shows that the clas-
sifier is more accurate. The percentages shown in the final row grouping in Table 4.2 are
wide–ranging, with values as low as 52.44% for iPod4, and as high as 96.66% for iPhone2
both with the 5–NN (Man) classifier, when not considering the iPhone4 results. Some of
this wide range of values can be attributed to the small dataset, although the overall results
are encouraging. The two 5–NN classifiers performed well for all owners; these are the two
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classifiers recommended for the keystroke data.
In some cases the EER and AUC values are relatively high and without much variance be-
tween classifiers, such as those values seen for iPhone1 as the owner. The EER values here
range between 29.08% and 41.19% and the AUC values range between 61.31% and 78.11%,
which means that nearly one-third of this owner’s patterns are consistently misclassified no
matter what classifier is used. This implies that the owner of iPhone1 does not have a par-
ticularly distinctive typing pattern, and that it is therefore difficult to recognize their pattern
from those of rest-of-world. This further implies that there are likely some owners for whom
keystroke dynamics will not be distinctive enough to allow identification or authentication,
possibly even when considered in conjunction with other biometrics. Many biometrics suffer
from this difficulty – it is known as failure to enrol [59].
The EER values in Table 4.2 support the choice of either of the 5-NN classifiers as the op-
timal classifier for the data in this study, since these are the lowest values for most owners.
As discussed previously, FAR and FRR as measures of quality (and thus EER since it is
dependent on FAR and FRR) have been shown to be sensitive to unequal or skewed datasets
in which there is an unequal number of positive and negative patterns presented to the clas-
sifier [134]. The sensitivity of EER to unequal representation in datasets means that it must
be considered with caution when attempting to determine the optimal classifier from this
measure alone. The AUC values, which are less sensitive to unbalanced datasets, support
the choice of either 5-NN classifier since they have the highest AUC values for most owners.
This discrepancy between classifier choices when considering different error rates is likely
to change when a larger study with more participants who provide more data is undertaken.
Therefore, the answer to the research question regarding the optimal classifier is k-NN with
either Euclidean or Manhattan distance measures.
The boxplots for iPhone1 and iPod2 in Figures 4.7a and 4.8a show mean key hold time
and inter-key latency values for owner and rest-of-world patterns that are quite similar. In
each case, the median of the means (represented by the horizontal line in each boxplot) for
the two groups are quite similar, which implies that it would be harder to distinguish the
owner patterns from other patterns during classification. On the other hand, the boxplots
in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that each owner’s mean key hold time and inter-key latency
values are distinct from the same values for the same keys for the rest-of-world group. This
may lead to higher than acceptable error rates. The distinctive nature of these latter two
examples shows that keystroke dynamics is a plausible biometric for authentication since
there are cases where patterns are different enough to be separated from others. As such,
these results show that further study is worthwhile and likely to deliver a viable tool, which
was the purpose of this work.
The results of this study show that there is sufficient data in owner keystroke dynamics on a
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(a) iPhone1
(b) iPhone4
Figure 4.7: Mean key hold times for Owner and World patterns. The keystrokes chosen in
each case are based on the five most frequently typed keystrokes for the owner in question;
they are different for each chart.
soft keyboard to support further work on using it as an authenticator on a mobile device with
a soft keyboard, particularly in conjunction with other biometrics. As with other keystroke
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(a) iPod2
(b) iPhone2
Figure 4.8: Mean inter-key latency times for Owner and World patterns. The bigrams chosen
in each case are based on the 10 most frequently typed bigrams for the owner in question;
they are different for each chart.
dynamics studies, the results do not support using keystroke dynamics as the sole authen-
ticator or identity verification tool because, while the difference in patterns between owner
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and rest-of-world is promising, there is not enough difference between patterns to identify
the device owner with sufficient confidence.
While the majority of the performance metrics shown in Table 4.2 support the conclusions
drawn above, the results for iPhone4 as owner are markedly different. The lowest FAR and
FRR values were 0.00%. The low error rates are because this owner’s typing rates are sig-
nificantly different than those of the rest-of-world group. Thus, their patterns are easily dis-
tinguished from more experienced typists. The result of this is that any keystroke dynamics
implementation should adapt to changes in the owner’s typing patterns as the owner becomes
a more proficient typist, but not so flexible that the error rates increase to unacceptable levels.
Comparison of the bigram mean inter-key latency for the owner and rest-of-world classes in
Figure 4.8 shows that there is a difference between the average typing speeds between the
groups, with the owner of the device generally being a faster typist for these bigrams. This
result can be attributed to two factors: first, the device owner is more familiar with their own
device than others may be; second, the use of the owner’s most frequently typed bigrams
results in faster and thus more distinctive typing speeds since the rest-of-world members
may not type those bigrams as often. This may support the creation of another metric for
use in future systems: that of keystroke and bigram frequency. If the owner’s feature vector
consisting of their most frequently typed keystrokes and bigrams were to change suddenly,
this may indicate that someone other than the owner is using the device. Such a result could
likely be combined with the results of the key hold time and inter-key latency to improve
the results of pattern matching, although further study needs to be performed to prove or
disprove this conjecture.
Large error bars on the rest-of-world datasets in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 imply that there is
variance in the timing values for the rest of the world, which is to be expected since the
mean and standard deviations take into account seven different keystroke patterns. However,
the smaller error bars seen on the owner datasets in the same figures show that, with careful
training, the owner’s keystroke pattern can be determined with far fewer possible errors. This
is significant because the goal was to separate the owner from the rest of the world, not to
identify exactly who created the pattern in question.
The mean timings shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 have grouped together the seven rest–of–
world members into a single result for clarity, but in doing so we have in essence created an
“normative world user” and compared them to the device owner. While the results shown
are valid, demonstrating that each owner in turn can be distinguished from each member
of rest-of-world would be more realistic, since it is unlikely that an exactly average rest-of-
world user will choose to use the device. Instead, comparing the owner to the extreme cases
within the rest-of-world class (i.e., those users who were very close and very far away from
the owner’s mean metrics, in terms of a measure such as Euclidean or Manhattan distance)
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would provide a better understanding of the proportion of other users from which the owner
can be distinguished.
Statistical Significance
The goal of statistical significance tests is to determine whether the differences seen between
two sets of data exist because of the differing data treatments or because of other random
effects. Since one of the goals of this study was to choose a optimal pattern classifier for the
keystroke data, the comparison for statistical significance is between the AUC and EER for
each owner and for each of the pattern classifiers tested. This method follows the classifier
comparison methodology described by Killourhy & Maxion in [156].
For the AUC and EER values calculated for this experiment, there are two important features
that a statistical significance test must have, as follows:
1. Non-Parametric: the data gathered is not parametric (i.e., does not follow a normal
or Gaussian distribution) as evidenced both by the fact that the EER and AUC values
range between 0 and 1 and the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [152, p. 160]
as shown for each of the calculations in turn, as seen in Table 4.3.
2. Pairwise Tests: For each owner data, the comparison is between the AUC or EER for
each classifier – this means that the results for the optimal classifier (the one with the
lowest EER median and highest AUC median) should be compared to the AUC and
EER for each of the remaining four classifiers in turn, which implies using a test that
will compare pairs of values.
Classifier
Metric Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
EER 0.0226 0.0226 0.0053 0.0026 0.0026
AUC 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
Table 4.3: Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution shape for EER and AUC
values. Since each value is less than the α = 0.05 significance level, then each distribution
of data is considered significantly different from a normal distribution (i.e., the distribution
for these values is non–parametric).
Based on these two requirements, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test has been chosen as the
statistical significance test for the keystroke data EER and AUC values. The Wilcoxon test
is the non-parametric version of the dependent t-test and is used in cases where there are two
conditions (i.e., two different classifiers) and the same participants have been used for each
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condition [152]. Non-parametric tests make fewer assumptions about the distribution of the
analyzed data, although often at the cost of the descriptive power of the test. The significance
level for the Wilcoxon tests was set at α = 0.05 as with Killourhy & Maxion’s procedure.
The median of the EER and AUC data per classifier in Table 4.2 was used as input to the
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test. The optimally performing classifier for EER is defined as the
classifier with the lowest average EER (i.e., 5-NN (Man) with 19.50%), and the optimal
classifier for AUC is defined as the classifier with the highest average AUC (i.e., 5-NN (Man)
at 88.49%). The two best classifiers were compared to each other classifier, thereby creating
four separate hypothesis tests for each error rate. The null hypothesis is that there is no
difference between the performance of the best performing classifier and all other classifiers.
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the performance of the classifier in question
is at least as good as the top-performing classifier and therefore must also be considered
top-performing. The result of calculating the statistical significance of the best classifier
for both AUC and EER compared to all other classifiers was that the best classifier was not
statistically significantly better than any of the other four classifiers being considered (see
Table 4.4). This is not an unexpected outcome given the small amount of data and the fact
that statistical significance is strongly influenced by the size of the dataset. These results for
statistical significance also support the need for a larger study of this type.
Classifier
Metric Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
EER (%)
24.02 20.25 31.77 26.08 19.50
(1.0000) (0.9375) (0.7810) (0.2969)
AUC (%)
83.35 85.36 73.80 79.94 88.49
(1.0000) (1.0000) (0.0781) (0.2969)
Table 4.4: EER and AUC medians for all classifiers. The bolded numbers represent the best
classifier based on either EER or AUC, and the number in brackets after each percentage is
the result of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, ρ. The bolded EER and AUC values were not
considered significantly different than the other classifiers at the α = 0.05 level.
4.5 Study Limitations
There were several potential limitations in this study. The results of this experiment should
be assessed with these biases in mind.
Devices: The devices used in the study were provided by the study participants. This means
that the experimenter could control neither the services and apps on each device, nor
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whether the device owner chose to upgrade their device operating system during the
study. The participants were asked not to upgrade during the study, but no informa-
tion is available to ensure this because it was not tracked beyond the initial question
regarding current operating system asked at the start of the study.
Display Differences: The iPod Touch display has fewer pixels than that of the iPhone 4,
which may affect typing patterns. The iPod Touch 3rd generation and iPhone 3GS
display is 480 x 320 pixels; the iPhone4 display has 960 x 640 pixels.
Realistic Conditions: Some realism was sacrificed in typing practices in order to protect the
participant’s privacy. Specifically, the participant was asked to use a custom-designed
application rather than the real email and text messaging apps so that they could be
certain that only keystrokes in the custom application were being sampled. The lack
of realism could mean that the participant typed non–typical words and phrases, or
typed in a way that they would not in normal practice in order to participate fully in
the study.
Features Limited: Auto–capitalization and auto–correct (for spelling) were disabled in the
custom application. This also limits the realism in the typing environment because the
participant must either correct mistakes or leave typing mistakes as they are. It also
means that the backspace key frequency, which appeared in nearly all of the partici-
pants’ most-frequent lists, is artificially high. However, the backspace frequency is not
an issue in further studies because it may simply be replaced by a more frequently used
keystroke. Further studies should, however, allow the use of the auto–capitalization
and auto-correct features to determine whether this has an effect on the distinctive
nature of typing patterns.
Language: The participants were asked to type in English only, which may not represent
their usual typing patterns. It is possible that, despite all participants being native En-
glish speakers, that they prefer to type in another language or an English variant such
as text-speak. Since both were disallowed during the study, this may affect the device
owner’s usual typing pattern. The reason for this requirement was that initial examina-
tion of the data gathered in this study used the standard frequency of English language
characters to select which timings to use in the feature vector. However, it was found
during the study that these were not the most effective and discriminatory values. Fu-
ture studies need not limit the language used in typing, and should examine the effects
on results of allowing the use of auto-capitalization and auto-correct features.
Participant Skill Level: While every effort was made to include participants from a vari-
ety of skill levels, it is possible that an individual participant’s skill level could have
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an effect on their typing patterns and thus on the study results. The study lasted ap-
proximately three weeks, so it may be the case that the typing patterns of some of
the less skilled participants could have changed rather dramatically during the study
timeframe. Another consideration related to participant skill level is the perceived
difference in typing patterns between a skilled and unskilled soft keyboard typist. In
general, an unskilled typist may be slower and potentially tap the keys for a longer
period of time compared to a more skilled typist. The former difference would in-
crease the inter-key latency times and the latter would increase the key hold times for
unskilled typists, making their patterns more clearly distinguishable from skilled typ-
ists. These differences could affect error rates by making them abnormally low for the
under-represented group. For instance, if there were far more unskilled than skilled
typists, it would be the skilled typists’ error rates that would be abnormally low, and
vice versa. This bias can be minimized by selecting a wide range of skill levels and
ensuring that the number of participants at a given skill level is approximately equal.
Small, Unbalanced Datasets: The number of participants in the study was small (N = 8)
and thus the amount of data gathered as part of this experiment was also small. This
is an acceptable limitation since this is intended to be a feasibility study upon which a
larger study may be based in the future.
4.6 Keystroke Dynamics in the Transparent Authen-
tication Framework
Keystroke dynamics is intended to be one of two biometrics used in the Transparent Au-
thentication Framework presented in this research, although the Framework is intended to
support as many biometrics as the designer may wish. The results of this study have shown
that keystroke dynamics hold promise as a potential biometric for use with authentication
services. The error rates are acceptable, but they are not low enough to use as the sole bio-
metric or authentication tool, particularly in light of the ranges of error rates cited by other
similar studies. Considering that the keystroke dynamics are intended to be combined with
speaker recognition results into a multimodal biometric, the results shown here are sufficient
to support the use of keystroke dynamics in this manner. Also, the intended transparent
nature of the authentication framework implies that the biometrics used should be sampled
while the device user goes about other common tasks on the device. Keystroke dynamics is
ideal for this purpose, and the promising results shown in this study support its continued
use as a biometric used to support authentication on mobile devices.
4.7. Summary 87
4.7 Summary
This chapter has introduced the Keystroke Dynamics Feasibility study, the first purpose of
which was to collect keystroke dynamics information from users of Apple devices with soft
keyboards and secondly to determine which of five possible pattern classification algorithms
is best suited to classifying the timing data gathered from the study participants. The study’s
design was detailed, and the results and analysis thereof were presented. The outcome of
this study is that its error rates, which are similar to error rates seen in other studies that
used different keyboard types, suggest that keystroke dynamics is not sufficiently distinctive
to use as the sole basis for determining whether the user is the device owner, although it is
sufficiently distinctive to consider combining it with one or more other biometrics in order to
improve accuracy. The results support using the inter-key latency rather than key hold time,
since the former has been shown to be more distinctive both in this study and other similar
studies. However, the results of the study do not support the choice of a particular classifier
due to the high variability in error rates, and the opposing recommendations when examining
the FAR and FRR data versus the EER and AUC data. Finally, the study’s results, although
promising, were based on a small group of participants (N = 8); therefore, they should be
verified via a larger study of the same or similar design that also uses a soft keyboard.
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Chapter 5
Speaker Verification Feasibility Study
This chapter presents the study1 that was carried out to determine whether speaker verifi-
cation is a sufficiently discriminatory biometric to contribute to identity verification in the
Transparent Authentication Framework. The chapter begins with an outline of the study
goals and justification for the voice pattern corpus creation, then continues with a descrip-
tion of the study design including participants and materials used. The study methodology
is then described in detail. Finally, the results of the study are presented and the study lim-
itations discussed, and a reflection of the relevance of the study within the context of the
Transparent Authentication Framework is provided.
5.1 Study Goals
This study was designed to answer three research questions:
1. Is there sufficient distinctive information in voice patterns to verify the identity of the
device owner, and to justify using it as a biometric in the Transparent Authentication
Framework?
2. Are the error rates produced by the five pattern classifiers low enough to support iden-
tity verification on a mobile device?
3. Can an optimal classifier be chosen for the speaker verification behavioral biometric,
based on the data gathered during this study? “Optimal” is defined as the classifier with
the lowest error rate that also respects the mobile device environment’s limitations in
processor speed and available memory.
1University of Glasgow ethics approval number CSE00977
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Answers to these research questions provide a partial response to Hypothesis H1 as stated in
Chapter 1.4.1, along with the answers provided by the Keystroke Dynamics Study described
in Chapter 4.
Answering these questions required a corpus of voice patterns from mobile devices, specifi-
cally from the Apple iPhone and iPod Touch. This corpus had the following requirements:
Type: The data type of the recordings must be known, and must be of a type that can be
processed by the feature extraction software described in Section 5.3. There is a wide
range of choices that may be used with this software, so this requirement is not overly
restrictive.
Recording Quality: The recording quality must not only be known, but be high enough to
support voice pattern classification. Audio pattern classification research suggests that
the minimum recording quality for voice-only recordings is 8000 Hz since most audi-
ble sounds in speech occur in the frequency range between 250 Hz and 8000 Hz [118].
Gender Mixture: In order to avoid possible bias in the case that the corpus contains only
one gender of speaker, a mixture of genders should be represented.
Single Speaker: The purpose of the voice classification portion of this research is to verify
that the person speaking into the device is the device owner. Therefore, since the most
usual scenario for this is during a phone call, only a single voice will be gathered by
the device microphone (or attached microphone in the case of the iPod Touch) and
thus it is reasonable to use only single speaker recordings in the corpus.
Device: At a minimum, the corpus should represent telephone conversations rather than
other voice recordings. This study focuses on the feasibility of speaker verification
on the Apple iPhone and iPod Touch, so the speaker voice samples should ideally be
gathered from these two devices only in order to avoid bias.
Variety: The speech gathered must not be limited to a specific word or phrase since this
study’s model is text–independent. Furthermore, in order to accurately represent the
possible circumstances in which voice data may be gathered (e.g., amount and type of
background noise, while the speaker is moving) the voice samples should be collected
in an uncontrived way.
Amount of Data: Text–independent speaker verification systems require a large amount
(e.g., several minutes) of training data in order to achieve acceptably low pattern clas-
sification error rates [70]. Therefore, the corpus used must contain a large amount of
sample data for each participant.
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Several corpora meet some of these requirements, including the SWITCHBOARD cor-
pus [121] and the Fisher corpus [157]. The SWITCHBOARD corpus is a good choice for
voice data studies because it contains a large amount of data from telephone conversations,
contains samples from both male and female speakers, and the quality and type of each
recording is known. However, these samples are not from an Apple iPhone or iPod Touch,
or any smartphone for that matter. Furthermore, they do not have the variety in location dur-
ing the call that is required for this study, since the speakers are all using landline telephones
and are therefore at a fixed location that may or may not have background noise. The use of
landline telephones also may mean that the subjects were not moving while speaking, which
may be different from mobile device users. Furthermore, the samples in this corpus repre-
sent conversations with two or more people, which means that the samples would have to
be pre–processed to extract a single speaker. These limitations make the SWITCHBOARD
corpus a poor corpus to support this voice study.
The Fisher corpus also contains conversations rather than single person recordings, and was
built for speech recognition rather than speaker recognition, meaning the words spoken were
important rather than who spoke them. As with the SWITCHBOARD corpus, the Fisher cor-
pus is composed of telephone conversations but not from the iPhone or iPod Touch, making
it a poor choice for this study. There are several other similar subscription–based corpora
available such as CALLHOME [158] and CALLFRIEND [159] but each were poor choices
for this study for similar reasons to the other two corpora considered above, in addition to the
fact that each of these corpora cost USD $1500. The MIT speaker verification corpus [160]
is a possible candidate for use with this study, although it is intended for text–dependent
speaker verification. Since a corpus that meets all of the needs of this research was not al-
ready available, and since this feasibility study did not require a large number of individual
speakers, an application was built for the Apple iPhone and iPod Touch that would serve to
gather the required data. This application is described in the following sections.
5.2 Study Design
This study has two parts: the first part was data gathering, in which voice recordings were
gathered from participants using a custom iPhone and iPod Touch application, and the second
part involved presenting the data gathered to software used to create the feature vectors
common in voice classification studies, and next to a series of pattern classifiers. This latter
step is used to determine whether there is enough distinguishing information in the voice
patterns gathered to verify the device owner’s identity, and thus provide an answer to the
three research questions described in Section 5.1.
A between–groups design [152, p. 74] was used for the data gathering part of this study. Each
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participant was in turn considered the owner of their device and the remaining participants
made up the group rest–of–world. Each of the participants used either an iPhone or an iPod
Touch during the experiment. All devices had a single user, and recordings made were of
that user and no one else. The participants were instructed to not record conversations – their
voice should be the only voice on the recordings. The data gathered was then presented to
the pattern classifiers chosen as part of the second part of the study.
The dependent variables were the classifier error rates, which depended on the recordings and
the feature vectors created from them. This study’s independent variable was which classifier
was used on which dataset, which depended in turn on which participant was considered the
device owner.
5.2.1 Participants
There were nine participants involved in the data gathering part of this study. They ranged in
age from the 21–29 age range to the 50–59 age range, and had owned their device between
less than one year and up to three years. They ranged in experience level from novice (two
participants, had never used an Apple device before this experiment) to intermediate (three
participants, up to two years experience using an Apple device) and expert (four participants,
more than two years experience with an Apple device). The participants represented a wide
range of accents including English, Scottish, Canadian, American and South African. There
were five female and four male participants, each of whom received a Consent Form and
Information Sheet. The participants agreed to participate in the study via a web page and
gave their consent to participate by choosing to tick a checkbox on the sign-up page. The
participants were volunteers who supplied their own mobile device and were not paid in any
way for their participation.
5.2.2 Apparatus and Materials
The participant–owned devices used were one iPhone 4, three iPhone 3GSes, three iPod
Touches 3rd Generation, and two iPod Touches 2nd Generation, for a total of nine devices.
Microphones were not provided to the participants; they used either the built–in microphone
or a peripheral device. The iPod Touch owner participants provided their own microphone
since these devices do not have one built in; many used one that was attached to headphones.
They type of microphone used was not captured for this study, nor was whether the same
microphone was used for all recordings. All the devices had iOS 4.2 or better as the oper-
ating system and most had iOS 5.0.1. The participants were instructed to use the devices in
any location, to follow their normal use patterns, and to speak in English. They were also
reminded not to record others’ voices, but that regular background noise was acceptable.
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Part 2 of the study, pattern classification, used SPro version 4.0.1 2 for feature vector creation
and MatLab version R2012b with the standard pattern classification algorithms included in
MatLab’s Statistics Toolbox for pattern classification, error rate calculations, and statistical
significance testing.
SPro output is intended for use by a software program called ALIZE [161], which is an
open–source biometrics authentication platform created by researchers at the Laboratoire
Informatique D’Avignon at the University of Avignon. ALIZE was tested for use with the
recordings gathered during the speaker verification study, but MatLab was considered more
convenient for use in this research, despite ALIZE’s intended use with SPro.
5.2.3 Procedure
Part 1: Data Gathering
Part 1 of the study used a purpose-built iPhone application to record voice patterns from the
study participants. The Apple iPhone and iPod Touch both have a voice memo application,
but it was decided that it would not be used for this study in order to protect the user’s
privacy. By using a completely separate application, the user must choose to provide their
voice recordings for this study; by using an existing application such as Voice Memo, the
user may be suspicious that other voice–related features, such as making a telephone call,
may be recorded as well. Furthermore, creating a separate application allowed for finer–grain
control of the data acquisition since the data type and format could be controlled. The trade-
off is that the VoiceData application does not run in the background as would be required
for a transparent authentication method, although this was not considered a limitation of this
study since its purpose was simply to gather voice recordings.
The participant pool was expanded by automating many of the processes related to study
sign-up. The information sheet was sent to each participant electronically, and then each
participant filled in a web form hosted on the experimenter’s university website. The web
form contained questions about the participant (name, age, email address and amount of
experience with their device), and questions about the device they intended to use for the
experiment (type, length of ownership, UDID). The final question asked whether the partic-
ipant had read the information sheet and whether they agreed to participate in the study –
the text was the same as that above the signature line in the consent form. If the participant
checked “Yes” next to this question, it was considered equivalent to signing the consent form.
The web form was created using an online form creator called JotForm3 and used Dropbox4
2http://www.irisa.fr/metiss/guig/spro/spro-4.0.1/spro_1.html
3http://www.jotform.com
4http://www.dropbox.com
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to collect the participant data. All data, once submitted, was removed from both websites to
preserve participant privacy.
Once the initial study sign–up was complete, the participant was sent an email containing
the VoiceData application and instructions on its installation and use. After installation, the
participants used the custom application to record their voices as often as they wished. After
three weeks, the participants sent recordings via email to the experimenter by using the built–
in email function in the application. After data gathering was complete, another email was
sent to participants with instructions on how to remove the VoiceData application from their
device.
Part 2: Pattern Classification
The gathered data was pre–processed and converted into feature vectors. It was then pre-
sented to five pattern classifiers available in MatLab version R2012b. The pre-processing
and feature vector creation methods are described in Section 5.3.3.
In order to answer the research questions stated in Section 5.1, five pattern classifiers were
tested during this study: k-Nearest Neighbor with both Manhattan and Euclidean distance
measures (k-NN (Man) and k-NN (Eucl), respectively), Decision Tree (DT), and Naı¨ve
Bayes with Kernel Density (NB(KD)) and Gaussian (NB(Gau)) estimations. The data gath-
ered in the first part of the study was divided into owner and rest-of-world patterns, as was
done in the Keystroke Dynamics study. In this case, there were nine participants, each of
whom was considered the device owner in turn, while the remaining participants became
part of the rest-of-world group. This resulted in nine datasets, each with an owner and rest-
of-world group. Unlike the Keystroke Dynamics study, however, the only difference between
each of the nine datasets was the classification of each feature vector into either the owner or
rest-of-world class; otherwise, the data remained the same. In other words, the data in each
of the nine datasets is the same; it is only the classification of particular feature vectors as
belonging to the owner that changed between the nine datasets.
Each classifier was trained using supervised learning methods, similar to the Keystroke Dy-
namics study. However, the large amount of data gathered meant that each data run through
the classification algorithms took a significant amount of time (about seven hours per run),
so the dataset was partitioned into randomly chosen sets of 5000 patterns evenly divided
between owner and rest-of-world patterns. 10-fold cross-validation methods were used to
verify the classifier accuracy; each cross-validation exercise used a different set of 5000
patterns. The classification problem for this study was two-class; either the voice pattern
belongs to the owner of the mobile device, or it belongs to the rest-of-world class.
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5.3 Data Acquisition
The first prototype for the data acquisition application used Apple’s CoreAudio libraries,
which are written in the C programming language. Testing revealed issues concerning the
use of the application. For example, standard functionality such as fast forward and rewind
did not work as expected. The second prototype used the AVAudioSession libraries, which
are a set of wrapper classes for CoreAudio that simplify adding standard functionality such
as fast forward, rewind and playback resumption.
(a) Initial screen with privacy
warning.
(b) Main screen. (c) Playback screen.
Figure 5.1: Screenshots of the VoiceData application used to gather the data required for the
speaker verification feasibility study.
The application interface is shown in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1a shows the initial screen upon
application launch. An alert box was presented each time the application entered the fore-
ground; it warned the user about the privacy limitations inherent in a study of this type. Its
intention was to ensure that the user knows that they cannot expect their recordings gathered
with the application to remain completely private, and was included in order to aid with ob-
taining ethics approval for the study. After tapping the I Understand button on the alert box,
the main application screen is revealed, as seen in Figure 5.1b. The interface contains Record
and Stop buttons for beginning or ending recording and a counter that shows the amount of
time that has passed since recording began. The counter also served as a visual reminder to
the user that recording is taking place. The other two buttons on this screen are to send the
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data to the experimenter via email, and to play recordings made using this application. Tap-
ping the Play... button brings up the screen pictured in Figure 5.1c. All previously recorded
data is shown in the list, and tapping on one begins playback of that audio file. The slider
at the bottom of the screen shows the progression of the playback and may also be used to
fast forward or rewind the recording by sliding the indicator to the left or right (this is known
as scrubbing). The Back button in the top left corner returns the user to the previous screen
(Figure 5.1b).
The audio playback feature was not required to fulfill the purpose of the application, which
was to provide an interface for gathering audio data recorded on an iPhone or iPod Touch.
However, it was included as a way of providing a more well–rounded interface that could be
used as a voice memo application, and was included to encourage the participant to record
more data. Whether or not this inclusion yielded more data was not examined as part of this
study.
5.3.1 Data and File Formats
The recorded audio files were stored on the participant’s device, so keeping the file size
small was an important goal when designing the VoiceData application. Two formats govern
audio data storage: file format and data format. The file format is the container that stores
the audio information itself; the data format specifies how this stored audio information is
encoded. One file format may be able to store many data formats: for instance, a .caf file
format may be used to store audio data encoded with Linear PCM, Advanced Audio Coding
(AAC) or MP3 data formats, amongst others. The file format has little effect on the stored
data file size, thus .caf was chosen because it is native to Apple iOS development.
The data encoding format, however, has a large impact on file size. Initially, the application
was designed using the LinearPCM data format enclosed in a CoreAudio File (.caf) file
format. This resulted in a 16000 Hz, 15 second long audio file that was over 1 MB in size.
Since participants were encouraged to record significantly longer recordings than 15 seconds,
the audio data may have taken a large portion of their available device memory. The AAC
data format, a successor to the MP3 file format (and thus a lossy representation), produces a
file that takes less disk space but at the cost of lower quality audio. The same 16000 Hz, 15
second audio file occupied just 61 KB. While many audio recordings that focus on voice data
are recorded at 8000 Hz [118, 132], 16000 Hz was chosen for this study because it may help
limit the lower quality audio effects that using the AAC data format entails (this assumption
was not tested).
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5.3.2 Data Retrieval
The concern regarding using too much space on the participant’s device was further allevi-
ated by sending the data to the experimenter in chunks of 5MB or greater and removing the
sent data from the participant’s device. To enable physically distant participants to submit
data, a facility for emailing the data to the experimenter was created. The data consisted of
many potentially large files, thus attaching them to a single email was infeasible since they
may be too large to be sent or received without error. To combine the audio files into a sin-
gle file, a compression program was used to create a single zip file that contained all of the
recorded audio files and attach this file to the email.
Several other methods were considered for data gathering, including uploading to a web-
server or to a facility such as Dropbox. These methods required either significant participant
effort and technical knowledge (Dropbox uploads) or complicated and lengthy setup by the
experimenter (server uploads). Since the devices tested have email capabilities, and most
participants had email set up and knew how to use it on the device, the email option provided
a convenient choice that worked very well in practice. Just over 57 MB of audio data was
gathered during this study.
5.3.3 Feature Extraction
Some of the considerations that may affect voice audio feature extraction are the amount of
noise and the overall quality of the recording, as well as whether the system is text–dependent
or text–independent. Speaker verification research focuses heavily on the choice of specific
audio data features that may be more or less deterministic, in terms of verifying the speaker’s
identity [119]. These features include physical traits such as vocal tract shape and larynx size,
which are often combined with behavioral traits such as accent and pronunciation to improve
recognition accuracy [119]. Since this work is not intended to push the boundaries of speaker
verification research, established methods were sought to create a feature vector that would
suit both the data and the verification of the speaker’s identity. To render the data suitable
for these purposes, it was necessary to perform pre–processing and feature extraction on the
data gathered for this study. Common pre–processing tasks for audio data include removing
background noise and periods of silence, and filtering out high–frequency sounds that are
outside the range of human hearing.
The tool used for preprocessing was SPro [162, 163], which is a freeware signal processing
toolkit that focuses on audio recordings that contain speech. It provides feature extraction
algorithms that are common to speech-related audio applications, specifically those required
for speaker recognition and verification. It is written in the ANSI-C programming language
and runs via a command-line interface. SPro is a fully-featured speaker verification tool, and
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includes such speech analysis capabilities as variable resolution spectral analysis, filter-bank
analysis, linear predictive analysis, and cepstral analysis. The SPro manual [162] is a good
source of information on these techniques for the interested reader, as is the reference text
by Homayoon Beigi [164] and the papers by Kinnunen et al. [119] and Bimbot et al. [69].
Data gathered in the speaker verification study was processed using cepstral analysis be-
cause it is a popular and effective method for speech recognition, and thus is also often used
in speaker verification work. Bimbot et al. call cepstral analysis “...the most commonly
[sic] speech parameterization used in speaker verification...” [69, p.1], and this assessment
was used to justify the use of cepstral analysis as the appropriate analytical method for this
research. Essentially, cepstral analysis is used to create a feature vector that has the most
distinctive parts of speech emphasized in order to increase its usefulness as a biometric.
SPro takes in as input a waveform stream (the input recording) and outputs a feature stream
that contains the feature vectors of the input recording. Feature streams are output files in an
SPro-specific file format (.mfcc extension) that includes header information about the input
audio recording. The SPro command for performing the cepstral analysis is sfbcep, as shown
below.
sfbcep --format = ’PCM16’ --sample-rate = 16000 <infile>.caf <outfile>.mfcc
Using MatLab, and specifically the classifiers used in other studies undertaken as part of
this research, would provide results that can be more easily compared to the results of the
Keystroke Dynamics study, as seen in Chapter 4. The additional control over the output of
the classifiers also provided a more flexible environment for combining classifier output as
is described in the Multimodal Biometrics study chapter (see Chapter 6).
The MatLab input data was formatted as a standard ASCII text file that was separated into
rows and columns using whitespace. The standard SPro output can be converted from .mfcc
files to simple ASCII files via the command scopy, which resulted in rows and columns of
feature vector values, where each row represented the features extracted from a 20ms long
voice sample, and the columns represented the individual features selected by SPro. The
scopy command is shown below:
scopy -o ascii <input filename>.mfcc <output filename>.txt
After feature extraction, the just over 57 MB of samples gathered were converted to more
than 1.8 million individual feature vectors with 12 features each. The data was manipulated
into different sets for each study participant, each of whom in turn was considered the de-
vice owner and the other participants were considered part of the rest–of–world class. This
rest-of-world set is often called a world model or cohort model in speaker recognition and
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verification research [119]. Irrespective of its nomenclature, the feature vectors included in
this set were used as negative (i.e., non–owner) samples during training, and were thus used
to create a universal background model during pattern classification.
The large number of feature vectors created by SPro became problematic when presented
to the chosen classifiers. A large amount of data must be stored in a matrix during training
and testing, which uses a large amount of memory. Furthermore, the k–NN classifiers must
compare each testing data point to each training data point individually, a task that increases
the time taken to classify exponentially with the addition of each new training point. As a
result, the classifiers took far too long to train and classify the data, so the decision was made
to reduce the amount of data to a more manageable level. After testing several training and
testing set sizes for both speed and differences in the classifier accuracy, the training set size
contained 4000 patterns and the testing set contained 1000 patterns. The entire dataset was
not used in this case, although each of the 10 cross-validation runs used a different set of
5000 randomly chosen patterns in order to use as much of the data as possible. The training
and testing sets were balanced; each contained the same number of owner and world patterns.
5.4 Results and Analysis
Table 5.1 shows the error rates produced when the speaker verification feature vectors were
presented to each of the five classifiers. The error rates include False Accept Rate (FAR),
False Reject Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER) and Area Under Curve (AUC), where the
curve in question is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. For the first three
error rates, lower rates indicate fewer errors. For AUC, a higher rate indicates fewer errors.
There was a large discrepancy between the amount gathered from each participant, as can
be seen in Figure 5.2. This discrepancy has significant implications for analyzing the results
of the pattern classification on this data. In general, the lack of balance between positive
data samples (i.e., those of the device owner) and negative data samples (i.e., those of the
rest-of-world population) means that FAR and FRR are less useful in determining the quality
of the pattern classifier being tested. This has to do with the fact that FAR and FRR (and
crude accuracy) are sensitive to differences in the base rate of the positive and negative
classes. This means that if there are far more of one type of class than the other, then
a few misclassifications in the under-represented class will make a large difference in the
calculated error rate, be it FAR, FRR or crude accuracy [134]. This can be used to explain
overestimation in the accuracy of a particular classifier, although it is difficult to detect such
an overestimation unless study results are verified with a similar study. Since EER is related
to FAR and FRR, then it too falls to possible estimation errors with unbalanced datasets. The
area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC-ROC) represents the probability
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of a true positive response from a given classifier in a binary problem, and thus is not affected
by unbalanced datasets [134]. Due to these constraints, the data was balanced into sets
containing 5000 patterns each: 2500 from the owner and 2500 from the rest-of-world group.
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Figure 5.2: Amount of voice data gathered, by owner.
The results of pattern classification, shown in Table 5.1, are the median values of the 10
cross-validation runs. The initial results from the five pattern classifiers show medium low
FAR and FRR values, slightly better EER values, and very good AUC values. Speaker ver-
ification studies for telephone conversations generally have EER values of approximately
10% [69, 71], although this is dependent on factors such as amount of background noise and
amount of training data. The EER values in Table 5.1 are somewhat higher than this, which
is likely due to the limits on training data. Since the datasets used for each cross-validation
step were balanced in terms of owner and rest-of-world patterns, the FAR and FRR values
are within the same range, although they are higher than expected. These higher levels can
be attributed to the natural sources of variance in audio data used for pattern classification,
and the fact that this study used a text-independent model. Such a model does not depend on
the participant speaking a particular word or phrase that has been chosen at enrolment. In-
stead, the participant speaks freely and comparisons are made between individual utterances
that are very likely to be different both in content and in location, and thus inter-utterance
differences in channel clarity and quality may exist. Text-independent models are known
to have higher error rates than text-dependent systems [118], which may explain the higher
error rates in the results of this study.
The FAR and FRR values show an acceptable level to justify a larger study (i.e., with more
participants rather than with more data). The variation between classifier results on a per-
owner basis was low; for example, the FAR values for iPodA ranged from a low of 33.80% to
a high of 39.70%, which means that all classifiers tested showed similar capability to classify
this owner’s speaker patterns. In other cases, such as for iPhoneA, the FAR and FRR values
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Classifier
Result Owner Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
FAR (%)
iPhoneA 52.10 42.80 42.20 40.80 41.90
iPhoneB 43.50 37.30 37.30 32.90 33.80
iPhoneC 44.90 40.40 35.70 27.80 28.80
iPhoneD 28.60 29.90 35.10 32.10 33.10
iPodA 39.70 36.00 34.90 33.80 35.30
iPodC 46.10 45.30 37.30 37.80 39.70
iPodD 20.90 21.20 33.80 24.80 23.60
iPodE 28.80 28.50 35.30 27.80 28.30
iPodF 44.60 35.40 31.10 29.10 30.50
FRR (%)
iPhoneA 26.90 38.20 42.40 32.20 32.90
iPhoneB 29.50 35.20 36.30 24.40 25.00
iPhoneC 24.40 27.50 35.80 27.60 27.40
iPhoneD 49.30 41.50 35.40 24.10 23.80
iPodA 34.10 32.80 34.00 19.40 20.00
iPodC 25.80 26.30 37.20 21.90 22.10
iPodD 43.10 42.70 34.50 30.60 31.20
iPodE 34.80 35.50 35.00 26.00 26.00
iPodF 17.80 25.10 31.40 19.60 19.10
EER (%)
iPhoneA 39.50 40.20 42.12 37.12 38.06
iPhoneB 36.80 36.30 36.87 29.33 29.55
iPhoneC 34.50 32.80 35.50 27.93 28.54
iPhoneD 37.30 35.30 36.14 28.61 28.94
iPodA 35.10 34.50 34.47 28.68 28.48
iPodC 35.60 33.70 37.82 29.99 31.39
iPodD 31.90 31.80 34.30 27.43 27.72
iPodE 31.50 32.20 34.60 27.25 27.65
iPodF 28.30 29.70 31.44 25.07 25.85
AUC (%)
iPhoneA 64.36 63.61 59.63 68.15 67.14
iPhoneB 68.08 70.65 65.83 77.75 77.24
iPhoneC 71.55 73.24 67.32 78.42 77.94
iPhoneD 66.36 69.37 66.00 77.90 78.36
iPodA 70.68 71.70 68.46 79.33 79.35
iPodC 70.67 72.00 65.52 76.63 75.71
iPodD 74.93 75.55 68.55 79.63 79.48
iPodE 75.85 75.59 68.52 79.66 79.06
iPodF 77.78 77.45 71.64 82.50 81.62
Table 5.1: Pattern classifier results, as median values of 10–fold cross-validation. Rest-of-
world participants are repeated in both training and testing sets (data is not repeated).
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are among the highest for all classifiers when compared to other owners. This suggests that
iPhoneA’s owner was harder to distinguish from other speakers and that there also may be
people for whom speaker verification is not a suitable biometric. Such a failure-to-enrol is
common with all types of biometrics. Despite their unacceptable levels, the FAR and FRR
values suggest that the optimal classifier for this data is either of the two 5-NN classifiers,
although neither show low enough error levels to justify using speaker verification as a sole
biometric. It should, instead, be combined with another biometric to improve the error rates
and increase the likelihood of correctly identifying the device owner.
AUC values ranged from an overall low of 59.63% for iPhoneA using the DT classifier to a
high of 82.50% for iPodF using the 5-NN (Eucl) classifier. Such a large range indicates that
most of the classifiers performed reasonably well for most owners, but that more training
data was required. The results on a per-owner basis were more regular: iPhoneA, which had
the lowest (and thus the worst-performing) AUC values ranged from a high of 68.15% to a
low of 59.63%, which means that iPhoneA’s patterns, as seen with the EER values, are not
very distinctive. The classifiers were only somewhat better than chance, which has an AUC
value of 50%. On the other hand, the AUC values for iPodF are higher while still maintaining
a similar variation to those of iPhoneA. AUC values for iPodF ranged from a low of 71.64%
for DT to a high of 82.50% for 5-NN (Eucl). These values are within acceptable ranges for
use as a biometric classifier, although not in production systems. The AUC values overall
suggest that the optimal classifier for this data is either of the two 5-NN classifiers, as was
the conclusion when examining the other error rates.
The classifiers used were not tuned or tweaked in any way when performing these classifier
comparisons. The typical workflow when considering pattern classification algorithms for
a particular task is first to train a model, then measure the classifier’s accuracy with test
data. The results of accuracy measurement are used to determine what, if any, steps may be
taken to simplify the model and thus reduce the amount of data needed to maintain that level
of accuracy. In some cases, model simplification may also lead to a more accurate model.
This study was a feasibility study to determine whether potentially noisy data gathered from
mobile device owners contains enough information to verify the device owner’s identity. As
such, the results of this study support a larger–scale experiment that can include classifier
model tuning. Such steps may lead to an increase in the classifier accuracy and a reduction
in the associated error rates.
Statistical Significance
As with the keystroke data analysis, there are two requirements that the statistical signifi-
cance test must meet, as follows:
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1. Non-Parametric: the data gathered is not parametric (i.e., does not follow a normal
or Gaussian distribution) as evidenced both by the fact that the EER and AUC values
range between 0 and 1 and the results of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test [152] for each
of the calculations in turn, as shown in Figure 5.2.
2. Pairwise tests: For each owner data, the comparison is between the AUC or EER
for each classifier – this means that the results for the optimal classifier should be
compared to the AUC and EER for each of the remaining four classifiers in turn, which
implies using a test that will compare pairs of values.
The AUC and EER data did not follow a normal distribution, as shown by the results of
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests seen in Table 5.2. The values in each case are well below
the ρ < 0.05 levels required for Gaussian distributions. This implies that the data is non–
parametric in nature. Thus, a non–parametric test such as the Wilcoxon Signed–Rank Test is
suitable for this data, as it was for the keystroke data in the previous chapter.
Classifier
Metric Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
EER (%) 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0013 0.0012
AUC (%) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5.2: Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution shape for EER and AUC
values. Since each value is less than the α = 0.05 significance level, then each distribution
of data is considered significantly different from a normal distribution (i.e., the distribution
is non–parametric).
Classifier
Metric Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
EER (%)
35.10 33.70 35.50 28.61 28.54
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0078) –
AUC (%)
70.68 72.00 67.32 78.42 78.36
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) – (0.0273)
Table 5.3: EER and AUC medians for all classifiers. The bolded numbers represent the best
classifier based on either EER or AUC, and the number in brackets after each percentage is
the result of the Wilcoxon Signed–Rank Test, ρ. 5-NN (Eucl) was considered significantly
better than the other classifiers for EER and AUC at the α = 0.05 level.
Table 5.3 shows the results of the Wilcoxon Signed–Rank test on the AUC and EER values
for the speaker verification data. The classifier with the lowest EER median value, 5–NN
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(Man) with 28.54% median EER, was chosen as the optimal classifier; this is shown by the
bolded median value in the table. 5-NN (Man) was then compared to each other classifier
using the Wilcoxon Signed–Rank test, with the results showing that 5-NN (Man) was statis-
tically significantly better than each of the other classifiers at the ρ < 0.05 significance level.
The table shows the same values for the first three classifiers because when comparing each
value for each owner to that of 5-NN (Man), the latter is the lower value in every case. The
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test assigns either a plus or minus sign to each comparison depend-
ing on whether the optimal classifier has a higher or lower value than the number to which it
is compared. Therefore, each comparison was assigned the same sign, and the probability of
seeing the median value reported does not change from one column to the other. The optimal
classifier according to the AUC data is that with the highest AUC value; in this case it was
the 5-NN (Eucl) classifier with median AUC over all owners of 78.42%. The results of the
Wilcoxon Signed–Rank tests that compared 5-NN (Eucl) to all other classifiers showed that
5-NN (Eucl) was statistically significantly better than the others. The results of the statis-
tical significance justify the choice of either of the two k-NN classifiers as the optimal one
for the speaker verification data. These results should be verified with a larger study with
more participants before implementing speaker verification as a biometric in the Transparent
Authentication Framework.
5.5 Study Limitations
There were several possible study limitations that should be kept in mind when assessing the
results of this experiment. They are as follows:
Study Size: As with the Keystroke Dynamics Study, the size of the speaker verification
study was small (N = 9), which means that any results from the study may not be as
conclusive as the results from a larger study. The amount of data gathered was signif-
icant, but only from a few participants which means that inter-participant differences
may not have been significant enough to allow the owner to be distinguished from the
rest-of-world patterns. This limitation can be alleviated by repeating this study with a
larger number of participants.
Devices: Although all devices used were Apple iPhones and iPod Touches, the devices be-
longed to the study participants so the amount or type of applications on the device
could not be controlled. Similarly, updates to the operating system may have been
made during the experiment, which may have subtly changed the study application’s
functionality. The amount of available space and processor speeds of each device is
not known, although this is unlikely to have had an impact on the study since all data
reached the experimenter as expected.
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Background Noise: Sounds other than the speaker’s voice may have been recorded, and
since the data was not filtered explicitly (although it may have been done as part of the
feature extraction step by the SPro software), these extra sounds may cause differences
in patterns from the same speaker. This is considered an acceptable limitation because
it more realistically mimics the usual environment during a phone call – it is unlikely
that the device owner will always be in a completely silent area during phone calls.
Speech Differences: Several speakers mentioned casually to the experimenter that they read
aloud books or other text during recording in order to gather more data. This may affect
their natural voice pattern since they are not speaking their own words with their own
cadence and inflection, as it is expected they would if they were on a phone call or
recording a voice memo. In terms of this study, it is an acceptable limitation because
their voice pattern would be from this same source throughout their recorded voice
samples.
5.6 Speaker Verification Accuracy
Speaker verification accuracy is affected by three major sources [119, 165]:
1. Phonetic variability: Differences between the words and phrases as spoken in the train-
ing set and in the testing set. This is a significant source of loss of accuracy in this study
since a text-independent model was used, which implies that the words and phrases are
very likely different between the training and testing sets.
2. Technical factors: these include the nature of the channel used, microphone quality,
recording quality, and data loss due to compressed data formats, among others.
3. Changes in the speaker’s acoustic environment: includes background noise, echoes
and room acoustics.
Other significant contributors to speaker verification accuracy include within-speaker varia-
tions such as mood, health and aging [71], as well as normal recording session variations.
This latter contributor is defined as a mismatch between any two recordings of the same
speaker, such as the recordings in the classifier training set and those recordings in the test-
ing set [165]. These differ from phonetic variability in that they are not necessarily about
the words spoken, but instead about tone, speaking speed, and pronunciation, and can also
include variations such as uncharacteristic utterances by the speaker. Kinnunen et al. cite
recording session variability as the “most challenging problem in speaker recognition” [119,
p.2]. Bonastre et al. [83] state that low error rates for speaker verification are not likely
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within the confines of current state of the art, which may help explain the higher than hoped
for error rates reported in this chapter.
The DT classification algorithm consumed extensive memory resources when processing
such a large dataset, which resulted in many out-of-memory errors during classification.
These were solved by moving to a more powerful computer with more available memory and
reducing the dataset size to 5000 patterns. Although these strategies supported this research,
they were not a viable solution due to resource constraints when this mechanism is deployed
in the wild. However, these difficulties must be addressed given that the Transparent Authen-
tication Framework was designed to keep all data on the device in order to protect the device
owner’s privacy and support a perception of enhanced security. The device owner’s data,
therefore, cannot be removed from the device to be processed on more powerful computers
and the results transmitted back to the device. The chosen pattern classifier must run within
the memory and processor constraints of the mobile device.
The memory and processor constraints are not as much of a problem as they appear to be
at first glance. The reason for the out-of-memory errors with the voice recordings can be
attributed to the volume of data to process rather than the attributes of the pattern classifier.
In the working Framework, a much smaller sample of voice data will be used for training,
and the testing set in each case will be a single feature vector, or perhaps a small series of
features in the case of a longer speaking sequence. Therefore, the out-of-memory errors
should not plague the Framework, no matter which classifier is chosen. In the event this does
happen, the training and testing sets can be reduced in size to ensure there are no memory
issues.
5.7 Speaker Verification in the Transparent Authenti-
cation Framework
Speaker verification was considered for inclusion in the Transparent Authentication Frame-
work because voice patterns can be gathered transparently while the mobile device owner
completes everyday tasks, such as making phone calls. The results of this study have shown
that voice patterns gathered on a mobile device are indeed a viable source of unique infor-
mation that can be used as part of the Framework to verify the identity of a mobile device
owner. These results also indicate that speaker verification is best combined with another
biometric in order to improve the error rates revealed in the results of this study. Therefore,
it can reasonably be argued that this study has justified the inclusion of speaker verification
as a possible biometric in the Transparent Authentication Framework, although it should be
acknowledged that a larger study needs to be undertaken to verify these results on a larger
sample size prior to including this biometric in a working framework.
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5.8 Summary
This chapter has reported on the design, implementation, and results of the speaker veri-
fication study that was undertaken to provide support for speaker verification as a useful
and meaningful biometric in the Transparent Authentication Framework. The results of the
study, although preliminary, suggest that speaker verification may be sufficient to verify the
identity of a mobile device user, although likely in combination with another biometric. A
larger study, as justified by these initial results, is recommended to verify these results and
to allow the inclusion of other mobile devices.
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Chapter 6
Multimodal Biometrics Feasibility
Study
This chapter discusses methods that may be used to fuse the biometrics used in the Transpar-
ent Authentication Framework. The fusion of keystroke dynamics and speaker verification
into a single multimodal biometric provides a bimodal input for calculating device confi-
dence in the Framework. The two fusion methods, called the Naı¨ve Method and Posterior
Probability Method, are presented. The calculations used are detailed, then the data from
the previous two studies are tested using these methods and compared to the results from
the individual biometrics. The results show that there are improvements in both the error
rates for keystroke dynamics and speaker verification reported in the previous two chapters,
although the improvements are not statistically significant.
6.1 Study Goals
The purpose of this study is to determine whether combining keystroke dynamics and speaker
verification biometrics results in lower error rates when compared to each biometric on its
own. This study examines two score-level fusion techniques that are based on the probabil-
ities output by the classifiers. Each technique is tested with the pattern classifiers used in
the Keystroke Dynamics (Chapter 4) and Speaker Verification (Chapter 5) studies to deter-
mine which performs best in terms of reducing error rates. This study provides an answer
to hypothesis H2 of this dissertation, as listed in Section 1.4.1, which asks whether com-
bining biometrics provides a better basis for determining if the owner is the current device
user, when compared to using single biometrics. An answer to this hypothesis further in-
forms the overarching goal of this dissertation, which is to provide a framework upon which
transparent authentication for mobile devices can be built.
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6.2 Fusion Methods
There are two ways to consider biometric fusion [57]. First, a single biometric type (e.g.,
fingerprint) may be classified using several classifiers, then the individual results combined
to create a single probability. The second way, the one that is adopted in this study, is to
use two or more different biometrics (e.g., keystroke dynamics and speaker verification),
classify them individually, and combine the results of these two biometric modalities into a
single probability. In this latter case, each biometric modality may be presented to a different
pattern classifier depending on which one provides the best results for the data presented to
it. While this is the approach taken for testing the efficacy of the two methods proposed in
this chapter, these methods may also be used with multiple values from the same type of
biometric.
Fusion methods for multiple biometric measurements include feature-level, decision-level
and score-level fusion [57, 123], as discussed in Chapter 2. Feature-level fusion techniques
were excluded because the two biometrics do not have features in common, which means
that combining the feature vectors may be more likely to produce higher error rates [57].
Decision-level fusion is also unsuitable because it can result in a multimodal biometric that
produces worse error rates than the individual biometrics. This is because it only has access
to the decision and not the granularity thereof. Thus, a decision could be made to reject based
on a borderline case (i.e., one very close to the threshold), which favors false rejections rather
than false positives.
Score-level fusion has been chosen for combining the keystroke dynamics and speaker ver-
ification patterns for this research because the two pattern classifiers output a score that
is interpreted as a probability that the gathered feature belongs to the device owner. This
method does not rely on pattern independence, which is important as some implementations
of the Transparent Authentication Framework may use different dependent biometrics.
6.2.1 Score-Level Fusion Techniques
Score-level fusion is a technique in which the scores or probabilities of several biometrics
may be combined. The biometric decision has not been made at this point, but the feature
vectors have been presented to a classifier that outputs either a probability or a score-match
matrix. Many of these methods require normalization to ensure that the different classifier
outputs are within the same range.
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Score Normalization
The scores to be combined are normalized to ensure that the value they represent comes
from the same distribution, say between 0 and 1 [127]. Normalization reduces the effect of
differing distributions. For instance, if one classifier outputs a score between 0 and 100 and
another classifier outputs a score between 1000 and 2000, the first biometric will have little
effect on the fusion result since its scores seem much lower than the second biometric. With-
out the normalization step, the biometric with the higher range of scores will eliminate the
contribution of the biometric with the lower range of scores. Furthermore, score normaliza-
tion allows the addition or substitution of other biometrics as they become available without
considering whether the scores will complement each other.
Common normalization techniques include Min-Max, Z-Score, and TANH, among oth-
ers [122, 166]. These methods, in general, involve combining the median, maximum and
minimum values, and standard deviations of several scores to ensure they fall within the
same ranges. The interested reader is directed to the sources cited previously for a detailed
discussion of normalization techniques.
Score-Match Matrix Methods
Many studies into multimodal biometrics use well-known score-level fusion methods that
are based on a score-match matrix [122, 166, 167]. Score-match matrix creation begins with
pattern classification. When classifying a particular test feature vector, the new input data is
compared to each feature vector in the training set. The comparison results in a distance that
represents how different (i.e., how far) the new data is from the training data. For each pair
of training and testing data, these distances are put into an n x n score-match matrix, where
n is the size of the training set. At the end of this process (i.e., the end of the classifier’s
testing phase), there is a score-match matrix for every feature vector in the test set.
The score-level fusion techniques that are common in the literature are summarized in Ta-
ble 6.1. These techniques are presented here to give a sense of the state-of-the-art, and to
justify the choice of the Naı¨ve and Posterior Probability Methods for this research. The im-
plementations in Table 6.1 assume that Mi is the score-match matrix from classifier i, and
that there are K classifiers in total.
Once all score-match matrices have been created, the fusion methods must normalize and
then combine them using the formulae shown in Table 6.1. For instance, the Simple Sum
method adds all elements of the matrices together, and the Minimum and Maximum Score
methods choose the smallest and largest scores, respectively, resulting in a new score-match
matrix that represents all input matrices [168]. These methods imply processing possibly
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Name Formula Description
Simple Sum
∑K
i=1Mi
The score-match matrix values for each
biometric are summed to provide a new
score-match matrix.
Min Score min(M1,M2, . . . ,MK)
The smallest score for each element in all
score-match matrices is selected, creating a
combined score-match matrix.
Max Score max(M1,M2, . . . ,MK)
The largest score for each element in all
score-match matrices is selected, creating a
combined score-match matrix.
Table 6.1: Summary of score-level biometric fusion methods that use score-match matrices.
large and complex data structures. This represents a potentially significant amount of pro-
cessor and memory use, both of which are constrained on mobile devices. For these reasons,
fusion methods that rely on score-match matrices are discounted from use in this research.
Instead, fusion methods that take probabilities as input were used rather than those that use
score-match matrices.
Sum and Product of Probabilities
Two common score-level fusion techniques that use output probabilities, Sum of Probabili-
ties and Product of Probabilities, were considered for this study [166, 168]. These methods,
summarized in Table 6.2, calculate the sum and product of the posterior probabilities of a
class given the input data. While these methods seem ideal for this work, the literature does
not provide adequate information to recreate such methods. When using the sum method,
for instance, there is no discussion of normalization techniques except to state that they are
“implied in the algorithm” [166]. Due to the lack of implementation details, these methods
were discounted from use in this study.
Name Formula Description
Sum of Probabilities
∑K
i=1 P (Owner |Mi)
Probabilities for all biometrics are
summed to create a single,
combined probability.
Product of Probabilities
∏K
i=1 P (Owner |Mi)
Probabilities for all biometrics are
multiplied to create a single,
combined probability.
Table 6.2: Summary of probability-based score-level biometric fusion methods.
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6.2.2 Sequential Probability Ratio Test
Another option for combining biometrics in the Transparent Authentication Framework is
using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). With this test, the Framework would
continue to gather biometric samples until a confident decision within two thresholds can be
made. Once the threshold is met, the biometric probabilities and decisions can be stored until
needed to raise the probability further. This method lends itself well to use in the Transparent
Authentication Framework, although it was not tested specifically in this research because it
may prove too slow in adjusting the device confidence in the presence of an attacker. This
assertion may be tested in a simulated implementation of the Framework, and is thus left for
future work.
Research has been performed that uses SPRT with multimodal biometrics, with good re-
sults [169].
Two score-level probability fusion methods have been selected for testing with the keystroke
dynamics and speaker verification data: the Naı¨ve and Posterior Probability Methods, as
discussed in the next section.
6.3 Combining Biometrics for Score-Level Fusion
This study uses the results from the keystroke dynamics and speaker verification experi-
ments first to create a multimodal biometric, then to compare the error rates for multimodal
biometric to those of the individual biometrics. The combination methods presented in the
following two sections, the Naı¨ve Method and the Posterior Probability Method, fuse the
probabilities output by the two classifiers to calculate a new probability. This new proba-
bility is then used to make a decision regarding whether both patterns belong to the device
owner. Both combination methods take advantage of the mathematical rules of probabilities.
An important consideration when combining probabilities is whether the samples are in-
dependent. In probability theory, stating that two events are independent means that the
observed value of one probability does not affect the other. Keystroke dynamics and speaker
verification biometrics are not truly independent since they are gathered from the same per-
son. However, the likelihood that they are completely independent or completely dependent
on each other is low. In this case, because the two values are independent measurements
(and, in fact, measure different characteristics of the same person), the values are considered
conditionally independent given the class (either owner or rest-of-world).
This explains independence in the case of the owner keystroke and voice patterns. In the
case of the rest-of-world patterns, there are some cases where the keystrokes of one owner
are matched with the voice of another since the rest-of-world patterns are not matched by
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owner before combination. For example, a posterior probability from Owner A’s keystroke
pattern may be combined with a conditional probability from a voice sample from Owner
B. Since both samples are not from the designated device owner, they both have the known
class of rest-of-world. Combining biometrics in this manner is likely more stringent than
ensuring that both probabilities originate with the same person, although this is not proven
in this research. In this case, true independence is assumed because the two measurements
are independent and also come from two different people.
Symbol Meaning
CO Class decision for owner
CW Class decision for world (i.e., not owner)
Di Data from an unspecified biometric or explicit
authentication attempt
DKD The keystroke dynamics data used for classification (i.e.,
the feature vector)
DSV The speaker verification data used for classification (i.e.,
the feature vector)
P (CO|DKD) Conditional posterior probability of Owner class given the
keystroke dynamics data (i.e., the classifier output)
P (CO|DSV ) Conditional posterior probability of Owner class given the
speaker verification data (i.e., the classifier output)
P (CO|DKD, DSV ) The combined probability of the Owner class given the
keystroke dynamics and speaker verification data
P (CW |DKD, DSV ) The combined probability of the World class given the
keystroke dynamics and speaker verification data
Table 6.3: Definitions and notation of terms for biometric combination methods.
6.3.1 Naı¨ve Method
The first method by which biometrics have been combined is a naı¨ve approach based on
the mathematical rules for probabilities. With this method, conditional independence be-
tween the two values being combined is assumed. This approach, which here is called the
Naı¨ve approach since it is a simple way to consider biometric combination, is calculated by
subtracting the product of probabilities from their sum:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) = [P (CO | DKD) + P (CO | DSV )]− [P (CO | DKD) ∗ P (CO | DSV )]
(6.1)
6.3. Combining Biometrics for Score-Level Fusion 113
This method, while unsuitable for mutually exclusive events, allows for some overlap be-
tween the the two classes, as shown in Figure 6.1. However, when two probabilities are
added, the intersection is added twice, which leads to error in the reported combination. The
intersection is removed by subtracting the intersection once by subtracting the product of the
two probabilities.
P(A) P(B)
P(A) and P(B)
Figure 6.1: Overlap between two probabilities. When adding P (A)+P (B), the overlap area
is added twice. It is removed by subtracting the intersection, P (A) ∗ P (B).
The Naı¨ve approach does not require an explicit normalization step; it is implied in Equa-
tion (6.1). This equation can also be written for more than two biometrics. This is helpful
since the Transparent Authentication Framework may use more than two:
P (CO | D1, D2, . . . DK) = [
K∑
i=1
P (CO | Di)]− [
K∏
i=1
P (CO | Di)] (6.2)
6.3.2 Posterior Probability Method
The second combination method takes into account the designated class given the input data.
This approach, called the Posterior Probability Method here, was extended from the method
for combining the output of two or more classifiers described in [170]. Its derivation depends
on Bayes’ Rule, which can be used to relate the probabilities of two events (A and B) before
and after conditioning on a third event (C). In terms of this research, the two events A and
B are the determination that the biometric sample belongs to the device owner given the
keystroke dynamics and speaker verification feature vectors, respectively. The third event,
C, is the determination of either owner or rest-of-world class. Bayes’ rule is represented as
follows, using the notation given in Table 6.3:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) = P (DKD, DSV | CO) · P (CO)
P (DKD, DSV )
(6.3)
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where it is assumed that DKD and DSV are conditionally independent measures given the
class CO:
P (DKD, DSV | CO) = P (DKD | CO) · P (DSV | CO) (6.4)
Substituting Equation (6.4) into Equation (6.3) results in:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) = P (DKD | CO) · P (DSV | CO) · P (CO)
P (DKD, DSV )
(6.5)
The next equation is the formula used for the Posterior Probability Method. The normaliza-
tion constant, α, ensures that the probabilities of the possible classes sum to 1:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) = α · P (CO | DKD) · P (CO | DSV )
P (CO)
(6.6)
The derivation of α depends on the constraint that the probabilities of the two classes CO and
CW must sum to 1 for the same input data, either DKD or DSV . This constraint is written as:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) + P (CW | DKD, DSV ) = 1 (6.7)
Thus, the derivation of α begins with the above assumption for the two classes in this work,
CO and CW :
1 = α ·
[
P (CO | DKD) · P (CO | DSV )
P (CO)
+
P (CW | DKD) · P (CW | DSV )
P (CW )
]
(6.8)
Rearranging trivially to move alpha to the left hand side gives:
1
α
=
[
P (CO | DKD) · P (CO | DSV )
P (CO)
+
P (CW | DKD) · P (CW | DSV )
P (CW )
]
(6.9)
Note that P (CW ) = 1 − P (CO) since there are only two possible classes. Substituting this
into Equation (6.9) gives:
1
α
=
P (CO | DKD) · P (CO | DSV )
P (CO)
+
(1− P (CO | DKD)) · (1− P (CO | DSV ))
(1− P (CO)) (6.10)
For simplicity (as is done in [170]) assume X = P (CO | DKD), Y = P (CO | DSV ) and
Z = P (CO) and substitute into Equation (6.10):
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1
α
=
XY
Z
+
(1−X) · (1− Y )
(1− Z) (6.11)
Simplifying by creating a common denominator gives:
1
α
=
XY −XY Z + Z(1− Y −X +XY )
Z · (1− Z) (6.12)
=
XY −XY Z + Z − Y Z −XZ +XY Z
Z · (1− Z) (6.13)
=
Z · (1− Y −X) +XY
Z · (1− Z) (6.14)
Substituting into Equation (6.6) (replacing values with X , Y and Z where necessary) gives:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) = Z · (1− Z)
Z · (1− Y −X) +XY ·
XY
Z
(6.15)
=
Z · (1− Z) ·XY
Z · (Z · (1− Y −X) +XY (6.16)
=
XY · (1− Z)
Z · (1− Y −X) +XY (6.17)
Replacing the original values of X , Y and Z into the final equation above gives the final
equation for the Posterior Probability Method of biometric combination:
P (CO | DKD, DSV ) =
P (CO | DKD) · P (CO | DSV ) · (1− P (CO))
P (CO) · (1− P (CO | DSV )− P (CO | DKD)) + (P (CO | DKD) · P (CO | DSV ))
(6.18)
Since the Transparent Authentication Framework is intended for use with any number of
biometrics rather than just two, it is helpful to rewrite Equation (6.18) for several inputs, as
follows:
P (CO | D1, . . . , DK) = α ·
∏n=K
i=1 P (CO | Dn)
P (CO)K−1
(6.19)
The α term is left out for brevity, and because its exact calculation depends on the number
of terms (i.e., biometrics) used.
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6.4 Study Design
The independent variable for this study is the combination method used: Keystroke Dynam-
ics (KD), Speaker Verification (SV), Naı¨ve Method (NM) or Posterior Probability Method
(PPM). While the first two are not combination methods, they are included here for compar-
ison purposes in order to determine whether either of the latter two methods show improve-
ments over the two individual biometrics.
6.4.1 Participants
The biometric data used in this study was from the Keystroke Dynamics and Speaker Veri-
fication studies described in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. The participants for this study
are those who participated in both the keystroke and speaker studies; the overlap yielded 6
participants. They ranged in age from early 20s to late 50s, and had a range of experience
with both typing and speaking on their device.
The keystroke and voice patterns used in the multimodal biometric come from the same
owner. In some multimodal biometric studies, biometrics coming from two different own-
ers are combined together to create an imaginary individual in order to determine whether
this also increases or decreases the error rates when compared to the individual biometrics.
However, this implies that there are known biometric samples from someone other than the
device owner. This is not known on a mobile device, where it is assumed there is a single
owner, and any biometric decisions are simply likelihoods, not certainties, that the pattern
belongs to the device owner.
6.4.2 Apparatus and Materials
The two studies that provided the data for this experiment used iPhones and iPod Touches
to gather the data, as detailed in Chapters 4 and 5. The only other equipment required
for this study was MatLab version R2012b, which was used to perform the NM and PPM
calculations described in Section 6.3 and to perform the statistical significance tests presented
in Section 6.6.
6.4.3 Procedure
The reported results from the Keystroke Dynamics and Speaker Verification studies are
cross-validation averages, meaning that the data is segmented into ten training and testing
sets and classified individually. This usually provides a stronger sense of the type of data
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reported, and to validate the results of a single data run. To this end, there were no single
posterior probabilities for each pattern and for each classifier to use as input for this study.
Instead, the exact method (short of cross-validation efforts) described in Chapters 4 and 5
was used to execute a single data run for each classifier, using the same data as in the two
original studies, and ensuring that the same data was presented to each classifier. The output
posterior probabilities were then used as described here, and are referred to in the results
tables as keystroke dynamics (KD) and speaker verification (SV) biometric classification.
The keystroke dynamics and speaker verification classifications included posterior probabil-
ities that a given pattern belonged to the device owner. These probabilities were calculated
for the five different pattern classifiers. For each of the six owners in this study, the posterior
probabilities from the keystroke dynamics data were matched with posterior probabilities
from the speaker verification study, ensuring that both original biometric samples were from
the same owner. Since there was far more speaker verification than keystroke dynamics data,
only enough samples from the former were used to match one to each keystroke vector. As
seen in Figure 6.2, the keystroke and voice data are then presented to classifiers that out-
put a probability that the input data belongs to the owner. Next, the posterior probabilities
were combined pairwise using the NM and PPM methods to produce combined probabilities.
These were then converted to a biometric decision, D, using the following rule:
D =
0 if P (CO | DKD, DSV ) < 0.51 if P (CO | DKD, DSV ) ≥ 0.5
Keystroke 
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Figure 6.2: Procedure for multimodal biometric fusion.
The new decisions were then compared to the known decisions, which were created using the
known classes of each biometric test set. These known classes are vectors of 0 and 1 values
that represent whether the given test feature vector belonged to the owner or not, where 1
represented an owner pattern. The comparison process is shown in Figure 6.3. The new
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known classes were created by ORing the known class vectors for keystroke dynamics and
speaker verification test sets. Since the same number of keystroke dynamics patterns from
the owner were paired with owner patterns from speaker verification and the same for world
patterns, ORing the two known class vectors resulted in only two calculations: 1 OR 1 = 1,
0 OR 0 = 0. In no cases was an owner pattern paired with a world pattern, meaning that the
calculations 1 OR 0 = 1, 0 OR 1 = 1were never performed. This improves the classification
rate in cases where there may be a disagreement between the component biometrics, even if
they both belong to the owner (i.e., one of the classifiers was incorrect).
Decision 1
Decision 2
Decision 3
Decision n
...
Known 1
Known 2
Known 3
Known n
...
Multimodal 
Decisions
Known 
Classes
Error 
Calculations
AUC
EER
Figure 6.3: Comparison of multimodal decisions to known classes.
Once this new vector of known decisions was calculated, it was used with the newly cal-
culated combined probabilities to calculate an ROC curve from which the AUC and EER
values may be calculated. Finally, the new AUC and EER values were compared to those
produced by the individual biometric classifiers. The calculations for pattern classification,
EER, ROC curves and associated AUC values were performed in MatLab version R2012b.
6.4.4 Biometric Weighting
In the Transparent Authentication Framework, each biometric can be weighted according
to how likely it is to represent the owner. For instance, in the case where an owner types
frequently but does not make many phone calls, there would be far more keystroke than
voice patterns. This affects the classifiers’ ability to classify data correctly since the speaker
verification classifier would have trained on far less data and therefore would be more prone
to errors. In this case, the keystroke dynamics biometrics could be assigned a higher weight
than the speaker verification biometrics so that the latter does not negatively affect device
confidence calculations unnecessarily.
Such weighting provides flexibility to the Framework, but the weighting is intended to take
place before the biometric combination method is used. The result of the weighting would be
a lower or higher probability than the original. However, this chapter is intended to examine
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the actual combination methods, irrespective of weighting, which is considered part of the
Framework. In essence, the weighting itself does not affect the validity of these results
since the probabilities used are from a range of possible values, and could represent either
weighted or unweighted probabilities. Furthermore, testing a weighting scheme is dependent
on the particular application that is based on the Framework, since it has a direct effect on
the provision of security. For these reasons, testing a weighting scheme is best left for a
simulation phase, which is future work.
6.5 Pattern Classification
The classifiers used in this study were the same as for the Keystroke Dynamics and Speaker
Verification studies: k-Nearest Neighbor with Manhattan (k-NN (Man)) and Euclidean (k-
NN (Eucl)) distance measures, Decision Tree (DT), and Naı¨ve Bayes with both Kernel Den-
sity (NB(KD)) and Gaussian (NB(Gau)) distributions. In order to simplify the process, the
two biometrics combined for this study came from the same owner and from the same classi-
fier, although in practice these decisions may come from different classifiers without affect-
ing the method or results. Classifier variations are not considered significant in the context
of this discussion because each classifier outputs a probability that the input pattern came
from the device owner. These probabilities range between 0 and 1 no matter which classifier
is used and are combined in the same way. If the classifier output is a low probability, it will
affect the multimodal biometric in the same way, no matter which classifier it came from,
and similarly for a high probability. Moreover, all classifiers may output unusually high or
low probabilities due to errors, even in the presence of a usually easily classified pattern.
The feasibility studies conducted for the two biometrics were undertaken to identify a “best”
classifier, which should be used for all future biometric choices.
6.6 Results and Analysis
This section reports the results and analysis of the Multimodal Biometrics study. The EER
and AUC values for each test are reported, but FAR and FRR values are not. In a single-
biometric situation, FAR and FRR are easily calculated from where the classifier output was
different than the known class of the test case.
Multimodal biometrics test cases from six participants were considered in the study. They
were compared to the known classes of the test cases and used to calculate the EER and AUC
values shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 respectively.
Table 6.4 shows the EER results by owner for the two single biometrics, KD and SV, as
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Classifier
Owner Metric Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
Owner1
KD 47.89 27.27 30.08 47.39 38.76
SV 39.44 45.07 42.22 36.36 36.03
NM 45.07 27.27 34.72 44.65 36.56
PPM 49.30 36.62 35.95 34.97 35.27
Owner2
KD 31.88 26.09 37.10 28.64 27.21
SV 46.15 38.46 49.57 38.36 36.95
NM 38.46 28.99 41.95 32.55 25.49
PPM 31.88 26.09 42.63 28.64 21.39
Owner3
KD 45.00 33.87 22.30 22.53 14.93
SV 40.00 40.00 49.10 39.90 41.93
NM 41.94 30.00 35.73 25.49 20.00
PPM 40.00 30.00 25.41 28.22 19.72
Owner4
KD 50.00 16.67 25.76 32.76 29.04
SV 40.79 42.11 55.47 53.98 50.33
NM 47.37 16.67 50.36 47.50 49.35
PPM 50.00 33.33 30.04 44.44 37.77
Owner5
KD 40.00 30.00 43.55 21.68 20.60
SV 36.11 44.44 41.46 29.51 20.00
NM 40.00 30.00 47.07 19.70 20.00
PPM 40.00 30.00 32.35 18.35 16.67
Owner6
KD 33.33 11.11 11.09 34.63 28.37
SV 44.44 39.73 43.58 45.80 40.84
NM 38.36 11.11 20.69 42.44 37.71
PPM 44.44 8.22 11.11 39.24 33.55
Table 6.4: EER values (%) for Keystroke Dynamics (KD), Speaker Verification (SV), Naı¨ve
Method (NM) and Posterior Probability Method (PPM).
well as for the two combination methods, NM and PPM. For each owner, the NM and PPM
were generally better than KD and SV in that they produced somewhat lower EER values.
For example, for Owner5 the EER was between 20.60% and 43.55% for KD and between
20.00% and 44.44% for SV, which means that the classifier was better than chance for both
biometrics, although not by much in most cases. When using the NM combination method,
the EER was between 19.70% and 47.07%, which is a nominal improvement. For PPM,
Owner5’s results were also slightly improved over individual methods.
Note that the NM and PPM values do not represent the combination of the KD and SV EER
values. They are calculated as combinations of the individual biometric posterior probabil-
ities and compared to a different set of known classes. Therefore, the SP and PPM EER
6.6. Results and Analysis 121
values are not expected to differ from the KD and SV EER values in a regular manner.
The individual and combination AUC values are presented in Table 6.5, and have better
results when compared to the EER values. For instance, Owner5’s AUC values range from
a low of 60.07% to a high of 85.83% for KD, with a similar range for SV. The NM method
showed little improvement over the individual biometrics, likely due to the limitations in
that calculation. The PPM combination method showed improvement over the individual
methods, with a low of 65.14% and a high of 90.00%.
Classifier
Owner Metric Naı¨ve Bayes Decision 5–NN
Gaussian Kernel Density Tree Euclidean Manhattan
Owner1
KD 59.15 79.64 76.95 50.45 63.76
SV 62.48 59.41 61.84 69.65 68.31
NM 59.92 79.45 72.61 58.77 67.86
PPM 58.45 67.35 70.42 67.16 71.06
Owner2
KD 70.79 84.17 68.73 79.15 82.39
SV 62.10 57.97 51.62 66.22 66.50
NM 73.13 79.15 63.44 74.75 78.14
PPM 74.69 82.61 62.88 81.10 86.90
Owner3
KD 60.89 78.31 83.15 84.07 88.27
SV 64.68 64.35 53.27 61.73 61.45
NM 63.31 79.60 72.21 82.10 86.08
PPM 61.21 80.16 78.06 80.73 85.89
Owner4
KD 55.70 90.79 82.13 70.18 78.40
SV 62.50 65.57 40.13 42.98 50.77
NM 63.38 92.54 49.28 54.71 52.30
PPM 59.43 82.89 75.11 57.13 72.04
Owner5
KD 63.19 78.75 60.07 80.97 85.83
SV 69.86 50.14 63.12 80.69 78.19
NM 61.67 78.61 55.54 87.22 84.24
PPM 65.14 69.17 69.72 90.00 91.11
Owner6
KD 64.84 97.41 93.15 66.29 71.08
SV 65.91 60.12 59.51 57.76 63.01
NM 70.78 95.74 86.28 62.40 67.81
PPM 66.97 97.87 92.16 66.74 70.70
Table 6.5: AUC values (%) for Keystroke Dynamics (KD), Speaker Verification (SV), Naı¨ve
Method (NM) and Posterior Probability Method (PPM).
For both EER and AUC calculations, NM tended to be somewhat more optimistic since the
calculation itself takes fewer factors into account (i.e., the constraint relationship between
owner and world class probabilities). This optimism means that for a combination that is
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close to the threshold separating owner from world, using this calculation may output the
Owner class more often that the World class. Using PPM, on the other hand, resulted in
stricter class determinations, as shown by the slightly lower AUC value than NM in most
cases. This strictness has the opposite effect on close decisions; using this calculation method
is more likely to output the World class.
Neither of these issues supports the selection of one combination method over the other.
Instead, since NM is optimistic and thus may allow more false positives, this method should
be used in cases where lower security levels are acceptable since a false positive represents
a potential breach. PPM’s stricter decision-making means that there may be a higher level
of false negatives, which may annoy owners in low security situations, since they are being
unnecessarily prevented from accessing the protected services. Therefore, PPM is better
used in situations that require higher security, where the higher false negative occurrence is
an acceptable tradeoff for an increased security level.
One of the reasons that PPM represents a stricter decision process has to do with the KD
and SV posterior probabilities that are input into the equation. In many cases, the classifier
was unable to make a decision regarding the class to which a particular feature vector should
belong. In these cases, the posterior probability for owner (P (CO | DKD) or P (CO | DSV ))
was zero, as is also the case when the feature vector was determined to not belong to the
owner. If a zero value is substituted into Equation (??), the numerator is also zero, which
means that the combination of the two posterior probabilities will be zero. This is particularly
concerning in situations where one biometric has a very high probability output, and the other
has zero probability. It is expected that this situation will happen with less frequency if there
is more data with which to train the classifiers.
The improvements shown with the two combination methods must be considered carefully
for several reasons. First, this is a very small dataset – much smaller than those from the
keystroke dynamics and speaker verification studies, and therefore is subject to the same
issues. Specifically, the classifiers are trained on a small amount of data and may not ac-
curately model the owner’s patterns, and tested on an even smaller set, which gives very
little data upon which to base EER and AUC calculations. This in turn means that individ-
ual misclassifications represent a much larger portion of the total number of classifications.
EER in particular may be artificially high in the individual classifiers. For these reasons, the
combination methods may present a positively biased case, particularly NM.
The ROC curves for each combination method are represented pictorially in Figure 6.4. This
figure shows the results for Owner5 only; the results for the other owners are similar and
have been therefore left out for brevity.
These ROC curve comparisons that can be made further enhance the differences between
the NM and PPM methods. The figures show that NM and PPM are only better than the
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Figure 6.4: ROC curves for Owner5 over all classifiers. The point where the diagonal line
crosses each curve is the EER for that curve.
individual biometrics up to a certain FAR value in some cases. For instance, in Figure 6.4c
the AUC values increase for all situations in a similar step-wise manner. This shows that
there is little improvement in combining classifier output for Naı¨ve Bayes Gaussian, and that
at some thresholds (e.g., up to 0.2 on the x-axis) KD is actually the better choice in terms of
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a higher AUC. Such a result can be explained by lack of input data or a poor match between
classifier and data.
In Figure 6.4a, the AUC values for NM and PPM are considerably higher than for KD and
SV at most thresholds. This shows that in some situations, combining biometrics provides
better data upon which to base a decision of owner or world. This may be explained by the
classifier being better matched to the data provided. The results of the keystroke dynamics
and speaker verification studies support the conclusion that some classifiers produce better
output depending on the type of data presented to them.
The figures representing the DT and both 5-NN classifiers seem to have far fewer datapoints
than the two Naı¨ve Bayes figures. In actuality, all five figures have the same number of
datapoints since they were generated from the results of presenting exactly the same data to
all five classifiers. However, many of the posterior probabilities for the 5-NN classification
were either exactly 0% or 100%. The reason for this lies in the method by which posterior
probabilities are calculated for k-NN classifiers. With k-NN classifiers, all training data is
plotted on an n-dimensional space, where n is the number of features. These training values
also have a known classification associated with them. Test data is also plotted on the same
space, and the determination for its class is made by polling the k nearest neighbors and
choosing the most common value1. The posterior probability is then calculated by averaging
the known classes of the k nearest neighbors. For instance, if the 5 nearest neighbors in this
example all had a known class of 1, then the posterior probability would be 1+1+1+1+1
5
=
5
5
= 1. The calculation is similar if the 5 nearest neighbors all had a known class of 0.
However, if the 5 nearest neighbors had different known classes (say 0,1,1,0, and 1), then
the posterior probability would be calculated as 0+1+1+0+1
5
= 3
5
= 0.6 = 60%. Therefore, it
is not uncommon to see a large number of 0% and 100% posterior probabilities with k-NN
classifiers.
The results in all cases show that the NM and PPM methods hold promise, although this
result should be considered as a preliminary finding, and confirmed with a larger study that
collects more data from participants for analysis. The selection of which method to use is
left to the developer, since the risk profile of the application under development must be used
to make this decision.
6.6.1 Statistical Significance
As with the Keystroke Dynamics and Speaker Verification feasibility studies, tests of sta-
tistical significance were used to determine whether differences in reported error rates were
1There are other methods of selecting the value other than most common, but this was the one chosen for
this implementation.
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due to the different combination methods or attributable to random effects. Similar to these
studies, the values being compared are EER and AUC, which are non-parametric as shown
by the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution shape (Table 6.6).
Metric KD SV NM PPM
EER < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
AUC < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Table 6.6: Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution shape for EER and AUC
values. Since each value is less than the α = 0.05 significance level, then each distribution
of data is considered significantly different from a normal distribution (i.e., the distribution
for these values is non–parametric).
In addition to having a non-parametric distribution, the multimodal biometrics data has been
compared in a pairwise manner (i.e., comparisons between two groups only). For these
reasons, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was used to determine whether the AUC and EER
values from the multimodal biometrics test were statistically significantly different.
As discussed in the previous section, using the two combination methods resulted in higher
AUC values and somewhat lower EER values than using keystroke dynamics or speaker
verification results separately. The values in Table 6.7 were calculated first by selecting a
biometric method (KD, SV, NM or PPM) and taking all values in the corresponding row for
all owners and all classifiers and computing their median. Then, the statistical significance
for the medians was compared in a pairwise manner. These results are the bracketed values
shown below each median. In all cases, the KD EER values were considered statistically
significantly better than SV and NM, but not the PPM (α = 0.05). The PPM and NM
methods were not considered significantly different, which means that the selection of the
KD EER median as “best” because it was the lowest value does not prove it truly was best
when compared to the other results. Similarly, the AUC KD EER median value was chosen
as “best” because it was the highest value, although it was only significantly better than
SV. As with the EER results, the lack of statistical significance means no determination of
the “best” method can be made with these results. For both the EER and AUC values, the
differences in results can be attributed to chance. This indicates that a study with more data
and perhaps more participants is justified.
These statistical significance test results, while important, should be considered with care.
Such tests are strongly affected by the number of participants and the amount of data used
in their calculation. In this study, there were six participants, and the same data samples
were used for each test. While this study size is acceptable in conducting a feasibility study
such as this one, it is unlikely to represent the target population with enough accuracy to
allow a statistical significance test to deliver meaningful results. They are presented here for
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Metric KD SV NM PPM
EER (%) 29.52 41.15 36.15 32.84
– (< 0.0001) (0.0082) (0.1986)
AUC (%) 78.36 62.29 72.41 71.55
– (< 0.0001) (0.2623) (0.1254)
Table 6.7: EER and AUC medians for all classifiers and all owners. The bolded numbers
represent the best classifier based on either EER or AUC, and the number in brackets after
each percentage is the result of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, ρ.
completeness and to support the use of both combination methods in a larger study.
6.7 Multimodal Biometrics in the Transparent Authen-
tication Framework
Keystroke dynamics and speaker verification, while promising, have not proven sufficiently
distinctive to justify their use as the sole decision maker for supporting authentication. To
overcome the higher error rates seen in the two biometric studies, a multimodal biometric
can be used to reduce the overall error rates to a more acceptable level. This study has shown
that the error rates for a multimodal biometric consisting of keystroke dynamics and speaker
verification biometrics result in a lower overall error rate. This provides a strong indication
that using a multimodal biometric could well enhance the authentication provided in the
Transparent Authentication Framework. However, individual biometrics may still be used in
the case where a device owner provides only a single biometric modality.
6.7.1 Limitations of the Study
Possible study limitations include the following:
Small Study Size: As with the other studies in this dissertation, the results presented are
from a feasibility study that is small both in terms of number of participants and
amount of data. This has a strong effect on the reported error rates and the deter-
mination of statistical significance.
Unbalanced Datasets: Again, as with the other studies in this work, the datasets were un-
balanced in terms of number of owner and rest–of–world patterns. This also has an
effect on the FAR and FRR (and thus EER) rates.
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Same Classifier: The posterior probabilities for each combined pattern came from the same
classifier, although it is possible to combine posterior probabilities of different classi-
fiers. It is not expected that the source of the probabilities will make a significant
difference, but tests should be performed to examine this.
6.8 Summary
This chapter has detailed the study designed to test the viability of a multimodal biometric
using the classifier output from the Keystroke Dynamics and Speaker Verification studies.
This study compared two probability-based score-level fusion techniques to determine which
provided the lowest overall error rates. Combining the multimodal biometrics using two
score-level fusion techniques resulted in an overall reduction in EER, and AUC increase,
although these differences were not statistically significant and thus may be attributed to
chance. These results support other research that has concluded that multimodal biometric
combination is a viable method for achieving lower error rates, and justify the inclusion of
multimodal biometrics in the Transparent Authentication Framework.
128
Chapter 7
Transparent Authentication
Perceptions Study
This chapter describes the Transparent Authentication Perceptions Study1, which was per-
formed in order to gain perspective regarding users’ willingness to use, and opinions on the
design of, a transparent authentication mechanism on a mobile device. This chapter provides
the study design details, including details of participants, materials, and methodology as well
as reports on the study findings. A discussion of the impact of the study’s results and its role
in the framework presented as part of this research rounds out the chapter.
7.1 Study Goals
Alternative authentication methods have been widely researched over the last decade, but
rarely deployed outside a lab setting. The reasons for this vary depending on the features
provided by such systems, but may be attributed to lack of user knowledge or a misunder-
standing of user wants and needs. The consequence is that researchers do not fully under-
stand how users will use, bypass or accept new security mechanisms. It is therefore beneficial
to determine during the design of such systems whether users would be willing to use the
system and what functionality they find important. The feasibility studies reported in Chap-
ters 4, 5 and 6 have shown that behavioral biometrics, particularly multimodal, show promise
as the basis for the decision–making in a transparent authentication system. The outstanding
question is whether mobile device users would choose to use such a method to protect their
devices and data. The first purpose of this study is thus to determine whether the participants
feel a transparent authentication method on a mobile device provides adequate security, and
whether they would consider using it on their own mobile devices.
1University of Glasgow ethics approval number CSE01076
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The second purpose of this study is to employ user opinions and suggestions to inform the
design of the Transparent Authentication Framework presented in this dissertation. Including
user-requested functionality in the final Framework ensures that it is not simply a product
of a research-focused endeavor. The findings of this study provide justification for further
research into transparent authentication for mobile devices. In this way the user, an important
stakeholder, has been consulted and their suggestions considered in the design phase of the
Framework.
This study attempts to answer several research questions that are related to the study’s goals:
1. What are the participant’s opinions of, and reactions to, using a transparent authenti-
cation method on a mobile device?
2. What is the participant’s perceived level of security while using a mobile device that
employs transparent authentication?
3. Do the participants find the transparent authentication method easy or difficult to use?
4. Do participants find transparent authentication generally helpful or mostly a hindrance?
5. Would participants choose to use a transparent authentication method on their own
mobile device, if one were available?
6. How do participants react to barriers blocking them from completing their intended
tasks, in terms of frequency?
To determine the answers to these questions, an iPhone application was developed that pre-
sented participants with a series of tasks to complete. Such a study would normally require
a fully-functional transparent authentication method on the device. Such a method does not
yet exist, thus the study was designed as a Wizard of Oz study [171], in which the partici-
pant assumes that the authentication method is running and receives feedback based on their
actions to confirm this. In actuality, the application reacted to predetermined actions and
triggers; no transparent authentication method was actually implemented.
7.2 Study Design
The Transparent Authentication Perceptions (TAP) study is a lab-based, between-groups
study [152, p. 74] in which 30 participants were asked to complete seven tasks using an
Apple iPhone provided by the experimenter for the duration of the study. The seven tasks
were divided into three security levels: Low, Medium, and High, that represented the level
of device confidence the device must have before the task is allowed.
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7.2.1 Participants
The 30 participants ranged in age from 20 to 58 years old (median = 26.5, mean = 29.4). All
participants were mobile device owners currently living in the United Kingdom, and thus
had experience with the UK mobile phone network. 60% of the respondents were Android
users with various handset models, 13% were iPhone users, 10% used a Blackberry and the
remaining 17% used a feature phone (i.e., non-smart phone). 17% of the participants were
female and 83% were male. Participants were recruited using convenience sampling meth-
ods. Specifically, they were recruited through a combination of email invitations, requests
for participation to university classes, and word-of-mouth from other participants to friends
and family.
Each study participant was randomly and evenly assigned to either the All, Some or None
category. The random nature of this selection is essential in order to avoid study bias and
to distribute other possibly confounding influences on the study outcome across all three
participant groups.
7.2.2 Apparatus and Materials
Each participant used an Apple iPhone 4 with iOS version 5.1.1 that was provided for their
use during the study. It was pre-loaded with the study application and preset with the partici-
pant’s randomly chosen category and a starting device confidence of Low for all participants.
Since the device was provided by the experimenter, it was possible to control the operating
system version, as well as other applications and data on the device. This limited the ef-
fects of other authentication methods, applications and data that may have interfered if the
participant’s own device had been used, as was done in the keystroke dynamics and speaker
verification studies. The experimenter recorded the interviews, with participant permission,
using the Voice Memo application on another iPhone.
After the participants had interacted with the transparent authentication application, they
were asked a series of questions in a semi-structured interview in order to collect their opin-
ions on the security levels, perception of barriers and needs for transparent authentication.
The interview responses provided answers to the questions that drove this research.
7.2.3 Procedure
The study began with a short questionnaire designed to elicit the participant’s age range, gen-
der and whether they currently own and use a smartphone. The participant was then given
a short introduction to transparent authentication, and introduced to the Apple iPhone and
the custom application they would use for the experiment. The participant was told that a
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transparent authentication method was running on the device. This description included a
discussion of keystroke dynamics and speaker verification as behavioral biometrics, and the
role of explicit authentication (i.e., challenge questions) in transparent authentication. The
participant was instructed on how to turn off the authentication and answer the challenge
question to override the transparent authentication should they wish to at any point during
the experiment. These steps were taken to build a mental model of the intended transpar-
ent authentication method, although the actual working of the application depended on the
category to which the participant had been assigned.
Since this study was designed in a Wizard of Oz style, there was no authentication system of
any type running on the device; the required device functionality was allowed or disallowed
based on the settings entered by the experimenter using the interface shown in Figure 7.1.
Each participant began the study at the “Low” security level and the category to which they
were randomly allocated. Participants were then given an information sheet that outlined the
steps for each task they were to perform, as well as instructions on how to answer their chal-
lenge question and how to turn off the transparent authentication method. A custom iPhone
application was designed for this experiment that was unlike Apple’s usual icon approach to
tasks and applications; this was done intentionally so that the participant had a sense of using
something different than the usual Apple interface.
Figure 7.1: TAP Study setup screen. This was not seen by the study participants.
Upon launching the study application, the participant was prompted via an alert box to set the
answer to their challenge question (see Figure 7.2a). The challenge question was provided
as a backup to the transparent authentication method. In the case where the current device
confidence is too low to allow access to a task, the challenge question would be used to
authenticate the user and raise the device confidence to the next level.
Next, the participant saw the main “Tasks” screen as shown in Figure 7.2b. It is from this
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screen that the participant was able to attempt each task. The participants were given a
detailed instruction sheet that they used to complete each task so that each participant com-
pleted the tasks in the same order and using the same methods. This was important so that
the user perceptions of security and task difficulty were not affected by the order of events.
The order of the tasks were from low to high security, and affected whether or not the explicit
authentication method was required.
(a) Challenge question alert (b) TAP application Tasks
screen
Figure 7.2: Screenshots of the starting screens for the TAP application.
7.2.4 Tasks
Each participant completed a series of tasks that were grouped into one of three security
levels: Low, Medium and High. The security levels directly map to the device’s confidence
that the participant is the authorized device owner. Since the experiment does not last long
enough for the participant to build up a device confidence of sufficient level, the device con-
fidence was initially set to “Low” by the experimenter and the participant was instructed to
assume that it was based on previous biometric authentication. The assumption given to the
participant was that this device was their own phone and that their keystrokes and voice data
had been sampled previously and placed on the phone in order to achieve a device confidence
of “Low”, and that their ability to complete tasks was dependent on this confidence.
The tasks were chosen to represent common functionality that a device owner may access
regularly, as well as for their familiarity to participants. Since one of the study goals was
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to determine how easy or difficult the task was to the participants, selecting familiar tasks
may mean that any increase in the task difficulty may be attributed to additional steps due to
security provision. The tasks were placed into one of the three levels based on the general
level of privacy or sensitivity a particular task warranted. For instance, viewing a photo has
the potential to disclose more private information than taking a photo, since the device owner
has the option of deleting any photos taken by another, but cannot stem the information leak
if an unauthorized person viewed or forwarded a sensitive photo. In a production system, the
device owner would ideally be able to choose the task authentication level for each function
of their device.
The participants were reminded that the purpose of the study was to assess their impressions
of the security features of the transparent authentication method as described to them, and
not their ability to achieve the tasks, nor the user interface of the application itself.
The tasks were available through the interfaces pictured in Figure 7.3. This interface served
as a method of implementing the functionality required by the study, as well as a method of
separating the task from the interface. For instance, if the Send Email task is not allowed
due to a low device confidence, the decision is made and the participant notified before the
send email screen is made visible. If the task is allowed, the decision is made in the cus-
tom interface and control reverts to the standard iPhone Mail application. Since the study’s
purpose is not to test the usability or perceptions of the interface itself, the use of a custom,
non-standard Apple interface was considered justified.
Low Security Tasks
Read Document: Several ostensibly private documents were pre-loaded onto the device.
The participant was asked to choose one from a list (see Figure 7.3a), open it and
read the contents. The document topics were chosen to create a sense of privacy;
while the documents did not actually belong to the participant, they were asked to
assume that they did. The documents included a bank statement, private thoughts, and
a password file. This task was included in the low rather than medium or high security
tasks deliberately in order to determine whether the participants would change the
security level due to the perceived document sensitivity. This task was intended to
determine whether assigning security levels by task was a realistic way of mapping
device confidence to device functionality, or if the participants had other preferences,
perhaps based on the contents of the document.
Take Photo: The participant was asked to take a photo of a diagram on a whiteboard in the
study locale using the mobile device. Taking a photo on a device is not considered a
high-security task since it is unlikely to cause embarrassment to the device owner, who
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(a) Open Document task
screen.
(b) An open document. (c) Take/View Photo task
screen.
(d) Make local/international
call task screen.
(e) Change Device PIN task
screen.
Figure 7.3: Screenshots of the individual task screens for the TAP application. The screen
for the Send Email task is not shown because it is the standard interface for Apple iPhone.
can simply delete such photos. Exceptions exist, especially in cases of applications
where a photo can be immediately uploaded to social networking sites, for example.
However, it is envisaged that access to such applications would fall under a higher
security level, where access to use of the device camera itself is not a security concern.
This assumption is supported by the security on an Apple iPhone under iOS 5.1, since
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(a) Task Not Allowed alert. (b) Options button screen. (c) Challenge question
screen.
Figure 7.4: Screenshots of the support screens for the TAP application.
the ability to take a photo with the device camera does not require entering the device
PIN (if enabled). Only the device user has access to the photos, not other photos stored
on the device, unless the PIN is entered. See Figure 7.3c for the interface for this task.
Medium Security Tasks
Send Email: The participant was asked to send an email to a particular email address, with
text provided by the experimenter. The text was intended to be somewhat private to
give the participant a feeling that they would want to prevent others from seeing it.
Sending an email was a medium security task because if the device was used by some-
one other than its owner, sending an email could spoof the real owner’s identity and
cause embarrassment or other negative effects. This task was also included to provide
a way for the user to type during the study in order to provide a biometric match or
non-match based on their typing pattern. No biometric classification was performed;
either match or non-match was randomly selected after typing. After the task was
completed, the participant was told whether their keystroke dynamics biometric was a
match or non-match and the device confidence level was adjusted up or down accord-
ingly. The send email interface is not shown here because the standard Apple Mail
application was used to support this task.
View Photo: The participant was asked to view a photo, generally the one of the diagram
7.2. Study Design 136
that had been taken in the “Take Photo” task. This task was intended to get the par-
ticipant thinking about viewing photos versus taking photos and the security ramifica-
tions of others viewing their (potentially private) photos. For these reasons, the View
a Photo task was set at medium security. The task interface on the iPhone can be seen
in Figure 7.3c.
Make Local Call: The participant was asked to use a custom interface as seen in Figure 7.3d
to dial a local phone number provided by the experimenter. The phone number went
to a generic voicemail prompt, thereby giving the participant no information as to who
they might be calling. They were then asked to leave a message of a private nature.
Making a local telephone call is not usually a security concern because they generally
have no or minimal cost associated with them, and the caller cannot usually spoof the
identity of the device owner simply by making a call, assuming the device owner’s
voice is known to the call recipient. Some other form of subterfuge (and associated
skill level) is required, such as imitating the device owner’s voice. However, access
to private information may happen if the call recipient is not familiar with the caller’s
voice. This task was included in the study so that the participant was required to speak
and thus (theoretically) provide a biometric sample. As with the “Send an Email” task,
the participant was informed whether their speaker verification biometric was a match
or a non-match, with the accompanying adjustment of the device confidence level.
High Security Tasks
Make International Call: The participant was asked to use a custom interface as seen in
Figure 7.3d to dial a long-distance telephone number that was provided by the experi-
menter. Dialing a long-distance call may have a high cost associated with it compared
to making a local call, and therefore is considered a high security task for the purposes
of this study. This task was included to provide another reason for the participant to
speak, and therefore have another speaker verification match or non-match, as with the
“Send an Email” and “Make Local Call” tasks.
Change Device PIN: The participant was asked to change the device PIN using a custom
interface as seen in Figure 7.3e. This task is considered a high security task since
changing the PIN in a case where the old PIN is known to others provides additional
security, and if someone other than the device owner were to have access to this func-
tionality, they could change the PIN to something not known to the device owner,
which may temporarily lock the owner out of the device. This task was included to
assess how participants perceive the value of the PIN mechanism and the security it
provides.
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The participant’s device confidence was affected due to two possible scenarios. First, they
performed one of the tasks from which a biometric could have been gathered (i.e., Send
Email, Make Local Call or Make International Call). As mentioned previously, a randomly
chosen decision (match or non-match) either raised or lowered the current device confidence
level. For instance, after typing the email the decision was made in the background and the
participant notified via an alert box that they had to clear before continuing with the next
task. The alert box contained the decision and the effect it would have on device confidence.
If the decision was “match”, then the device confidence was raised one level (from Low to
Medium or Medium to High). If the decision was “non-match”, the device confidence was
lowered one level (from High to Medium or Medium to Low). The participant was able to
see the current device confidence via a series of smiley faces displayed in the upper right
corner of the application screens. Figure 7.5 shows the faces and their meanings. This map-
ping of biometrics to device confidence adjustment was intended to represent the transparent
authentication method. In a production system, the alert box with the decision would not be
shown, and the device confidence level representation would be more granular. For example,
device confidence could be represented as a horizontal bar that has more or fewer ticks in it,
depending on the device confidence.
The second scenario in which device confidence may change is when the participant used
the explicit authentication feature. The explicit authentication method for this study was a
challenge question. If the participant entered the correct challenge question response, the
device confidence was increased by one level, much like with a biometric match. If they
entered an incorrect response, the device confidence was lowered by one level, as with the
biometric non-match. The participant was told whether or not their response was correct via a
notification, although this would not happen in a production system. This scenario represents
the case where transparency must be foregone in order to increase device confidence to allow
a task.
(a) Low (b) Medium (c) High
Figure 7.5: Visualizations of Low, Medium and High device confidence.
Each participant was allocated randomly to one of three categories, which affected their
ability to complete the tasks. The participant was able to perform the tasks firstly based on
the current device confidence and secondly on their pre-set category, as described below.
For example, a participant could be in the Some category and have a device confidence of
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Medium, and would be able to perform tasks assigned the Medium or High security levels.
The categories were as follows:
None: The participants in this category were unable to complete any task, regardless of their
current device confidence. This group is intended to assess the level of frustration seen
in a seemingly broken authentication method – one that does not allow task comple-
tion. This group is also intended to determine whether the participant chooses to turn
off such a method if it gets overly frustrating, and whether they choose to override the
transparent authentication with explicit methods when given the chance. This level
of authentication can be seen to mimic the first stages of using a transparent method,
when the device owner has not yet provided sufficient biometric samples to create a
baseline for future comparisons. At this point, the device owner would be blocked
from performing most tasks on the device and would have to resort to using explicit
authentication to perform all tasks.
All: The participants in this category were able to complete all on-device tasks regardless
of device confidence. The purpose of this category was to see whether the participant
becomes distrustful of the security provided by the transparent authentication method
since they are neither challenged nor denied access to data or device functionality.
This level is meant to mimic the situation in which the mobile device user suspects the
security method is allowing full access to all users; for instance, a user may become
suspicious if their fingerprint reader does not occasionally say that their fingerprint did
not match the one on file. This group tests all goals as stated in Section 7.1.
Some: The participants in this category were able to complete the tasks that were at their
current device confidence and those at any lower confidence, but were unable to com-
plete tasks at a higher device confidence. As such, the application compared the cur-
rent device confidence to that of their current task, and allowed access if the task level
(Low, Medium, or High) was lower than or equal to the current device confidence.
The participant could raise the device confidence by answering their challenge ques-
tion or by having a matching keystroke or speaker biometric result. The purpose of
this category is to test questions 2 and 3 in Section 7.1 and to see whether the partici-
pant would choose to use explicit authentication in order to complete their tasks. This
setting mimics the real design and use of a transparent authentication method, where
the current device confidence is matched to a pre-chosen authentication level required
for a given task.
The participant’s category and their current device confidence determined what tasks were
allowed at any given time. Table 7.1 shows the task availability for each category over all
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possible device confidence levels. The checkmarks represent tasks that are allowed and the
crosses represent tasks that are denied, assuming transparent authentication is enabled.
Category
None Some All
Device Confidence L M H L M H L M H
Task Level Task
Low
Read Document % % % " " " " " "
Take Photo % % % " " " " " "
Medium
Send Email % % % % " " " " "
View Photo % % % % " " " " "
Make Local Call % % % % " " " " "
High
Make International Call % % % % % " " " "
Change PIN % % % % % " " " "
Table 7.1: Task availability by current device confidence and study category. "implies
participant had access to the task; %implies access was denied, assuming transparent au-
thentication is enabled.
While the participants were completing the tasks, the experimenter recorded observations. In
particular, the number of times the challenge question was used per task was recorded. Also,
the number of times the transparent authentication method was turned off was recorded per
task. These values are expected to vary depending on which category the participant was
in. Those in the All category, for instance, should not have needed to turn off security or
answer the challenge question. The participants in the None group, however, may have tried
the challenge question several times before turning off security, and may have tried turning
security back on before other tasks. Once the participants had completed all tasks, they
were asked a series of questions about their experience in a semi-structured interview. The
participants were debriefed after the interview; at this point they were told that no transparent
authentication mechanism had been running on the device, and about the three participant
categories, including to which category they had been allocated.
The independent variable for this study is the level of transparent authentication the user
sees: a high level (the None category), a moderate level (the Some category) or a low level
(the All category). The dependent variables were their subjective perceptions of transparent
authentication and their subjective beliefs about the security level provided by a transparent
authentication method. These were measured using ordinal-answer questions (i.e., Likert
scale questions) as well as a semi-structured interview whose results were analyzed using
the Grounded Theory approach [172, p. 101] to elicit themes in the answers. These mea-
surements allow linkages between perceptions and stated opinions based on the interview
question. These linkages offer answers to the questions posed in the previous section.
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7.3 Results and Analysis
The participants attempted all tasks on the device via the custom designed application and in
the same order. No participants withdrew from the study, and each participant was paid £6
for their time. The authentication-specific behavior observed as the participants completed
the tasks is discussed in terms of the themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis.
Figure 7.6 shows the usual method of traditional security used by the participants on their
own mobile device. The Sketch category refers to the sketched password used on Android
devices. 27% of participants used a 4-digit PIN, with the same percentage using a sketched
password. 30% used no security method, and the remaining 16% used another method. The
other methods included encryption, passwords and specialized software that could be used
to wipe the device memory remotely in the event it is lost or stolen.
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Figure 7.6: Traditional security methods used by the 30 participants on their own mobile
device.
The responses to the questions in the interview were used to determine the acceptability
of, and perceptions towards, transparent authentication on a mobile device. Statistical sig-
nificance of the ordinal data questions was determined initially using the Kruskal-Wallis
test. This test was chosen for its applicability to non-parametric data with three or more
independent participant categories and determines whether there is a statistically significant
difference between the three categories used in the study. This test does not indicate between
which categories the significance lies. In cases where the Kruskal-Wallis test indicated sta-
tistical significance, the inter-category significance was tested in a pairwise manner using the
Mann-Whitney test, which is suitable for use on non-parametric data in cases where there
are two independent groups, as was the case here.
Some interview questions, as seen in Appendix A, asked a participant to rank a task or
perceived level of security. Statistical significance tests were not performed for these results
because these tests make assumptions regarding the data that are not supported. For example,
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these tests assume that a response of High by one respondent would cancel out a response of
Low from another respondent, which is not the case.
The participants were asked why they chose a particular response to a given question. This
qualitative data was analyzed using the Grounded Theory approach, which does not depend
on pre-selected themes [172, p. 101]. Instead, this approach allows themes to emerge natu-
rally, which is preferable for this work since the results of this study were used to inform the
creation of the Transparent Authentication Framework.
Several themes emerged from the qualitative data analysis, as presented in the following
sections. The first theme, basis for security level choice, provides an answer to the first
stated question of this study (see Section 7.1). It provides an insight into user perceptions
when choosing security levels. The second theme, security as a barrier, answers the fourth
question about the helpful nature of removing security barriers, as well as the fifth and sixth
questions, which ask whether they would use or override transparent authentication and why.
The second question, regarding perceived security, is answered by the final theme, which is
user perceptions of transparent authentication.
7.3.1 Theme 1: Basis for Security Level Choice
The traditional security methods used by the participants are shown in Figure 7.6. The ma-
jority of device owners chose to use a security method on their device, although there were
still a number who used no access control at all. Follow-on questions in the interview showed
that there was concern regarding the data and functionality on current mobile devices, and
that the participants in this study attempted to protect it. One reason given in the interviews
for not using access control was the inconvenience of having to enter a password or PIN
frequently. Mobile device use is characterized by a bursty use pattern where owners use
their device frequently but for short periods of time. Requiring a device PIN prior to each
interaction may increase frustration and inconvenience. Indeed, 39% of overall participants
gave this as a reason for choosing to forego using access control. Other reasons included
fear of forgetting the PIN or password, and perceived susceptibility to observation attacks,
particularly for sketched passwords. Forgetting passwords and PINs may be seen as an in-
convenience, which falls into the same reasoning behind the choice to not use access control
at all. Perceptions of susceptibility to observation may an understanding of the limitations of
the security provided by the access control mechanism.
Provision of point-of-entry security such as the methods discussed above protects all func-
tionality and data on the device equally. Transparent authentication allows for the possibility
that security levels can be assigned on a per-document or per-task basis; the latter was the
assumption made for this study. Figure 7.7 shows the participant responses for the required
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security for each task, grouped into High, Medium and Low as an aggregate of the three
participant categories.
0!
5!
10!
15!
20!
25!
30!
Re
ad 
Do
cum
ent
!
Tak
e P
hot
o!
Se
nd 
Em
ail!
Vie
w P
hot
o!
Ma
ke 
Loc
al C
all!
Ch
ang
e P
IN!
Ma
ke 
Int.
 Ca
ll!
Nu
m
be
r o
f O
cc
ur
re
nc
es
!
Task!
High!
Medium!
Low!
Figure 7.7: Participant choices for task security level
All participants, regardless of category, considered Change Device PIN a high security task.
This result indicates that changing PINs was considered a “meta-security” task, in that use
of a PIN controls access to all data, most functionality and settings on the device as well
as providing point–of–entry security. Some participants noted that control over the device
and its functionality belongs to the person who knows the PIN. For example, if the PIN was
changed by another person, the device owner would no longer be able to use the device. One
participant referred to a PIN-locked device as a “brick” if the owner does not know the new
PIN. This comment underscores the uselessness of the device if the new PIN is not known.
Participants did not consider the Take a Photo task to be high security. Taking a photo adds
data to the device rather than editing or exposing existing data, and is easily deleted by the
device owner. Therefore, this task is not a source of data leakage or privacy concerns.
The Read Document task had a relatively even split between high, medium, and low security.
This shows the link between the contents or subject of the document and the preferred level
of security. Participants preferred to have the ability to assign a security level based on the
sensitivity of the document’s contents, rather than to the task itself. When asked to select a
single level when undecided, many participants chose a higher security level with the inten-
tion of better protecting the more private or sensitive information. There was a distinction
between personal and business-related documents; the former were referred to with the terms
“personal”, “private”, which denote a sense of ownership. Work-related documents, on the
other hand, were referred to as “sensitive” and “dangerous”, which imply risks associated
with their exposure, but not a sense of ownership.
The differences between the preferred security levels per task show that there are a number of
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considerations taken into account by participants when intuitively determining the sensitivity
of a given task or data. The considerations were major themes discovered through qualitative
data analysis of the responses given when the participants were asked why they chose a
particular security level for the task in question.
Perceived Risks
The study participants cited the following risks that affected the levels to which they allocated
the tasks:
Data Loss or Exposure: is strongly linked to data ownership. For example, participants
made a distinction between loss of personal data versus work–related data. Loss of
personal data implies loss of reputation or “face” that may be difficult to overcome in
the device owner’s social circles, but loss of business data could result in loss of a job
and professional reputation.
Impersonation: Particularly with respect to sending email, the risk of impersonation was a
strong theme throughout the interviews. The severity ranged from pranks by friends
who may send a false email to a mutual friend, through examples that included sending
negative or derogatory email to the owner’s boss, or using the owner’s email as a way
of “doing evil things” or committing fraud.
Financial Loss: was prevalent when discussing making telephone calls, both international
and local. The perceived risk of financial loss was directly proportional to the chosen
security level. For instance, international calls were considered more expensive than
local calls, and thus were placed in a higher security level. Thus, associating financial
loss with a particular task makes it more likely that device owners would take more
extreme measures to protect the data or the task.
Loss of Reputation: Usually considered as a secondary risk to impersonation, it was di-
vided into personal reputation amongst friends, and professional reputation. The for-
mer held more risk of embarrassment and was a particular concern to younger partic-
ipants. The risk was humiliation and teasing. With professional reputation, the risks
were much greater, including job loss and the inability to gain another job in the same
field.
Embarrassment (Misinterpretation of Actions): Strongly related to impersonation and loss
of reputation, embarrassment was a risk factor that was associated with many of the
tasks. Participants were particularly concerned with embarrassing or compromising
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photos and other images, as opposed to emails, text messages, or documents. The em-
barrassment risk was not in the subject of the photo itself, but with the risk that others
may see it, or perhaps pass it onto other via email or MMS.
Identity Theft and Fraud: Identity theft differs from impersonation in that the latter is
single instance and ID theft is multiple instances and has much more serious con-
sequences due to the importance of identity in transactions such as banking.
Damage control after data compromise: Once a person’s identity is stolen, it can take a
significant amount of time to reclaim the identity and to rebuild reputation and cred-
ibility as well as things such as credit ratings and credit card ownership. In less far
reaching situations, there is an aspect of damage control linked to the embarrassment
and reputation risks, since time and effort must go into rebuilding status in both social
and professional spheres.
Access to some data or tasks may imply access to others: Coupling of tasks and data ac-
cess is common on mobile devices. For instance, access to email may imply access to
the device owner’s address book. It was unclear to many study participants whether
protecting one task implied protection of all coupled tasks or data.
Data/Task Sensitivity
If a task or data is considered sensitive, personal or private, the participants in all three
categories felt that the device confidence level required to access the task or data should
be higher. This also includes the perceptions users have of their own data on the device in
terms of the amount and its sensitivity. Many of the participants did not consider their data
on-device as important or sensitive, and many believed they had little data on their device.
Many participants seemed unaware of the amount and type of data stored on their device,
whether placed there by themselves or on their behalf. This finding shows that owners do
not understand what information is on the device and may not be able to adequately assess
the risks of its loss. For instance, most mobile devices store such personally identifying
information as GPS coordinates, phone call timings and recipients, email messages, and text
messages, even when it is believed that these have been deleted.
Control over Data or Device
While device owners often misjudged what data was on their device, they expressed a strong
preference to control both the physical device itself and the data it contained. Such a finding
indicates that device owners have a sense of identity attached to the device and highlights the
belief that mobile devices are single-user. This sense of identity meant that the participants
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wanted to keep their personal and personally identifying data on the device and within their
control. One participant suggested that since the biometric data is already on the device, it is
a positive benefit to the device owner to have this data used for security provision:
“In the past people might have raised concerns about storing that kind of in-
formation [keystrokes and voice] on a mobile device, but ...if it’s already on
there, why not use it to provide additional security? It’s practically already
recording your voice, and it’s already recording what you’re typing and things
like that, so, I’m not sure the objection of storing that information on a mobile
device is valid.”
Device sharing, as defined by a device owner allowing another to use their device tem-
porarily, was cited as another reason to assign security levels according to perceived data
sensitivity. Participants stated that having public and private folders or memory locations
would allow them to share their device without risking sensitive data exposure, although su-
pervision during device use was non-negotiable. This finding shows that electronic security
methods may only engender a certain amount of trust, and that techniques such as supervi-
sion and physical possession of the device eased security concerns. This latter method was
voiced by a participant, as follows:
“...it never really leaves my pocket, so I don’t actually have any real security
because I’m scared I’m going to forget the PIN.”
The sense of control over the device and data extended to the security mechanism. When
asked whether they would consider using a transparent authentication method on their own
mobile device, 83% of participants stated that they would, at least on a trial basis. The
participants stated that they would “play around with” the method to “see how it works”.
Such a statement shows the owner’s desire to know the security provisions provided, even
in a transparent method, and to have control over its use and access to data. Furthermore,
it suggests that they may want to understand how intrusive the security provision will be
before committing to its use. Reasons for subsequently removing transparent authentication
included annoyance, too frequent explicit authentication, or if they believed the method “al-
lowed anybody to access my stuff”. Interestingly, many participants stated that their feeling
of device and data security was enhanced by barriers in the way of accessing data, although
others considered such barriers annoying and frustrating.
7.3.2 Theme 2: Security as a Barrier
Although some participants perceived increased security due to barriers such as explicit au-
thentication, these barriers were more often considered to block their own access to desired
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tasks and data. Figure 7.8 shows the frequency of explicit authentication use per task.
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Figure 7.8: Per-task frequency of explicit authentication use for each participant category.
There were significant differences in the frequency of explicit authentication use in all tasks
except View Photo and Make Local Call (see Table 7.2). The order of the tasks had an effect
on these values, since all participants began the study at a Low device confidence, and thus
had access to at least the first two tasks as they were Low security. The exception is the None
category, since they were unable to complete any task as long as transparent authentication
was on. The significance in explicit authentication frequency per task can be interpreted as
the number of barriers presented to participants in various categories; the All category had
no barriers at all, the Some category had a moderate number, and the None category had a
large number. It is interesting to note that some participants in the All category decided to
use the explicit authentication despite having task access without it. This shows that they had
a strong mental model of the transparent authentication mechanism, and attempted to work
within it.
Task ρ Value
Explicit Authentication Turned Off Security
Read Document < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Take Photo 0.0436 0.0030
Send Email 0.0008 0.0025
View Photo 0.1290 0.0146
Make Local Call 0.5958 0.1260
Change Device PIN 0.0009 0.3679
Make International Call < 0.0001 0.0490
Table 7.2: ρ values calculated using the Kruskal-Wallis test for frequency of explicit authen-
tication use and disabling of transparent authentication. ρ < 0.05 are significant (bolded
values).
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To determine which categories contained the significant results, pairwise comparisons be-
tween the frequency data for the All, Some, and None categories were performed using the
Mann-Whitney test, as shown in Table 7.3. The View Photo and Make Local Call tasks have
been excluded from Table 7.3 because there was no indication of statistical significance as
per the results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests.
Task Group Participant Category
All Some None
Read
Document
All – NaN < 0.0008
Some – – < 0.0008
None – – –
Take Photo
All – 0.3681 0.0347
Some – – 0.1224
None – – –
Send Email
All – < 0.00002 0.0147
Some – – 0.7066
None – – –
Change PIN
All – < 0.0005 0.5828
Some – – < 0.00008
None – – –
Make Inter-
national
Call
All – 0.0012 1.000
Some – – 0.0012
None – – –
Table 7.3: Pairwise ρ values calculated using the Mann-Whitney test for number of times
explicit authentication was used for the tasks that were significantly different. ρ < 0.05 are
significant (bolded values). The comparison between the All and Some categories for the
Read Document task is NaN because there were no occurrences of explicit authentication
for either category.
Most of the categories were significantly different from each of the other categories in terms
of the number of times explicit authentication was used per task. The exceptions are when
comparing All and None for the Change PIN and Make International Call tasks, and All and
Some and Some and None for the Take Photo task. These differences show that barriers
presented before allowing tasks were significantly more frequent for Some and All. This
represents a potentially annoying amount of intrusion into the participants’ completion of
tasks, a notion that was supported in the participants’ comments. Many stated that they
would remove the software if it got “too annoying”, or commented that the number of times
they had to enter their challenge question response was “frustrating”.
The Some category had the largest number of explicit authentication requests, as shown in
Figure 7.8, which stands to reason since this category had the least access to tasks out of
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all categories when transparent authentication was enabled. The None category had fewer
explicit authentication uses because they seemed to learn quickly that using explicit authen-
tication did not help them complete the tasks. These differences and supporting comments
show that the device owner’s threshold for interruption is relatively low. They also reinforce
the idea that users see security as a barrier, and that their usual tasks are their main goal when
using a mobile device.
To determine the effect of barriers on security provision, the participants in all categories
were able to disable transparent authentication. Table 7.9 shows the frequency with which
participants disabled transparent authentication on a per-task basis. The Some category par-
ticipants did not disable transparent authentication for any task. Their mental model matched
the actual working of transparent authentication, therefore they were able to complete all
tasks using explicit authentication and biometric matches only. The All category members
chose to disable transparent authentication before the tasks that required higher device con-
fidence. The None category disabled transparent authentication frequently for the first task,
and increasingly less with subsequent tasks. This shows that in more cases the participants
chose to disable transparent authentication and leave it off for subsequent tasks. This finding
shows that task completion may have been a more important goal than protecting the device
and its data.
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Figure 7.9: Per-task frequency of disabling transparent authentication for each participant
category.
Perceiving tasks as the main goal is supported by the significant differences between the
None and All and None and Some categories for the tasks in Table 7.4. In both cases, many
participants in the All category did not feel the need to disable transparent authentication
since all tasks were accessible with it enabled. In the None category, the only way to com-
plete the tasks was to disable transparent authentication, so the difference between these
occurrences is understood. Similarly, there would also be many instances in the Some cat-
egory where disabling transparent authentication aided the participant in completing tasks,
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therefore explaining the statistically significant differences between these occurrences and
the None category. These results reinforced the finding that disabling transparent authenti-
cation, and leaving it off for subsequent tasks, was considered the correct course of action,
and that completing the tasks was more important than protecting the information and acces-
sibility of tasks on the device.
An important consideration when assessing the results of disabling security is the fact that
the participant was engaged in a study whose perceived goal was to complete a series of
tasks on a device that did not belong to them. If the device and the data on it truly belonged
to them, the participants may have been more hesitant to disable transparent authentication.
It may be that their main goal would not have been to complete the tasks, but to protect their
own data. However, these concerns were not addressed during the interview nor during the
study design, thus they must be considered but cannot be assessed further.
Task Group
Participant Category
All Some None
Read
Document
All – NaN < 0.0001
Some – – < 0.0001
None – – –
Take Photo
All – NaN 0.0137
Some – – 0.0137
None – – –
Send Email
All – 0.1675 0.0318
Some – – 0.0016
None – – –
View Photo
All – 0.3681 0.0636
Some – – 0.0137
None – – –
Make Inter-
national
Call
All – 0.3681 0.1444
Some – – 0.0336
None – – –
Table 7.4: Pairwise ρ values calculated using the Mann-Whitney test for frequency that
transparent authentication was turned off for the tasks that were significantly different. ρ <
0.05 are significant. The two NaN values mark cases where both categories had no instances
of turning off security.
The strong theme of security as a barrier is supported by the data. Explicit authentication
requests force the user to stop the task they intend to complete and resume it once authen-
tication is complete. The perceived level of frustration with such interruptions was cited
as a major reason that participants in this study would consider disabling a transparent au-
thentication method on their device. Thus, transparent authentication methods should aim to
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minimize explicit authentication provisions to avoid frustrating or annoying the user, which
may result in disabling the security method meant to protect their data and device.
Figure 7.10 shows the participants’ perceptions of the task difficulty as an aggregate of all
three categories. The findings here further highlight participants’ perception of security pro-
visions and their intended tasks as being separate. Most participants considered the tasks
either very or somewhat easy. Reasons offered for this determination included that the in-
terface used for the tasks was “simple” or that they were already familiar with the task from
previous experience with mobile devices. Tasks that were considered very or somewhat
difficult were placed in these categories either due to security barriers (“I had to answer the
challenge question twice for that one”) or because the task was simply disallowed with trans-
parent authentication on. These findings show a disconnect between security requirements
and the task at hand, and that the frustration with security is considered separately from the
task at hand. Furthermore, the number of barriers, which varied from category to category,
does not have an effect on participant opinions of the ease of tasks, while the responses
to other interview questions indicate a higher level of user frustration with transparent au-
thentication from those participants in the None category. This can be summarized with the
following quotation from one participant in the None category:
“...when it works right, then you’ll be able to use it without having to unlock
it all the time... I do think that, you know, the fact that you have to keep upgrad-
ing your level sometimes is a nuisance, but if the system knew more about you,
then that wouldn’t be a problem.”
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Figure 7.10: Participant perceptions of task difficulty over all categories.
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One of the main reasons for the amount of frustration felt when security provision was seen
as a barrier was lack of access to the data on the device. A sense of protection for the device
and data may be linked to the provision of the very barriers that cause frustration. Figure 7.11
shows the participants’ perceived levels of data protection provided by transparent authenti-
cation, per category. Participants in the All category thought the data was poorly protected
since they indicated an answer higher than neutral in only two cases. This category had the
fewest security barriers with which to contend. Conversely, more than half of the None cat-
egory members, who had the most security barriers, considered the data very or somewhat
well protected. The Some category members ranged somewhere between the All and None
extremes. They had a moderate number of security barriers, and largely considered the data
either somewhat protected or not protected, but never very well protected. These results in-
dicate that barriers, while annoying and frustrating, also provide a sense of security and data
protection. This can be related to the device owner’s mental model. If the idea of security
provision can be communicated in another manner besides difficulty in data access, then the
frustration created by these barriers may be reduced while keeping the perception of security
high.
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Figure 7.11: Perceptions of data protection provided by transparent authentication. Each
category had 10 participants; some declined to provide a specific value, as shown by the
shorter bars.
7.3.3 Theme 3: Perceptions of Traditional and Transparent Au-
thentication
Despite the number of participants who chose not to use security provisions on their own
device, the participants generally felt that security delivered benefits. Figure 7.12 shows
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participant opinions on transparent authentication provision compared to either their current
mobile device security method (see Figure 7.12a) or to no security at all (Figure 7.12b).
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Figure 7.12: Comparison of device security. Several participants declined to provide a re-
sponse, which is why the bars do not each total 10.
These results show that these participants believe that “something is better than nothing” in
terms of security provision. This, however, does not explain the actions of those partici-
pants who chose to use no security at all on their device. Other things, perhaps the barriers
provided by explicit authentication methods, discourage them from using security on their
devices when they seem to believe that it is useful. This theme can also be seen in the pre-
viously stated opinions on PIN use. Participants saw the PIN as a powerful over-arching
security method with a direct link to the provision of applications on their device. However,
many of the participants explained their avoidance of PINs in terms of fear of the negative
consequences that result from forgetting it. In most cases, participants feel that security
provision is improved with transparent authentication as compared to either traditional se-
curity methods or none at all. This does not, however, answer the question of whether they
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find security provisions necessary, or whether they would use them if provided. Answers to
these questions can be partially provided by examining what inclusions participants found
important in a transparent authentication method.
7.3.4 Theme 4: Suggestions for Transparent Authentication Func-
tionality
Several areas of improvement were identified by participants. These preferences have been
fed into the Framework design to provide a more useful application that meets user needs.
The suggestions are as follows:
1. Assign required device confidence on a per-task or per-folder basis, in addition to by
task or application. Have pre-set values that can be changed by owner to reduce initial
setup effort.
2. Minimize the number of explicit authentication interruptions as much as possible as
these are considered frustrating and intrusive.
3. Keep the owner’s data on the owner’s device. Do not share it with others, or remove it
from the device in order to implement a security mechanism.
4. Minimize effort for frequent tasks. This can be managed by allowing the device owner
to select a lower device confidence for tasks that are accessed frequently.
7.4 Study Limitations
The limitations to this study are less about the type of device used since this was controlled
by the experimenter, and more about the participants and the experimental design. The
limitations and their potential effect on the results are listed below.
Subjective Nature: The majority of the data gathered in this study is of a subjective nature;
it is the participants’ opinions and perceptions and is thus subject to their own beliefs
and knowledge. It may be that the same study conducted on a larger or differently
populated group may result in some differences in participant opinions and thus affect
the study results.
Application Design: The application used in the study does not use the actual Apple in-
terface for the tasks included in the study. This is considered acceptable because the
study was not designed to test or gather participant opinions of the Apple interface.
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However, it may have added a bias to the participant opinions due to their belief that
the application as designed was actually the transparent authentication method.
Device Ownership: The participants in this study did not use their own device, therefore
there may be a disconnect between the security level perception and the data on the
device, since the data did not belong to the participant. This means that the participant
might consider the data adequately protected because its loss would not affect them
personally.
Suspension of Disbelief: Although the participants were initially told that a transparent au-
thentication method was currently running on the device, this was not actually the case.
Therefore, the interactions with the study application may not accurately mimic a pro-
duction transparent authentication method. This should be taken into account when
assessing the study results because participant opinions may change due to changes in
the system itself. One example of how this might affect the results is that the device
confidence is intended to increase and decrease in a much more granular fashion. In
this study, a biometric result or challenge question answer raised or lowered the de-
vice confidence by one level: low to medium, medium to high, and vice versa. The
Transparent Authentication Framework described in Chapter 3 states that a single bio-
metric result or explicit authentication attempt would have a small effect on the device
confidence; it could well be that such a small change would mean that the device con-
fidence remains at its current level, although at a slightly higher point. For example,
if the Low level was defined to be less that 25% device confidence and the device was
currently at 24%, a correct biometric match might raise the device confidence to 26%
thereby moving overall device confidence to Medium. However, if the device was at
15% device confidence when the correct biometric match was seen and moved to 17%,
the overall device confidence would remain at Low, although at a slightly higher level
than previously.
Participants: The study participants were self-selecting in nature, since each person was in-
vited to participate by the experimenter. 90% of the participants were either computer
science academics or involved in technology-related jobs, such as IT support. This is
a potential limitation because the participants no longer represent a subset of the target
user group, which is “all mobile device users”. The participants instead represent a
small subset of the target group, and one that may be more aware of security concerns
and mitigation techniques than the average smartphone owner. This could potentially
affect the study results since the opinions of a technically-minded and security-aware
group may differ from others.
Experimental Error: While significant effort was put into planning the study and develop-
7.5. Summary 155
ing the required iPhone app, there were several places where experimental errors were
seen that might affect the study outcome. For instance, biometric matches and non-
matches were reported after the participant had completed the “Send Email”, “Make
Local Call” and “Make International Call” tasks. These were intended to simply be
a random choice between match and non-match since the participant’s biometrics did
not exist on the device in order to provide a baseline biometric for actual matching.
This was tested during application development and outcomes were observed to be
sufficiently random. However, during the study no participants experienced a match
result; only non-match results were produced. This is likely due to a seeding issue
with the random number generator used to select either match or non-match. Since
the application was restarted on the device prior to each participant’s use, the seed was
likely the same each time and thus only produced non-match results. This may have
had an effect on the participants’ opinions of the transparent authentication method
because they may perceive that it never matches, and thus is not trustworthy.
7.5 Summary
This chapter provided details of the Transparent Authentication Perceptions (TAP) study, a
between-users study (N = 30) that was designed to elicit user perceptions and opinions of a
transparent authentication method like the one described in this work’s Transparent Authen-
tication Framework. The study results, as analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative
methods, were used to provide impetus for future research and as a method of informing the
framework design to more closely match users’ wants and needs.
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Chapter 8
Security Discussion
This chapter outlines the threats and the vulnerabilities that could be exploited to compromise
the Transparent Authentication Framework. Despite the assertion of some researchers that
mobile operating systems are sufficiently secure [173], there are still threats that should be
considered when using the Framework as a model for transparent authentication. Biometrics,
in particular, have their own classes of threats, which are discussed in terms of how they
impact the Framework. Mitigation techniques are discussed for each attack, although an
attacker may still be able to take advantage of a vulnerability despite mitigation. This list is
not (and is not intended to be) exhaustive; new attacks arise daily and an implementation of
the Framework will have to adapt to emerging attacks as they are discovered.
8.1 Attacker Capabilities
In order to focus on attacks that are specific to the design of the Framework, the attacker’s
capabilities are outlined below:
• The attacker is physically near the device and its owner, and can observe their actions.
They may be able to take physical possession of the device through theft or temporarily
if the device owner leaves it on a table or desk, for example.
• The attacker has knowledge of the Framework and its component processes and data.
This assumption is similar to the conventional threat models in cryptography where
the algorithm details are not kept secret from attackers.
• The attacker does not know which specific biometrics are used in the particular Frame-
work implementation. This knowledge does not come with knowledge of the Frame-
work itself since it is designed to include several biometrics that are not explicitly
specified in the Framework.
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• The attacker does not have access to the closed 3G network, nor any secured wireless
network that the device owner may connect to with the device. This assumption is
justified because it requires a separate set of attacks that are not specific to the Frame-
work.
In addition to the attacker capabilities described above, the following assumptions are made
when considering the attacks discussed in the remainder of this chapter:
• Generic attacks that apply to any application on a mobile device, and that are not aimed
specifically at the Framework, are out of scope. These attacks can be mitigated in ways
beyond the Framework design. These attacks include hardware- and software-centric
attacks and device-independent attacks via the wireless networks.
• Attacks that require a malicious version of the application created based on the Frame-
work are not considered. This form of attack also has its own mitigation techniques,
and such an attack cannot be mitigated through adjusting the design of the Framework
itself.
• The data created and used by the Framework (i.e., biometrics and their decisions)
remain on the device. They are not transmitted or stored off-device at any time.
The following sections describe some of the possible threats to the Transparent Authentica-
tion Framework. Figure 8.1 shows an overview of some of the relevant Framework function-
ality, and shows what parts of the Framework could be targeted.
8.2 Social Engineering Attacks
Social engineering attacks include any means of manipulating or deceiving a person into
revealing information that might be used by an attacker to gain access to a protected system.
While it might seem simple to reject attempts to gather personal information, it is often
easier for an attacker to simply ask for the information they require rather than attempting
other, more complex attacks [175]. In terms of the Transparent Authentication Framework,
social engineering attacks involve gaining a copy of the device owner’s biometrics, such as
typing and voice patterns, in order to reuse them to spoof the device into allowing access
to an impostor. Methods include calling the device owner and recording a conversation, or
directing them to a website and gathering typing patterns via a web form (phishing). In both
cases, the device owner would not necessarily link the request for information (speaking or
typing) to an attack on the device security.
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Figure 8.1: The Transparent Authentication Framework and the relevant attacks (shown ital-
icized and in boxes). Adapted from [174].
Social engineering can take another form within the Framework: tricking the device owner
into overriding the security by entering the explicit authentication answer. This threat in-
cludes methods of fooling the owner into turning off the device security (Framework-based
or other) or into continuously providing positive owner samples for classification while the
actual device user is an impostor (e.g., speaking near the microphone or revealing the se-
cret knowledge that may be used for explicit authentication). Mitigation techniques include
enhanced user education, using multiple secrets or biometric methods for explicit authenti-
cation, and encrypting the device data when it is not being used. Use of these techniques in-
volves balancing the mitigation against performance penalties in terms of memory, processor
power and battery usage. This type of threat requires the attacker to know what biometrics
are being used for authentication, which may not be easily determined simply by observing
the device owner.
8.3 Explicit Authenticator Attacks
These attacks, as with explicit authentication use outside of the Framework, take advantage
of the weaknesses in the method used for explicit authentication. While the method is not
specified within the Framework, it may still represent a security weakness since no security
provision is without flaws that may be exploited. Suggestions for the explicit authenticator
include challenge questions, a password or PIN, or a biometric that is explicitly gathered,
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such as fingerprints. Challenge questions, passwords and PINs are secret-knowledge tech-
niques that are vulnerable to social engineering attacks in which the legitimate owner is
tricked into revealing the secret. They are also vulnerable to brute-force attacks in which all
possible combinations of secrets (i.e., letters, numbers and special characters) are tried until
the correct combination is found. If the explicit authenticator is a biometric, it is vulnerable
to the same attacks as discussed in Section 8.5. Mitigation techniques depend on the chosen
explicit authenticator, and thus are not described here.
8.4 Time–Based Attacks
These attacks include any that are associated with timings, such as where an impostor uses
the device more than the owner and thus trains the classifiers to recognize him rather than
the owner, or when the owner has achieved a high device confidence, then the device is lost
or stolen. The thief would then be able to perform high level tasks for a period of time before
the device realizes that it is not being used by the device owner. This window of opportunity
could be sufficiently long that serious loss of data or intrusion results.
A possible mitigation technique for this type of attack is to require use of explicit authen-
tication methods after a set number of contiguous biometric non–matches. The number of
non-matches can be selected by the developer or device owner. It is important to set the
number low enough that attacker access is limited as quickly as possible, but high enough
that the device owner is not locked out unnecessarily, as may happen if a biometric false
reject takes place.
8.5 Biometrics–Based Attacks
Biometrics are not secrets, and thus they are vulnerable to being captured, copied and forged.
The risk of this is enhanced by the fact that biometric traces are left while doing other tasks.
For instance, fingerprints are left on every surface touched and it has been known for quite
some time that they can be collected and possibly reused [176, 177]. More germane to
modern biometrics systems is that captured latent fingerprints can be used to spoof fingerprint
biometric systems [178].
The literature on biometric vulnerabilities has identified some overarching categories, in-
cluding impersonation, replay, transmission and data simulation attacks [174]. They are
applicable to both behavioral and physiological biometrics, but many of the attack vectors
are more applicable to the latter. In each case, they are discussed in terms of the Trans-
parent Authentication Framework in particular, with mitigation techniques suggested where
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possible.
8.5.1 Impersonation and Replay Attacks
Impersonation attacks, also called spoofing, involve stealing the device owner’s biometric
pattern and replaying it to gain access to the secured system. With physiological biometrics,
the norm is to artificially recreate the data and reuse it (i.e., a fake finger or high–resolution
eye image). Spoofing behavioral biometrics usually requires mimicry rather than reusing
biometric artifacts, although behavioral biometrics are susceptible to both. In all cases, im-
personation attacks require the attacker to capture a biometric sample from the legitimate
device owner, either for reuse or to use as a template for creating new samples. Imperson-
ation and replay attacks are shown between gathering biometrics and creating the feature
vectors in Figure 8.1, and also when adding new biometric event objects to the biometrics
buffer.
In the Transparent Authentication Framework, an attacker could launch an impersonation
attack by gathering the biometrics used. For example, the attacker could record the device
owner’s voice while making a call or saving a voice memo. This voice pattern could then
be played back at a later date in order to provide a positive voice sample and thereby in-
crease the device confidence. The owner’s voice pattern may also be gathered via social
engineering efforts in which the device owner receives a call and is engaged in conversa-
tion for the purpose of recording their voice. Possible countermeasures include sampling
the spoken words, inflections, background noise, and duration of the recording for matches
to previously seen samples. This countermeasure is unlikely to be viable, however, because
such functionality is quite advanced and unlikely to run efficiently on a mobile device due to
resource constraints.
A further example of the type of impersonation attack that may be possible within the Frame-
work is if the attacker attempts to mimic the device owner’s typing pattern. Keystroke bio-
metrics are not trivial to mimic. While it is possible that an attacker may watch the user
typing and attempt to mimic their pattern, it is unlikely that they will be successful, par-
ticularly without a way of practicing that includes feedback on whether they are correctly
matching the device owner’s pattern. Furthermore, one study has shown that attempting to
mimic a legitimate user’s typing pattern has little or no effect on the pattern matching results
with keystroke dynamics [179]. Spoofing keystroke dynamics may be more likely to succeed
when using keylogging rather than mimicry.
Keylogging is an attack where a user’s typing is captured and logged, often in an offsite
location, although it can also be done on the device itself. Keylogging is used to determine
what a person has typed, and is a form of privacy invasion. In terms of the Framework,
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if keystroke dynamics are used as a biometric, keylogging potentially could be used in a
replay attack where the attacker logs keystrokes and plays them back. This implies that the
keylogger must also track the metrics used in keystroke dynamics: inter-key latency and
key hold time. The attacker would then have to ensure that the keys were played back in
a manner that resembled real typing. They could not, for instance, attempt to enter a long
series of characters, complete with key hold time and inter-key latency values, all at once.
This would likely be detected by the biometric system. It is more likely that an attacker could
use a keylogging program that gathers not only the keys but their metrics as well, and use
this information to create new Event Objects that can then be injected into the event object
buffers as legitimate owner patterns. This attack would require detailed knowledge of the
specific format of the Framework used by the developer, including specifics about the Event
Objects and their buffers. A simple mitigation technique includes preventing access to the
on-device memory used by the Framework implementation by other applications.
Impersonation and replay attacks can also take advantage of biometric inter–subject simi-
larities. Such an overlap in the feature space between users [57] allows for pattern matches
even when the device user is not the owner. One example of this in the proposed biomet-
rics for use with the Transparent Authentication Framework is in typing patterns. There are
relatively few ways of typing distinctively, as evidenced by the results of many keystroke
dynamics studies discussed in the background provided in Chapter 2. Therefore, an attacker
may find a pattern that is similar enough to that of the device owner that the Framework is
spoofed into thinking that the device owner is using the device, although the likelihood of
this is expected to be low.
An impersonation-style attack that is related to inter–subject similarities could be launched
by an attacker who uses the device sporadically. The attacker could type or speak into the
device frequently enough that his pattern becomes known to the biometric classifiers, but not
so often that he is discovered as an attacker. Over time, the attacker increases the frequency
of his device use compared to the device owner, until the classifiers identify the attacker’s
patterns as those of the legitimate device owner. This attack would be easier to launch and
more likely to succeed if there were inter-subject similarities between the attacker’s and the
device owner’s typing patterns. Alternatively, the attacker could imitate the device owner
well enough to begin the process, and slowly alter their typing pattern until they are typing
as themself. The success of this attack depends on the device owner allowing the attacker
to use their device, or the attacker being able to use the device frequently enough to provide
sufficient samples in some other way. This attack can be mitigated by not allowing others to
use the device.
Replay attacks can be mitigated using liveness testing techniques. Such techniques disallow
replay of biometric patterns by ensuring that the supplied pattern is from a live person at the
moment it is supplied. For example, fingerprint liveness techniques can check for bloodflow
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in veins while scanning the fingerprint. In the Framework, liveness techniques for keystroke
and voice patterns could be employed, although it is unlikely to happen within the constraints
of battery life, processor speeds and memory availability.
8.5.2 Pattern Simulation
A pattern simulation attack is one in which the attacker generates patterns that are very sim-
ilar to those of the legitimate owner, and uses these to gain access to the protected resource.
This is a form of algorithmic mimicry, or digital chameleons, and has been suggested as an
attack on behavioral biometric systems [180]. In this case, the mimicry is undertaken by a
computer program.
The difference between pattern simulation and impersonation attacks is the source of the pat-
tern. In the latter, the attacker obtains a real pattern from an authorized user and replays it,
where in the former the pattern is created in an automated manner, possibly from using legit-
imate patterns as a template. The difference, although subtle, is important since a simulated
pattern would not have the same hash value as a legitimate pattern, and thus a hash-based
mitigation technique would fail. Pattern simulation attacks are shown during feature extrac-
tion and adding to the biometrics buffer in Figure 8.1. Mitigation techniques for pattern
simulation include ensuring that the patterns come from the device itself, and protecting
against phishing and eavesdropping, which may be used to gather legitimate patterns.
8.5.3 Man–in–the–Middle Attacks
A man–in–the–middle attack is defined as a form of eavesdropping in which the attacker
relays messages between two people, computers, or processes. In this attack, the two orig-
inal victims believe they are still communicating securely with each other. In terms of the
Framework, a man–in–the–middle attack could take place at several points (see Figure 8.1),
including between gathering the biometric and feature extraction. Specifically, the biometric
can be captured and replaced with another before it is used for feature vector creation.
Man–in–the middle attacks to the Framework would require access to the memory and com-
munication channels between the discrete parts since the biometrics do not leave the device
and the connection between gathering and using the biometric is all on–device. Such ac-
cess is limited on some platforms. For instance, the Apple iOS operating system does not
allow applications to overwrite or access memory that is not assigned to that application.
In essence, this type of attack would likely have to be done with a malicious version of the
software.
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Mitigation techniques for man–in–the–middle attacks include disallowing access to memory
and communication channels, verifying the identity of the communicating processes, and
using secured cryptographic protocols to protect the gathered biometrics and feature vec-
tors. These defences are relatively expensive in terms of memory and processor power and
are thus unsuited to a mobile device environment. Furthermore, continuously encrypting
and decrypting data throughout the Framework’s authentication process adds a significant
amount of time to the device confidence calculation, which may become annoying to the
device owner. Fortunately, man–in–the–middle attacks are considered unlikely on a closed
system such as the Framework.
8.5.4 Template Attacks
A biometric template attack takes place when the information used for comparison to a newly
gathered biometric is altered to allow authentication of an impostor. The Framework refers
to the biometric template as the trained classifier, or alternatively, the set of event objects
in the training buffer. In this type of attack, the training event objects themselves may be
replaced, or the trained classifier may be replaced with a pre-trained substitute that has been
trained on the attacker’s patterns, or the entire training event object buffer may be replaced,
as shown in Figure 8.1. In the latter case, periodic classifier retraining would replace the
current model that represents the device owner with one that represents another.
To mitigate template attacks, protection must be given to the memory and communication
channels between the Framework components. Furthermore, event objects that have not
originated from biometrics gathering should be rejected. Since the data does not leave the
device and all calculations are expected to take place on–device, it is unlikely that such
attacks would be successful.
Mitigation techniques for biometrics–based attacks usually involve either watermarking, en-
crypting or hashing the biometrics themselves. It is unlikely, given the environmental con-
straints, that the Framework could support such processor- and memory-intensive operations,
particularly on such large amounts of data. However, it is possible that the individual fea-
ture vectors used may be protected via these techniques, particularly if a simple encryption
technique is used.
8.5.5 Multimodal Biometrics
Using multimodal biometrics is itself a form of mitigation against biometric replay attacks
since any attacker would have to provide more than one type of authorized biometric simul-
taneously in order to create a multimodal biometric [174]. The transparent nature of the
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authentication provided by the Framework makes spoofing biometrics more difficult since it
is not obvious to observers what biometrics are being gathered. Furthermore, each applica-
tion that uses the Framework as an authenticator may employ different biometrics, and could
replace weak or subverted methods with others as needed. In terms of the Framework, us-
ing multimodal biometrics is only a partial mitigation to replay attacks since the Framework
also allows use of single biometrics in cases where only one type is available. Use of sev-
eral biometrics to create multimodal biometrics within the Framework would help use this
mitigation technique to its fullest potential.
8.6 Summary
Many types of attacks are specific to mobile device environments. While the Transparent Au-
thentication Framework is vulnerable to these attacks to a greater or lesser extent because it
runs on a mobile device, there are also specific attacks that exploit the Framework’s structure
and components. These have been discussed in this chapter, and mitigation techniques have
been suggested for each attack. Many of the suggested mitigation techniques rely on stan-
dards such as cryptography, user education, and use of hash functions for software. These
may not be worth pursuing in terms of the cost-benefit tradeoff.
In general, the Transparent Authentication Framework is vulnerable to many mobile device-
based attacks, and may use the mitigation techniques for these as necessary. The Framework
is no more susceptible to attacks than other mobile device software, with the possible excep-
tion of biometrics-specific attacks. Many attacks depend on the mobile device environment
being used; thus, a security risk assessment should be undertaken before implementing soft-
ware based on this Framework.
165
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation has provided details of the Transparent Authentication Framework, includ-
ing the design, candidate biometrics and a perception study carried out to assess user ac-
ceptability of the mechanism. The Transparent Authentication Framework delivers transpar-
ent, continuous authentication on mobile devices by relating device confidence to tasks and
data on the device. The Framework provides transparent authentication by using behavioral
biometrics that are gathered in the background. It provides continuous authentication by
recalculating device confidence whenever biometric samples are available.
To conclude this dissertation, design considerations for the Transparent Authentication Frame-
work are provided. The purpose of providing these design considerations is to inform future
iterations of the Framework and to highlight issues in transparent authentication design. The
research contributions this dissertation has made are then related to the hypotheses and re-
search questions that define this work. Finally, areas for future work based on the Transparent
Authentication Framework are discussed.
9.1 Motivation Revisited
Three core considerations motivated this research. They have been addressed by the Frame-
work in the following ways:
The Password Problem: The Framework may reduce the need for explicit authentication
methods such as passwords and PINs by repositioning authentication provision as a
background task. This provides the device owner with fewer chances to subvert secret
knowledge techniques by using weak or shared secrets. Furthermore, the Framework
provides a nuanced approach to security provision that goes beyond point-of-entry
security to allow users to map device confidence to tasks and data on the device. This
further reduces the reliance on typically weak passwords and PINs.
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Disconnect between Mental Models and Password Security: The Framework allows for
mapping between device confidence and specific functionality and data on the device.
Allowing the user to control the mappings may encourage creation of a stronger men-
tal model, as well as increased knowledge of the data that is stored on the device.
Applying a minimum device confidence encourages the owner to assess the risks they
associate with the data or functionality, and further supports a strong mental model of
the provided security.
Inflexibility in Authentication Policy Creation: With the nuanced approach to security pro-
vided by the Framework, the device owner in essence creates their own security policy.
Reducing the reliance on often weak secret-knowledge techniques may mean that there
is less reason for organizations to dictate policies that encourage circumvention. The
Framework allows device confidence to be set on a per-document basis, which allows
for increased protection for sensitive documents, rather than relying on the same pass-
word to protect everything on the device.
The motivations stated here are further supported by a series of design considerations for the
Framework that will help it meet device owner needs.
9.2 Framework Design Considerations
Continuous, transparent authentication is not intended to be the only choice for security pro-
vision on mobile device platforms. There will be cases in which other methods, such as
graphical passwords, physiological biometrics, and passwords and PINs are more applicable
choices. Continuous, transparent authentication has the potential to provide a secure en-
vironment that allows security provision to remain largely in the background, and to help
alleviate the memory and task load of the device owner. In this way, it becomes another
tool in a developer’s authentication and security toolbox. Through this research, several
design considerations have been identified when considering generic transparent authentica-
tion. Through their identification, a broader picture of authentication design considerations
can be seen. The design considerations are as follows:
9.2.1 Basis for Security Level Choice
Consideration 1: Transparent authentication methods should allow the user
to select appropriate required device confidence levels for both data and tasks or
applications.
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The choice of these methods and levels are individual, and attempting to apply firm levels
may make the Framework useful in fewer cases. Default settings should be provided for
particular documents, images, and folders; the device owner should have the ability to adjust
the levels to suit their own data and comfort levels. Allowing such choice provides a basis
for a mental model of the security provided, and gives not only control over their own data
and device, but also a feeling of understanding the Framework so device owners can work
within it rather than against it.
The Framework allows for this by setting default device confidence levels for all tasks and
data, and allowing users to change these levels at their convenience. The default levels can
be set initially by the application developer who uses the Framework, taking into account the
specific needs and risk levels of the application under design.
9.2.2 Security as a Barrier
Consideration 2: Transparent authentication methods should work in the
background, relieving the user of much of the repetitive provision of knowledge-
based authentication methods, while also provide a sense of security and robust-
ness.
One interpretation of this consideration is the balance between providing too many barriers,
which are seen during explicit authentication methods such as passwords, PINs and challenge
questions, and providing too few. The former may be annoying, frustrating, and provide
a reason to stop using security methods. The latter, on the other hand, may reduce the
device owner’s sense of the security provided by transparent authentication. Barriers could
be provided through periodic explicit authentication and reports of biometric non-matches.
One result from this research is that they should not be too frequent; a difficult goal, to be
sure, since the ideal frequency must vary from person to person.
The Transparent Authentication Framework has been designed to provide continuous, trans-
parent authentication. By definition, it works in the background, although early interaction
with the Framework is characterized by a higher number of explicit authentication requests
since the Framework is still learning the device owner’s biometric patterns. The biomet-
rics, while left to the application designer, should take advantage of backgrounding to gather
information unobtrusively. The two biometrics suggested in this research, keystroke dynam-
ics and speaker verification, support background data gathering since they take advantage
of regular tasks performed on mobile devices. The sense of security associated with the
Framework is an area of future work, although this research has indicated that device own-
ers depend on this idea of robustness in order to continue using security provisions beyond
initial testing.
9.2. Framework Design Considerations 168
Consideration 3: Transparent Authentication methods should take into ac-
count the user’s mental model of the security provided, and work towards en-
hancing the model to bridge the gap between explicit and transparent authenti-
cation.
Users create mental models, an internal understanding of how something works, of systems
with which they interact [181]. These mental models help the user understand how to interact
with a given system, and allow them to begin to build trust in how the system will react.
In security, mental models help with risk perception and communication [182], which is
informing the user of particular security risks that exist with the use of an application1.
This research found that the mental model of the Framework determined whether study par-
ticipants chose to complete their tasks within the Framework or turn it off. Furthermore,
participants considered PINs to provide “meta-security”, and in many cases chose to use
them to provide security on their mobile devices. They stated that a barrier, such as that pro-
vided by entering a challenge question response, improved perceptions of security, even in
cases where the transparent authentication was running normally. This implies that the user
looks to their understanding of traditional security to help understand new methods, which
can be used to build acceptance for new security methods.
9.2.3 Perceptions of Traditional and Transparent Authentication
Consideration 4: Transparent authentication methods should not attempt to
eschew or replace traditional security methods.
Users are familiar with provisions such as passwords and PINs, and have strongly-held be-
liefs as to the security provided (or lack thereof) by these methods. Similar to the previous
design consideration, it may be the case that familiarity could help breed a sense of security.
Furthermore, crafting a strong mental model of transparent authentication security may be
easier if the device owner is first introduced to the explicit authentication method provided,
then the transparent method.
The Framework includes a back-up security method that is based on explicit authentication
methods. The chosen implementation of this is left to the application designer who uses
the Framework, but challenge questions have been suggested as an option. Other options
include passwords, PINs and explicit biometrics such as fingerprints. User familiarity with
such provisions may bolster the user’s mental model and help provide a feeling of enhanced
security provision.
1An example of risk communication, although not from the security field, is the TV commercial that showed
a frying egg with a voiceover stating “This is your brain on drugs”.
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Consideration 5: Continuous, transparent authentication methods should
respect the limitations of the platform for which they are designed.
This consideration takes into account the likelihood that the user is trying to achieve other
tasks that may require security provisions, and not to “do security” itself. Thus, on a mo-
bile device platform, considerations must be made for the bursty, frequent use pattern that
characterizes this platform, as well as the limitations this platform has on memory, processor
speed, and power consumption. These limitations are especially important when considering
the continuous nature of the Framework presented in this research, since the frequency of re-
calculating device confidence may have an effect on these resources. Finally, the intended
transparent nature of the Framework should also be kept in mind when selecting the biomet-
rics to use in the Framework. They should be ones that may be gathered while the user goes
about regular tasks, and the number should be sufficient to provide the accuracy needed by
the specific application while respecting the resource limitations of mobile devices.
Efforts have been made in the Framework design to select processes that minimize complex-
ity. For instance, the pattern classifiers tested are all simple to program and relatively fast
in decision making. The processes and data structures that define the Framework have been
selected to minimize battery use and memory. These choices were made deliberately, but it
is left to future simulation work to determine whether these choices are as efficient as nec-
essary. The choice of biometrics respects the platform since they can be gathered while the
user goes about regular tasks. Finally, the continuous and transparent nature of the Frame-
work blends well with the bursty nature of mobile device use since it largely removes the
need for frequent explicit authentication.
9.3 Research Contributions
This research provided a framework for continuous, transparent authentication on mobile
devices. The specific research question that drove this research was as follows:
It is possible to verify the identity of the current user of a mobile device in
a secure, continuous, transparent and passive manner by using a combination
of behavioral biometrics. Such authentication will not normally require explicit
owner action, but will instead rely on the owner’s usual interaction with the mo-
bile device. Finally, such a transparent authentication method will be acceptable
to device owners.
This research question provided the basis for the hypotheses that drove the research and the
creation of the Transparent Authentication Framework, as follows:
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H1: Behavioral biometrics such as keystroke dynamics and speaker verifi-
cation are sufficiently distinctive to contribute to verification of the identity of a
mobile device owner.
This hypothesis was addressed with the Keystroke Dynamics and Speaker Verification fea-
sibility studies. In both cases, the studies showed that the owner of a mobile device had
sufficient patterns in their typing and speaking patterns to justify using it as a behavioral
biometric in the Transparent Authentication Framework. However, neither method provided
low enough error rates to justify using it as a sole means of identity verification. These two
feasibility studies have sufficiently low error rates to justify extended studies of the same
type that have more participants and more data per participant. As such, this hypothesis is
accepted since there is enough information in each of these biometrics to contribute to mobile
device owner identity verification. Care should be taken, however, to select the behavioral
biometrics used within the Framework to ensure that those chosen are sufficiently distinctive
to make a similar contribution.
H2: Combining keystroke dynamics and speaker verification into a mul-
timodal behavioral biometric reduces the error rates seen with the individual
biometrics.
This hypothesis was addressed with the Multimodal Biometrics feasibility study, in which
the speaker verification and keystroke dynamics study results were combined in a measurable
and repeatable way. The results of this study showed that both the Naı¨ve and Posterior Prob-
ability Methods (NM and PPM, respectively) showed improvements in error rates via higher
AUC levels. While these results were not statistically significant at all levels, they do provide
support for a larger study that further examines the applicability of these two combination
methods. The results of this study indicate that applications that require lower security levels
would benefit from using the Naı¨ve Method because it favors user convenience over resisting
intruder access (i.e., allows fewer false negatives). The Posterior Probability method, on the
other hand, is preferred for higher security applications since it favors blocking intruders over
the inconvenience of asking legitimate owners to re-authenticate. Thus, since the error rates
were indeed often lower for the multimodal biometrics compared to the single biometrics,
this hypothesis is accepted.
H3: It is possible to gather keystroke dynamics and speaker verification
biometrics while the mobile device user goes about other tasks on the device.
This hypothesis was addressed by undertaking the keystroke dynamics and speaker verifica-
tion feasibility studies. While it is conceptually possible to collect both keystroke data and
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voice samples while the device owner goes about regular tasks on the device such as writ-
ing email or making phone calls, the implementation of this functionality is somewhat less
possible. The Apple iPhone and iPod Touch environment was chosen for the experimental
platform. While writing the mobile device applications that supported these two studies, it
became clear that Apple did not allow processes to run in the background as a regular work-
ing condition. Since this is a requirement of gathering either keystroke dynamics or speaker
verification biometrics in a transparent manner, further work into backgrounding these ap-
plications was not pursued. However, the Android development environment does allow for
background processes, and thus further research into this platform may provide a different
result for this hypothesis. This hypothesis is rejected for Apple mobile device environments
since background processes are disallowed, but accepted in theory since it is demonstrably
possible on the Android platform.
Another consideration that was discovered during this research was the apparent mismatch
between the idea of keystroke dynamics and the reality of it. During the keystroke dynam-
ics feasibility study, several participants indicated that they would not feel comfortable with
participating in the study if their keystrokes were sampled in the background. These par-
ticipants were happy to provide their keystroke patterns for the study as long as they could
choose what to type. However, the participants in the Transparent Authentication Percep-
tions study did not seem to have an issue with their keystrokes being sampled and used for
authentication purposes. One possible reason for this difference in opinion lies in the dif-
ferences between the two studies’ design. In the keystroke dynamics study, the participants
knew that their patterns would be removed from their device and compared to other such
patterns, but in the transparent authentication perceptions study, the participants were led to
believe that their keystroke patterns remained on the device. This is a small but very impor-
tant difference, since the former has privacy implications while the latter appears to protect
privacy. The discovery, then, is that privacy and control over their distinguishing information
and data is important to device owners, and therefore must be considered carefully during
design of applications that are based on the Framework presented here.
H4: Mobile device owners would consider using a transparent authentication
method if it was available to them.
This hypothesis was addressed by the Transparent Authentication Perceptions (TAP) Study.
The results of this study showed that the participants would at least consider using such an
authentication method. There were several caveats to this claim, however. First, several
participants indicated that they would trial such an application, but would not hesitate to
remove or disable it if it either kept them from their data and device functionality, or if
it seemed to not block unauthorized users (i.e., if their friend started using the device and
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was allowed the same access as the owner). The idea of security as a barrier was a theme
identified during the TAP study; the number and frequency of the barriers to intended task
completion should be considered when using the Framework. This hypothesis is accepted.
9.3.1 Major Contributions
This research has provided novel contributions to the field of authentication, particularly in
the mobile device environment. The major contributions, which extend the design consider-
ations and hypotheses provided in the previous sections, are as follows:
1. Developed a framework for continuous, transparent authentication on mobile devices
that is intended to be independent of both device type and model, and also of the
operating system type and version.
2. Designed the Framework so that it is plausible on a mobile device without a depen-
dence on offline processing in order to allow the owner’s data to remain on the device
and within their control.
3. Extended keystroke dynamics research into soft keyboards on mobile devices.
4. Gathered data on user perceptions of transparent authentication, and used these per-
ceptions to inform the creation of the Transparent Authentication Framework, with the
hope that this will help move transparent authentication beyond the research lab and
into more regular use.
5. Provided support for the use of multimodal biometrics in such a Framework, which
has not been proposed previously, and allowed for flexibility in the number and type
of biometrics chosen.
9.3.2 Minor Contributions
In addition to the novel contributions discussed in the previous section, this research also
provides support for the work of other researchers in the field. Although these minor contri-
butions were not directly mandated by the research question and hypotheses that define this
research, they are important since they may help advance the field of transparent authentica-
tion.
1. Supported the results of similar work in keystroke dynamics, including verifying the
conclusion that key hold times are not very distinctive on mobile devices and showing
similar error rates to other research in this area.
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2. Provided methods of combining multiple biometrics that depend on the posterior prob-
abilities provided by pattern classifiers, rather than on individual score matrices. One
interpretation of this result is that using probabilities may prove to use less memory,
which is a consideration in the mobile device platform.
3. Provided up-to-date research into the current mobile device security provisions used
by device owners through the TAP study.
4. Provided a survey of current research in keystroke dynamics on mobile devices, desk-
top and laptop computers [133].
9.4 Future Work
This research has provided novel contributions to the field of authentication through the
answers provided to the overarching research question. In providing these answers, however,
more questions have been identified. These questions provide a rich source of future work in
this field.
1. Extended studies on keystroke dynamics and speaker verification on mobile devices.
Extended implies both more participants and larger datasets, as well as potential ex-
amination of alternative pattern classifiers to those studied in this research.
2. Creation of a simulation of the Transparent Authentication Framework. This will pro-
vide a method of verifying the Framework’s inclusions, allow for stringent testing of
assumptions such as the usefulness of identifying attackers quickly, and allow multiple
biometrics scenarios to be tested free of the constraints of a mobile device platform.
This future work has several objectives: to justify the Framework’s parts, to provide a
basis for a proof-of-concept application, to allow refinement of the Framework’s parts
and to identify any gaps in the Framework.
3. Creation of a proof-of-concept prototype application that is based on the Framework
and that runs on a mobile device. The resulting application would be based on the
results of the simulations, and would focus on its processor, memory, and power needs
and usage. Once tested, the application may be used to conduct further tests into the
Framework’s usability and device owner requirements.
4. Experiments into whether typing and voice patterns (and potentially other biometrics)
can be gathered in a transparent manner by using backgrounding on mobile device
application platforms. This work may be conducted in unison with creating the proof-
of-concept application. Examples include gait and implicit facial recognition.
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5. Explore the relationship between tasks and data that have different required confidence
levels. For example, if one low security and one medium security task each attempt
to access data that has been assigned a high security level, should access to the data
be granted? One option is to default to the highest level, thus disallowing data access,
but this is a complex problem that should be examined, perhaps by using solutions in
different fields that have similar problems.
9.5 Conclusions
This research provided a description of a framework for continuous, transparent authenti-
cation on mobile devices, called the Transparent Authentication Framework. To provide
support for the use of behavioral biometrics within the Framework, feasibility studies into
keystroke dynamics, speaker verification, and the multimodal combination of these biomet-
rics were undertaken. To answer questions about the usefulness and needs of users who
may use such a Framework, a study into user perceptions of transparent authentication was
implemented.
The results of this research show that transparent authentication on mobile devices has po-
tential both in terms of technology and support from device owners. Results of this research
include support for keystroke dynamics, speaker verification and multimodal biometrics for
use in the Transparent Authentication Framework, further understanding of user perceptions
of transparent authentication in general, and specific suggestions for functionality that have
been reflected in the Framework design.
Future work includes creating simulations of the processes and data structures that comprise
the Framework, and a proof-of-concept implementation on a mobile device platform that
supports application backgrounding. To support this future work, larger studies with more
participants and more data into the usefulness of keystroke dynamics and speaker verification
are justified by the feasibility study results reported in this research. Examination of other
possible biometrics such as gait and implicit facial recognition may provide support for other
biometrics as well. Finally, a large-scale user study of the utility and usability of the proof-
of-concept implementation will identify ways in which the Framework may be improved.
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Appendix A
Transparent Authentication
Perceptions Study Interview
Questions
The Transparent Authentication Perceptions Study received ethics approval from the Col-
lege of Science and Engineering (formerly the Faculty of Information and Mathematical
Sciences) on August 7, 2012 under the ethics number CSE01076. No changes to the exper-
imental design described in the ethics application were required in order to gain ethics ap-
proval. The following pages show the questions asked during the semi-structured interview
conducted during the study. Not all questions asked are represented here. The interviewer
may have asked additional questions depending on the answers provided by the participant.
Transparent Authentication Perceptions Study (Ethics: CSE01076)
Interview Questions
Subject ID:
Subject ID: Interview Date: Interview Duration:
1. Were you able to complete all the tasks given to you? YES / NO
(a) Notes:
2. Did you turn off the transparent authentication system (i.e., tapped the button marked “Turn Off
Security”)? YES / NO
(a) Why or why not?
3. Did you use the challenge question feature? YES / NO
(a) Why or why not?
4. Assume for a moment that you were placing each task from the study into a security level that you
think is most appropriate given how you use your mobile device and how sensitive you think each task
is. Use the 3-point Likert scale to assign each task from the study into what level you think it should
be in.
Read Document: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Take Photo: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Send Email: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
View Photo: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Make Local Call: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Change Device PIN: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Make International Call: Low (1) Medium (2) High (3)
Transparent Authentication Perceptions Study (Ethics: CSE01076)
Interview Questions
Subject ID:
5. How many security level choices would you like to have? Is Low/Med/High accurate enough, or should
there be more choices?
6. Use the 5-point Likert scale to indicate how easy or difficult it was to complete each of the tasks (1 is
very easy, 5 is very difficult):
Read Document: 1 2 3 4 5
Take Photo: 1 2 3 4 5
Send Email: 1 2 3 4 5
View Photo: 1 2 3 4 5
Make Local Call: 1 2 3 4 5
Change Device PIN: 1 2 3 4 5
Make International Call: 1 2 3 4 5
7. What did you like about using the transparent authentication system?
8. What did you dislike about using the transparent authentication system?
9. Would you use a transparent authentication method on your own mobile device? YES / NO
(a) Why or why not?
10. Using the 5-point Likert scale, indicate how well protected you thought the data on the device was. 1
is very unprotected, 2 is somewhat unprotected, 3 is neither protected nor unprotected, 4 is somewhat
protected and 5 is very protected.
Transparent Authentication Perceptions Study (Ethics: CSE01076)
Interview Questions
Subject ID:
(a) Why did you select this level?
11. What security mechanism do you currently use on your mobile device?
12. When compared to using your usual security mechanism as the sole security method on a mobile
device, did you feel that using a transparent authentication method was more secure, less secure, or
about the same? Use the Likert scale for this 1 is a lot less secure, 2 is somewhat less secure, 3 is
about the same, 4 is somewhat more secure, and 5 is a lot more secure.
1 2 3 4 5
(a) Why?
13. When compared to using no security method at all on a mobile device, did you feel that using a
transparent authentication method was more secure, less secure, or about the same? Use the Likert
scale for this 1 is a lot less secure, 2 is somewhat less secure, 3 is about the same, 4 is somewhat more
secure, and 5 is a lot more secure.
1 2 3 4 5
(a) Why?
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